NASA Responds To Stick Rumors

NASA Internal Memo From Constellation Program Manager Jeff Hanley

"All, between articles like this one (see below) and the wave of 'better ideas' for architecture that have waded into recent notoriety, I thought it was time to level set folks on where things stand and dispel these rumors and hearsay surrounding the "issue" of the Ares 1 performance and overall implications to the architecture."

Big Problems With The Stick, earlier post

Editor's 14 Nov. note: In closing his memo, Jeff Hanley notes: "We will continue to get these faux expressions of concern from those who wish to see us fail. They will be disappointed."

For the record, Jeff, I do not want to see you fail. I want to see you succeed.

What is really annoying about comments like Hanley's is the simple-minded and intellectually lazy way that NASA people deal with criticism. If you dare to criticize their approach - in any fashion - you are automatically against them. And, if you are outside the agency, then you are automatically unqualified to have an opinion. It never seems to occur to these NASA folks that the people who highlight potential issues may actually be concerned that they will not succeed unless these issues are addressed.

But no, it is so much easier to manufacture enemies - that way you have something external to blame things on when programs run into trouble.

Reader comments (send yours to nasawatch@reston.com):


Maybe I'm just stupid, but I don't understand how the Ares Sick is better than the Shuttle.

  • The Space Shuttle, which works fine, they're getting rid of, but they're keeping the very elements that have killed people. The Ares Stick uses both elements of the STS that have killed 14 people: Solids and a Foamed Tank, Yes? Seven a piece and counting - is Marshal trying to break their own record? Solids and Foam...here we go again. Throw away what works and keep the risky stuff.
  • The vibration caused by the solids today is allegedly rather intense, and this is with them attached to the ET. What happens with the vibration on the Ares Stick? I guess those riding it will find out.
  • Also, without being attached to the ET, won't the Solid used on Ares want to flex a little in flight, like an arrow? What happens to the O Rings then? What happens with and to the rather heavy payload on top? Right now the solids on the STS pull mass, with the Ares Stick they're going to push
  • The 'cost' behind the Shuttle program is the people, not the equipment. Less people working Ares? Really?
  • The Shuttle takes both people and cargo to orbit. Now we're to use two launches with Ares for every one Shuttle launch. This is going to be cheaper how?

The Emperor has no clothes? Anyone?"


Not sure if you've seen "Constellation Battles the Blogosphere" at http://space.com/spacenews/businessmonday_061120.htmlThe last time we were left with a single launch platform was with the Shuttle. Then STS-51L happened, DoD was left in a bad place, and the EELV was eventually born. So now we have very distinct launch groups Shuttle, Delta, and Atlas.

With ULA it isn't clear how distinctly different Delta and Atlas will become 10 years down the road. Without a Shuttle-derived vehicle couldn't we end up with some common problem (the RL-10A engine, an avionics multiplexer, the payload mating adapter, anything) grounding both DoD or NASA. We're going to put our lunar missions on hold because we lost a hypothetical GPS satellite?

So, while EELVs will be better off financially when the flight rate goes up, let us preserve the redundancy and independent systems that are a hallmark of aerospace engineering.

Regarding NASA attitude and culture, please bear in mind this isn't the spaceflight operations branch. This is a design branch, under constant pressure from the EELV side looking for any weakness to exploit.

Isn't it a double standard to allow EELV fans to constantly criticize Ares development and then pounce on Ares management as they counter EELV's remarks? The end of that email, what everybody is all upset about, was just a way to rally the Ares "troops" and improve morale.

Granted, the Ares 1 differs significantly from ESAS, but isn't that the point? This is a more detailed design, and some earlier estimates proved incorrect. Is this iterative process truly a surprise? This is how the engineering process works.

Of course, it will be a whole new ball game if Bigelow/Lockheed human-rate the Atlas V and if SpaceX's Falcon 9 proves successful. Then we could end up with a diverse, capable, independent set of launch systems. Isn't that what everybody should want?


Didn't anybody think to make a Titan 3 clone out of shuttle components, i.e., two off the shelf four segment solids, and a core vehicle using an SSME, ground started? Derate the solids thrust by changing the propellent composition so you don't get a 6g takeoff (cool to watch, though), and the solids won't go high and fast enough to prevent reusing them, and stretch the core vehicle so the SSME would burn a long time, but still get Orion to orbit.


