NASA is Adrift
Logsdon and Pace Criticize Lack of White House Leadership on NASA, Say Agency is Adrift, SpacePolicyOnline
“George Washington University (GWU) space policy experts John Logsdon and Scott Pace agree NASA is adrift today, particularly with regard to the human spaceflight program, and blame the White House for a lack of leadership. … Both believe NASA is adrift today and criticized the Obama Administration for its lack of leadership. Logsdon stressed that when he talks about a lack of leadership he is referring more to the White House than to NASA itself.”
It’s not the lack of leadership, it’s too much leadership, from people who have nothing to do with later responsibility, if one can call that leadership ..
People crying over the lack of leadership seem have that complaint because their agendas are denied.
There is a very clearly defined path for NASA, but unfortunately that might need a bit more greasing to stop squeaking ..
I am not sure why Logsdon or Pace think that the White House is at fault and not NASA?
I have not seen a clearly laid out plan from NASA. This goes back ten years, since the aftermath of the Columbia accident. For a year or two NASA seemed to be developing such a plan and then came Griffin and Apollo on steroids, which made absolutely no sense. At the same time NASA’s plan was to shut down and lay-off the Shuttle workforce before they had a plan to replace them. That compounded the foolishness. They did not have to fly any more Shuttle missions than were ultimately flown, but they could have spaced them out; they could have come up with a plan to use the workforce and the production facilities. Instead the mismanagement shut down the facilities and laid off the workforce before SLS came along and they decided they would now need to start things back up. And the poor design decisions, exorbitant cost and extended schedule for Orion-there really has not been a need for Orion since commercial crew got started in 2005, but there is no excuse for the Orion/MPCV design and management mistakes.
Logsdon, with his credentials, certainly knows that it was NASA that defined the Apollo plan. Surely they need the buy-off from JFK, LBJ and Congress, but make no mistake it was a NASA plan. Logsdon is also well aware that NASA laid out the plan for the Shuttle and STS beginning in 1968. Once again they needed the buyoff from Nixon and Congress, but the plan and the design were all NASA’s. And NASA laid out the plan and design for ISS, beginning in 1980 and culminating in Reagan’s 1984 decision and Congress’ support. They needed the support but the plan was NASA’s.
Now and for the last ten years NASA cannot seem to put together a sensible or manageable plan but for some reason they blame the White House? Part and parcel of the plan is getting it before the President and Congress. Its a non-sequitor to blame the politicians because the technical plan has not been developed!
You seem to be under the mistaken impression that NASA formulates space policy. As a senior member within NASA, I can assure you that NASA’s role is execution of space policy as established by the Executive (essentially OMB and OSTP for the President). Not ‘independent formulation’ of space policy. Within the constraints placed by the Legislative Branch.
NASA is occasionally asked for its opinion, but it is a minority opinion.
Much of the hand-wringing by many about ‘what is wrong with NASA’ do not understand or appreciate this very-fundamental construct within which NASA operates.
NASA implements this policy. So far Mr. Bolden has bungled much of it and when things get bungled it is harder to get additional support from the WH and Congress. So NASA is not exactly faultless with regard to its current state of drift.
Agree. It used to be that the ranks of leadership in NASA were populated by the best-and-brightest from within the organization. Bottom to top.
I think it is important for people to understand that NASA is essentially an executing-organization. As opposed to a formulation-organization. It has no seat at the table (Cabinet). Its function is to salute and use its expertise to implement that which it is directed to do.
It’s also important for people to understand that NASA can kill any initiative by slow-rolling it, like they did to both SEI and the VSE. You guys are not as Simon-pure in policy as you pretend to be.
That’s interesting never heard of that before
I doubt someone in the Clinton White House directed NASA to build an X-33 launch facility years before a possible launch. I also doubt that the White House chose the all up approach of having unproven fuel tank tech fly with relatively new tile and engine tech. Talk about Scope Creep!
If NASA and its contractors say to decision makers they can each project manage properly at X cost, Y milestones and Z deliverables, then yes, it Is the responsibility of NASA to fix its project management process(es) and the processes of its contractors.