I think if Bigelow/Lockheed manage to 'human-qualify' the Atlas, faster-better-cheaper! than NASA gets its Big Shaft in the air, NASA will suffer a hugely embarassing blow; especially when the damage to NASA's *successful*, REAL exploration, half is also put on the scales.


There is a historical parallel here. As Apollo was winding down in the 70's: NASA abandoned the "expensive" Saturn V in favor of the "cheap, reusable" shuttle. There was a 5 year gap in American manned spaceflight capability. Finally the Shuttle began flying, but it was a huge dissappointment. It was far more expensive than the Saturn V, and was not the safe, routine space transportation system it was supposed to be. Dismantling the Saturn launch system infrastructure was a huge mistake, setting back the American space program by perhaps two decades. We could have had Skylab 5 in operation by now, and arguably already have people walking on Mars, and inhabiting permanent moon bases.

Finally the day has come when the shuttle will soon be retired, and we have the opportunity for a new, more sensible national space transportation system. Even NASA's administrator Mike Griffin now admits the Shuttle was a mistake, a realization that came 30 years too late for my generation. And here is our grand prize for waiting and paying taxes for 30 years... the Stick. My first reaction .. you've GOT to be kidding me !! NASA is doing it again! The nicest thing I can say is "well, at least it's not QUITE as stupid as the shuttle." Taxpayers once again get the Shaft.. this time, literally. Perhaps hindsight is NOT 20-20.

It is well documented that using EELV assets and/or truly shuttle-derived launch vehicles (i.e the DIRECT) would be far less expensive and fly 4 -6 years sooner than the current Ares I & V vehicle designs, and probably more reliable as well. To their credit, NASA did finally get rid of a side-mounted winged orbiter in favor or the good old-fashioned capsule, and eliminated SSMEs... but most of their other design decisions have been inexplicably foolish. Where is the wisdom in gutting space science and aeronautics budgets in favor of developing unnecessary systems that will take far too much time and money? Mike, I had such high hopes, but you disappoint me!


I don't know if NASA's present-day management does not tolerate criticism. As far as JSC goes, none of my friends there have vented that.

To answer a few criticims, let's start with why did NASA do in a few years for Apollo what will take over a decade for VSE? Easy...no bucks, no Buck Rogers. NASA was given a huge increase in appropriations starting in 1961--the Kennedy speech in which the President says, "...set forth the goal of sending a man to the Moon and returning him safely to earth..." is the one in which Kennedy asks for appropriations for NASA that are the beginning of that very large influx of cash. NASA today is not getting a big budget increase, unless 1% or 2% is big to NASA Watch readers. And if you look at the earmarks NASA is suffering from, its budget is only marginally increasing by some very small amount while it pays for planetariums and other non-mission-specific items that members of Congress covet.

The "Stick" is not an EELV. For one, Ares-I will have more LEO28 cargo capacity than any EELV today at 25,000 kg vs. 22,000 kg for the Delta-IV Heavy and 20,000 kg for the Atlas V 551. Also, the EELV's are not man-rated where Ares-I is to be. Since the SRB's are already man-rated, the thought is that it should be cheaper and quicker to go with a modified SRB, a.k.a. Ares-I, than making one of the EELV's mentioned above man-rated. Hey, if anyone has a man-rated launcher with a LEO28 lift capacity of 25,000 kg or more, bring it on. But neither Bigalow nor Branson nor Bezos do.

And why not just skip Ares-I and go for the Saturn-V equivalent, Ares-V? Because the Ares-V development cycle is expected to take awhile and cost money that NASA will not have until (hopefully) the Shuttle is retired. So it's either develop Ares-I and go up in...oh, around 2013 or wait for Ares-V and go up...allot later, with the concurrent gap in non-US manned space access. The other solution is for NASA appropriations to increase by a very hefty amount, but that isn't going to happen under either a Republican or Democratic Congress.

Another reason for building Ares-I is that it fills the role that the Saturn-Ib filled (oh how they forget so soon), as in Apollo 7, the Soyuz-Apollo Rendezvous, and Skylab missions. In other words, using an Ares-V for a simple manned LEO mission is overkill on the grandest level. I heard Griffin here in Austin admit that Ares-V could be tasked much like the Saturn-V's were, that is as a one-stop rocket for the CEV, LEM (or whatever they are terming it these days), and TLI stage. For an ISS replenish mission, all you need is an Ares-I.

I think NASA is viewed by many here as having a thin skin because their management is deathly worried that, as happened a bit with Shuttle but was chronic with ISS, the VSE program will become a debating contest in which billions are blown on ever more paper studies while nothing is built. Remember ISS, that over $4-5 Billion were spent before one piece of flight hardware was built? Sometimes too much study is bad because you get in the cycle of letting the friend of the perfect be the enemy of the good. As we learned when Mueller decided to go with an all-up Saturn test launch program, sometimes you have to just start building and testing to get people properly focused.

And lets face it, some of the feedback to NASA has started with the premise that NASA can't do anything right. Remember two years ago when the alt.space crowd was crowing that NASA should listen to Rutan because at least he'd gotten people in space that year? Yeah, 60 mile cannon shot != space travel. Why do so many here think NASA sucks, that NASA doesn't know what it's doing? Do any of us know better? I know maybe one little thing better than some, not all or even most, NASA engineers at JSC, but do I tell NASA that it's over-all scheme for getting back to the Moon sucks? No. Why? Because I don't know it sucks, because getting there requires allot more expertise than I, and I'll wager most of the NASA Watch readers, have.

I think it's great to debate how our government spends our money. But at a point, continued debate become meaningless and it becomes time to go with a program that has been developed by some bright, experienced, and hard-working folks that may do things we do not agree with but we hope none-the-less that they are overall doing the right thing. Right?

Why not direct this energy at our legislators instead of at NASA? Because, if NASA doesn't get the money it needs, all the planning and debating in the world will not get us off the ground.


How did NASA come to this situation with Ares I? The ESAS recommended the LV-13.1/LV-27 over the other designs competed. LV-13.1 was a 4-segment SRB directly derived from the proven Shuttle SRB with a SSME directly derived from the proven Shuttle main engine and altered for air start. This gave a launch vehicle with flight proven hardware and retained employees as politically mandated. It also gave some commonality with the LV-27 (Ares V).

Then things started to fall apart. It proved impossible to air start the SSME requiring a new second stage engine. NASA chose the J-2X, which had been planned for the Ares V moving up its development timeline (and adding to the early costs). However the J-2X could not produce anywhere near the power of the SSME and this necessitated the transition to the 5-segment SRB also originally planned for the Ares V once again adding to the developmental timeline of the Ares I and adding yet more up front costs.

All this seems perfectly logical, shifting late developmental projects to earlier in the timeline and retaining commonality, until you step back and take in the big picture. Ares I was no longer directly derived from the shuttle program with flight proven hardware, it has become an all-new rocket with all new untested hardware. At this point many who had already questioned the ESAS methods began to come out of the woodwork calling foul.

The Ares program bares little resemblance to the original ESAS recommendation and many believe that if the trades made in the ESAS were made again with the current versions of the LV-13.1/LV-27 it would not stand a chance. Added to this were all the insider leaks that weight trades between the stages and performance of the stages were still not providing sufficient lift to meet the original goals. These leaks were lent credence as NASA released a series of altered specifications on the weight and size of the CEV and decreased the initial insertion orbit, shifting more and more of the burden of orbital injection and circularization to the CEV/SM.

It is no wonder that Mr. Hanley overreacted; he is trying to defend a project that, step by step, has turned into a nightmare. The Ares I is now three years behind schedule and 3 to 5 billion dollars over budget. Of course the entire Ares project is not over budget or behind schedule since most of the costs and development were projected later down the road.

What worries me is that somehow the Ares project managed to pass the first SRR. The changes to the Ares I were not trivial, these were not simply design revisions, they were complete redrafts of the design. Furthermore NASA is not revisiting the original ESAS in light of the design redraft. Even if every one of the rumors of Ares I problems were false the premise that the program was founded on has become questionable.


I have been wondering: if it took less than a decade to get to the moon using pencils and sliderules, why is the timeline to return so seemingly long? NASA has had proposals for shuttle follow-ons for years. Why dump all that work for the Orion program? Is it too late to get back to sketching concepts out on cocktail napkins and handing them over to a roomful of draftsmen with pocket protectors for fleshing out? Granted, I am just a closet spacegeek. But some of these questions seem fairly obvious, and I haven't seen much, if any, discussion of them.