I can’t speak to the Constellation or Freedom/ISS Alpha overruns, but I would suggest there were similar project management issues there as well.
NASA should make a better case for the money it needs- then deliver. Success will engender trust and more money- and the willingness for the WH to take a risk on supporting/asking Congress to fund a mission of any significance.
While NASA could use fewer administrators, I think you are painting with a broad brush here.
The history of the Shuttle is a case in point. NASA asked industry to propose configurations for the STS, and received many unique proposals in the first couple of rounds. Many of these configurations would have been much safer, and cost less to operate than the eventual Shuttle. Most were nothing like what we wound up with, and some, like the configuration proposed by Chrysler Corp., were startlingly innovative.
But, at bottom, we got what we did because Congress did not want to pay up front for a system that would cost much less to operate down the road. And in the end, beyond safety issues, operating cost proved to be the Shuttle’s Achilles’ Heel.
If you want to see what NASA and industry suggested as opposed to what Congress allowed us to have, I recommend this book, probably one of the most thorough treatments of the Shuttle’s history available to the public.
http://www.amazon.com/Space…
The history of NASA in the early 60s with Mercury, Gemini Apollo and Skylab – NASA was responsible for the plan and the design. In the early 70s, NASA was responsible for the plan and the design of Shuttle. In the early 80s for the Space Station, which became the ISS, NASA was responsible for the plan and the design.
In all of these cases, NASA formulated what it wanted to do, came up with a plan for how to make it work, and sold it to each President and the Congress.
Now, apprently something has changed? Now you say that NASA really has no technical expertise to be able to formulate a plan or a design? NASA is simply the system operator? The expertise for space is in the White House or OMB or OSTP ? Yours is a convenient excuse.
You may be right, that the people who hold the reins at NASA Headquarters are incapable of coming up with a plan or a design-after all the leading people in NASA human spaceflight all came out of crew operations and mission operations and themselves have never come up with plans or designs for anything. That is owing to a misguided NASA over the last quarter century. The lead people in NASA never had to be strategists or politicians before. However that does not excuse them from bringing in the right people to do the job.
“The history of NASA in the early 60s with Mercury, Gemini Apollo and Skylab – NASA was responsible for the plan and the design.”
That is correct. But NASA did not establish the policy that the US shall go to the Moon. NASA was responsible for its implementation once this decision was made.
” Now you say that NASA really has no technical expertise to be able to formulate a plan or a design?”
That was not stated.
“NASA is simply the system operator? The expertise for space is in the White House or OMB or OSTP ?”
I have personally participated in meetings where OMB personnel have pre-established and defined what technologies NASA shall invest in. Read for example the Policy Directive dated August 4, 2009 under White House letterhead, co-written by Peter Orszag/OMB and John Holdren/OSTP entitled “Science and Technology Priorities for the FY2011 Budget” sent out to all Executive Departments and Agencies. If your agency is not aligned with these Executive priorities then your budget is impacted, negatively. Hence the continued diminution of NASA’s budget, and its relevancy to the Nation.
Resources are applied, as an example, based on decisions to enhance US economic competitiveness (i.e., you know – get more economic bang for the taxpayers buck) – these decisions being made outside of the space agency. It is incredible naivete to believe all decisions are made based on ‘selecting which rock to look at in our solar system.’ And so it should be.
“The lead people in NASA never had to be strategists or politicians before.”
You clearly are uninformed relative to NASA’s history. Arguably the most effective NASA Administrator was James Webb – an extraordinary politically astute operator. Read his biography.
“The lead people in NASA never had to be strategists or politicians before.”
I was being facetious. Your statement is exactly what I was saying. In every prior generation NASA’s leadership decided the way forward and sold it to the President, the President’s Advisors and the Congress. You are telling us all that NASA no longer has that ability. The management is sitting passively while others are deciding the future of spaceflight (or non-future).
In almost every case you mention, Congress went against NASA’s recommendations and favored cheaper systems, in some cases, quite dangerous ones, e.g., the STS. Congress continued to penny pinch for the next three decades, eliminating many improvements and safety upgrades to STS, and killing other high-potential programs outright.