There is a historical parallel here. As Apollo was winding down in the 70's: NASA abandoned the "expensive" Saturn V in favor of the "cheap, reusable" shuttle. There was a 5 year gap in American manned spaceflight capability. Finally the Shuttle began flying, but it was a huge dissappointment. It was far more expensive than the Saturn V, and was not the safe, routine space transportation system it was supposed to be. Dismantling the Saturn launch system infrastructure was a huge mistake, setting back the American space program by perhaps two decades. We could have had Skylab 5 in operation by now, and arguably already have people walking on Mars, and inhabiting permanent moon bases.

Finally the day has come when the shuttle will soon be retired, and we have the opportunity for a new, more sensible national space transportation system. Even NASA's administrator Mike Griffin now admits the Shuttle was a mistake, a realization that came 30 years too late for my generation. And here is our grand prize for waiting and paying taxes for 30 years... the Stick. My first reaction .. you've GOT to be kidding me !! NASA is doing it again! The nicest thing I can say is "well, at least it's not QUITE as stupid as the shuttle." Taxpayers once again get the Shaft.. this time, literally. Perhaps hindsight is NOT 20-20.

It is well documented that using EELV assets and/or truly shuttle-derived launch vehicles (i.e the DIRECT) would be far less expensive and fly 4 -6 years sooner than the current Ares I & V vehicle designs, and probably more reliable as well. To their credit, NASA did finally get rid of a side-mounted winged orbiter in favor or the good old-fashioned capsule, and eliminated SSMEs... but most of their other design decisions have been inexplicably foolish. Where is the wisdom in gutting space science and aeronautics budgets in favor of developing unnecessary systems that will take far too much time and money? Mike, I had such high hopes, but you disappoint me!


A little history might shed some light on NASA's position on the "stick" concept. If memory serves, the concept was championed by Scott Horowitz while he was employed by ATK, before he returned to NASA as the AA for Exploration Systems. There is not much more difficult in the NASA culture than to challenge an idea that is promoted by an astronaut, especially if the idea has dubious technical merit.

Another factor is Dr. Griffin's general response to debate; that is, he does not suffer fools gladly. While I am sure that Dr. Griffin would welcome informed discussion, his point of view seems to be emulated by those who report to him. In the case of Griffin's staff, sadly, anyone who differs with the party line is labled the "fool".


"I agree with thereader response, that "NASAleaders would do well toreviewAnnex A of the Final Report of the Return to FlightTask Group". I have only been at NASA as a contractor for a couple years, but I have seen examples of dissent suppression at all levels.Our programeven publisheda report two years agoevaluating the use ofELVs forhuman missions based on the since canceled OSP program. Although it was not a dissenting opinion, as we were in favor of the VSE andplaying a part, itsdissemination throughout NASAseemedto besuppressed for unknown political reasons. The express train for shuttle-derived options had already left the station by then and with Dr. Griffin taking over as administrator, the 'stick' solution seems to have become the only answer. I find it ironic that Bigelow/LMmay makehuman-rated ELVshappencommercially sooner than any NASA'stick' will fly with astronauts.

Managers should take note of Dr. Rosemary OLeary'sresponse in Annex A of the report as well. She talks about the specific dissent suppression of 'Groupthink'and states, "Groupthink is an insular decision-making process in which decision makers are so wedded to the same assumptions and beliefs, that they ignore, discount, or even ridicule information to the contrary (Janis 1972). Symptoms of groupthink include overestimations of the groups power and morality, closed-mindedness, and pressure toward uniformity."

'Groupthink' seems to be embedded in the NASA culture for good, unless leaders within can make the changes needed to implement the VSE."


A lot of folks here at KSC have given "The Stick" a more appropriate name ... "The Shaft" because that is exactly what NASA is doing to the taxpayers in the continued development of this unaffordable, unsustainable new launch vehicle.


As a taxpayer,I am appalledby the fact that we are developing yet another EELV class rocket, when two are already developed andflying with high dollar payloads (i.e., almost "human-rated").Want to make the most of monies already invested by the taxpayer? Want to save $6-9B and who knows how long to get this dog ready to fly? Kill the Stick and compete the EELV's to do the job. Want assured access? Use both of the existing vehicles.

Hanley's response, and Griffin's solutions in general,are archaic and backed by a trailer full of pride. Pride is going to cost us a lot of money, perhaps cost us the Vision, and in the worst case, put lives once again unneccessarily at risk.

Its time tohelp the emperor pick out some clothes instead of blindly watching the folly unfold. Where's my Congressman whenI really need him?


Keith: I have to whole heartedly agree with your comments about NASA. They have incredibly thin skin. Those of us on the outside are interested in their programs because of their past success and future potential. Those who want NASA to fail aren't usually interested enough to follow the program to offer any meaningful criticism anyway. The decision makers definitely think they are the only ones that can come up with a good idea and are offended by any suggestions from the outside. The automatic rejection of NIH (not invented here) ideas is very disappointing to see.


What hasn't been addressed is why they are building the stick in the first place. The design was meant to be shuttle derived, but the only part that remains the same at the moment is the fuel - and they are even considering changing that. (The vehicle even looks unsafe being so top-heavy). The amount of brand newinfrastructure that needs to be built to support this vehicle negates any benefit from using the design.

Also not addressed is why NASA isn't even considering the blindingly obvious "Direct Launcher" concept given that it is something that would save money, increase capability, use existing infrastructure, be truly shuttle derived,speed up the program and receive a lot of public support. The "Stick" is coming to symbolize everything that is wrong with NASA.

I fear that NASA is wasting money and wasting the opportunity, just as it did back in 1989 when George Bush Senior announced SEI. I just hope we don't waste lives in the process.


The lack of professionalism in Hanley's memo addressing criticism of the Stick design was quite eye-opening. He obviously fails to understand that he works for, and is paid by, the very people he lists as his enemies and detractors. His closed-door, leave-us-alone mentality is indicative of a dangerous closed-mindedness. It is very clear from his defensive and combative attitude that there is an inferiority complex and a subconscious recognition of the absurdity inherent in the current VSE system designs.

If you read between the lines, Griffin essentially admitted that the new exploration architecture was strongly influenced by politics, and that a major goal of the chosen VSE architecture is sustaining certain jobs in certain districts in return for congressional support for VSE funding. The fact that existing EELV assets could be rapidly adapted to manned spaceflight missions is a given, NASA's BS excuses aside. An EELV-based CEV as a shuttle replacement could be flying by 2010 with high reliability, and at a relatively low price tag that over-burdened taxpayers deserve! No 4 year gap is needed.

It makes you wonder if NASA leadership actually cares about the 4-year gap in manned spacecraft capability. I shutter to imagine American crews begging for rides to the ISS on the increasingly expensive Russian Soyuz. Does NASA leadership understand the political ramifications of wounded national pride? Some have suggested that this plan is a nefarious attempt to keep the shuttle flying for another 4 years. It doesn't really matter if it is deliberate malice or simple incompetence, the result is the same. Make no mistake.

Americans want to return-to-the-moon and start on the path to Mars. Americans want the exploration effort to succeed, but the arrogance and foolishness of the current NASA leadership can be very discouraging.


Ah, yes, systems engineering. "We're doing design and analysis cycles, and we've got our schedules of SRRs and PDRs and CDRs set up, so we must know what we're doing.We've even got CAD drawings and PowerPoint charts, so this has to be correct!"

NASA leadership apparently needs to be reminded that "systems" engineeringdoesn't actually produce a tangible product; other engineering disciplines are called upon to build the "systems." And manypracticioners of these other engineering disciplines --including someinside NASA -- are saying that the new vehicle architectures simply do not stack up (so to speak).

It's probably striking to outsiders to see how smarmy NASA leaders are,but from the insideone sees this behavior everywhere and every day.In today's NASA, it's the fast-talking, self-serving, look-at-me-and-how-much-more-loquacious-I-am-than-everyone-else types who float to the top. If you disagree with them, it must be due to some lack of understanding on your part, because they're always the smartest guys in the room.

Many NASA leaders would do well toreviewAnnex A of the Final Report of the Return to FlightTask Group. It's available here:

http://www.returntoflight.org/assets/pdf/final_rtftg_report/9_RTF_TG_Annex_A.pdf

A guy by the name of Dan Crippen -- a rather accomplished bloke -- penned the following comments:

"NASA's leaders and managers must break this cycle of smugness substituting for knowledge."