The executive branch proposes, but Congress disposes. Looking back, Obama’s originally proposed space program was fairly sound with its emphasis on long-term research and “commercial” launchers; almost none of it remains, instead we have SLS, Orion, and JWST, all mandated by Congress at mind-boggling cost to the taxpayer.
Absolutely agree –
The Executive Branch directs NASA to facilitate the establishment of a robust commercial launch industry – so that NASA can ultimately buy these services and concentrate on deep space exploration.
At the same time the Legislative Branch, via controlling the purse strings, re-vectors the Agency into a government-led heavy lift launcher development.
Hence we spin around in circles.
I think you need to read some accurate history books and perhaps talk to some of the principals left alive. NASA recommended the Shuttle design that was built. After they looked at it there was zero interest by the NASA managers in having a fly-back booster or liquid fueled boosters for several reasons: complexity in getting all of the engines to fire at once, competition between JSC and MSFC for astronauts, costs, etc. ISS is built out of the elements that were designed for the station by NASA and its partners in the 80s. MASA has done less and less with a farily stable budget-almost precisely the budget that Nixon decided would be reasonable in the early 70s.
I wonder if some of these interesting comments aren’t at cross purposes. I think perhaps we need to more clearly delineate between the original proposed plans (before program start) and the implementation details (after program start). What I recall is that, typically, NASA produced the former — sometimes in respose to government request, sometimes not — but various government entities significantly affected the latter.
Consider, ISS was originally Space Station Freedom, which became Alpha, which became ISS, and there was a lot more to this morphing than just a name change. Both the station’s capabilities and its purpose were modified several times, and most of these changes were driven directly by a succession of Presidents and their staffs, after which the implementation details fell to NASA. Reagan made personal presentations to allied leaders for SSF. Clinton brought in the Russians. Bush II made major reductions to the scope. In each case, the motivations were political agendas and cost. That was the station development, but other programs didn’t follow a similar path; each one was unique in its history, so I don’t think we can generalize.
Instead of trying to fit all programs into a generalized pattern, I think that for each one separately we have to look at:
1) Who proposed it?
2) Who did the original scoping and requirements determination?
3) Who converted those requirements into a design concept?
4) Who turned the concept into a detailed design and implementation plan?
5) Who interjected changes and oversight / review after program start, and for what reason(s)?
6) Who altered budgets resulting in scope and capability changes?
7) Who altered program parameters after program start for non-technical reasons?
etc…
And we need to make sure that we’re not confusing who did a certain step with who we think should have done it.
These are just some of the higher-level factors whereby various entities formed, affected or modified the various programs. What you’ll find if you answer these questions for each program is that:
1) No one entity is the answer to all the questions for any program; and
2) You won’t get the same list of answers for every program — in fact, I don’t think any two programs will have the same list.
Even if nothing else is considered, both the political and economic environments were different at the outset of each of the major NASA programs. These significantly affected the requirements, the budgets, and the participants of each program.
I think we’re better off sticking to discussing one program at a time instead of trying to generalize, even when we’re discussing aspects that are supposedly controlled by legislation. Just my opinion.
Having been present and integrally involved for much of the beginning of Station, as well as the entry of the Russians, I can tell you that NASA management, NASA centers with the support of NASA contractors mounted the campaign to build a space station. The design of the modules, nodes, Japanese and European modules, Canadian remote manipulator, the truss and essentially all of the mounted equipment came out of the NASA led design effort. The scope was never reduced. Instead NASA made mistakes in some of the planning and costs skyrocketed.