"The Columbia Accident Investigation Board noted an air of arrogance within NASA that led leaders and managers to be dismissive of the views of others, both within the organization and, especially, from outside the Agency."

"The recurrence of apparently preventable accidents and the seeming unwillingness to learn should be sufficient to instill some humility to temper what often looks like arrogance. During the past two years, we have not witnessed very much of such humility."

Keep looking, Dan, but don't hold your breath.


Bravo! I love your response to Jeff Hanley's e-mail. Your comments to on how simple-minded and intellectually lazy management is with how they handle criticism is right on the mark. Management has been aware for sometime prior to the CLV SRR of the magnitide of some of the problems with the "stick". They have chosen to ignore the problems and somehow hope they can wish them away.


Dear Keith: Thanks again for your running commentary about NASA and its workings. In re: NASA Responds To Stick Rumor what is really bothersome to me is that Mike Griffin and the rest of NASA management has turned completely to a philosophy of not just intolerance, but open hostility, toward virtually any advice that doesn't fit their unilateral positions. Examples include (but aren't limited to): the vehement refusal to consider ANYTHING but the 'Big Stick'; the summary dismissal of scientists on the NAS; the failure to act upon the issue surrounding Dr. Hansen until it became a real PR problem.


I'm convinced this philosophy comes from above, which seriously disappoints me in Dr. Griffin; he SHOULD be the line of defense against current politicization, but now seems to be more like its instrument. Dr. Louis Friedman (of Planetary Society) wrote an editorial about this in the latest APSNews (American Physical Society).


If NASA wants to dispel rumors about the stick, it should publish the data on weights, trajectories, performance etc. To have the design debated in the open would be helpful, and might help make the vehicle safer or result in cancellation before spending too much on it. The people that I talk to at AIAA conferences think that it won't work. It kind of made sense when it was a four segment booster, with a long history of success and 1 failure. When they switched to a five segment booster the requirements for engineering and qualification testing increased substantially. Would it have traded as well at the outset as a five segment design? Now that the Democrats have control of the budget, perhaps it is time to eliminate the red state program content requirements for the VSE and redo the trades.

Note that a standard Republican truism is that big government can't do anything right. They have proved it in Iraq and New Orleans, will they prove it in Huntsville next?


I read Hanley's note, I gotta tell ya: Having worked in Big Program Offices before, I don't think I've ever seen such a thin skin, 'us vs. them' attitude demonstrated in the manager of a major program. I am truly concerned about the leadership of that program now.

If I were doing my 'due diligence' on a company before buying its stock, and saw the CEO make that kind of comment....I'd probably shy away from buying it, on the grounds that the company wasn't under adult supervision.


Of course he still doesn't answer the real question - why the hell are they designing that thing? The other article - the LMCO/Bigelow one - is much more significant. It may end up like the NASA/Air Force cargo split, where NASA keeps using the expensive system and makes a complete fool of themselves every time they launch. Having more than one customer will be good.


Mr. Cowing, I'd like to submit a reader comment in response to this, "What is really annoying about comments like Hanley's is the simple-minded and intellectually lazy way that NASA people deal with criticism. If you dare to criticize their approach - in any fashion - you are automatically against them. And, if you are outside the agency, then you are automatically unqualified to have an opinion. It never seems to occur to these NASA folks that the people who highlight potential issues may actually be concerned that they will not succeed unless these issues are addressed."

My anonymous comment is that here you have summed up the mind set of the current (passing) administration. Remember that our Commander-in-Chief said, "If you're not with us, you're against us," in response to criticism from other countries, namely those which were still but may not be any longer our allies. That is the childish understanding we have to mature beyond as a country and as a space program.

Thanks!
Anonymous
Orion Systems Integration


"It might be worth pointing out that this kind of attitude killed the Apollo 1 crew, caused the destruction of Challenger and the loss of the crew, and caused the destruction of Columbia and loss of her crew. None of those accidents would have occurred had people listened to the machinery and listened to those people who were being critical of the decision making process."


"The NASA culture criticized first by the Challenger investigation and then by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board has never changed one iota. Virtually everyday some tells me to "keep my head down" or "don't rock the boat." Question anything and you risk "going out the gate." Needless to day, I question and I'll be going out the gate in a few weeks."

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This page contains a single entry by Keith Cowing published on November 21, 2006 10:40 PM.

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