Anyone who thinks that someone else came up with the idea of landing on the moon and that NASA simply implemented it, is flat out wrong. Apollo as a trans-lunar program and eventually as a landing program had been in work since NASA was formed in 1958. A lunar landing was envisioned sometime in the mid-1970s. After the Bay of Pigs when Kennedy was looking for a political means to refocus people’s attention, he asked Johnson, who asked NASA for options. The most difficult option was the moon landing. The simpler options everyone thought there was a good possibility that Soviets could be first. Shuttle was pushed by the NASA associate administrator for space. By 1970 a double delta wing Orbiter configuration was chosen. Solid rocket boosters were an easy implementation since they were simply scaled up from the Titan III. Sure there were lots of other options considered. Shuttle was the last big NASA program to come in essentially on time and under budget. The NASA managers of the time knew full well that without Shuttle they had no way to put people in space. There were lots of other concepts for follow on capabilities to Shuttle but Shuttle operational costs needlessly got out of hand. So, while the theory that NASA got things going only to have others curtail or change them is not correct. The strategic decision was made in 1971 by Richard Nixon. NASA was told in 1971 its budget would be about 1/2 of 1%. The alternative at that time was to terminate the human space flight program. The budget has remained relatively stable for 40 years. NASA and especially its contractors keep thinking that if they come up with a BIG idea, like Constellation, then surely they’ll be given a lot more money. But the budget remained at 1/2 of 1%. The same thing is happening now with SLS and Orion. Besides the poor management and design decisions, there is no reason why an Orion capsule which is not much more than a replica of an Apollo command module (remember the US is not even designing or building the Service Module), ther eis absolutely no reason why it should be costing the time and dollars that it is. Boeing’s CST and Space-X’s Dragon are proving how it could be done. NASA politicians from JSC and MSFC together with their contractors are trying to demonstrate how big and costly it might be in the hopes of being given more money (and remember more time = more money). But the budget is not going up. All this wishful thinking about a different more expensive Shuttle is nice but it was always unrealistic. All this talk of lunar and Mars landers to go with the Orion capsule, more wishful thinking. Thoughts of a new Apollo (called Constellation)-it was never going to happen. NASA, Dr. Griffin, and NASA’s contractors all wanted 4% of the US budget. People in hell want ice water…The budget is still 1/2 of 1%, just like it was 40 years ago. The political decision made after Apollo was that for a high tech R&D effort that had no immediate payback for a lot of its activity NASA and its contractors would get 1/2 of 1%. That was a fair amount to invest. NASA and its contractors are doing less and less with what has been a pretty constant budget; they are not getting any more money and in my view, and I am a long time NASA supporter, NASA and its contractors shouldn’t get any more as long as their management is so bad. In fact the money has just begun to go down a bit in the last couple of years. If NASA were demonstrating excellence and achievement, the budget might have continued where it was. But the management is lousy and the results are exactly what we are seeing. Why do I say the management is lousy? They have no logical plan. They are delivering very little for the money they are getting. Change needs to start with the NASA leadership.
If you read through the original Rockwell documents for the Shuttle design you can see a lot of differences between the original bird and what we ended up with, but most of them are relatively minor. However, my reading of the “history books” is that there were a lot of people involved in the various changes to the Shuttle between the original concept and start of manufacturing. Some of them did more harm than good. For example, DOD, primarily through USAF, wanted to see certain changes in order to accommodate some of their specific requirements (which tended towards larger and more expensive), but then after getting what they were after decided to withdraw from active participation in the program. In its early stages, the Shuttle went through a period of trying to be all things to all people, which never works out. What troubles me is that probably nothing was learned from this. If they were starting over today, with all of the history known, I suspect it would go down a very similar path again.
Seriously, you think Congress proposed SLS/Orion/JWST?
Even SLS, the senior oversight committee members often can’t even remember the name. They call it “the big rocket”. People who say “they big rocket” are not creating programs.
JFK decided he wanted a symbolic space race to divert the conflict with the USSR away from the nuclear arms race. But he asked von Braun to choose the goal and the strategy. Similarly, if someone other than Mike Griffin came up with Constellation, I would like to know who. NASA like all technical agencies gets to make detailed recommendations to the administration and with no one in the senior NASA management even willing to discuss the obviously unrealistic SLS/Orion/Constellation budget there is no way these recommendations can be appropriate. If NASA is under pressure it is from Frank Wolf and a a handful of senators, not the White House.
If the senor NASA management had the rocks to launch a public campaign against SLS and Orion who could fire them!!!!
I tried to joke here once about getting your check on Friday. Seems to me that NASA has largely become just a jobs program for the rich which the white house supports. And NASA folks that get the money support along with their old club of contractors.
I repeat
If senor NASA management had the rocks to launch a public campaign against wasteful/ unaffordable SLS and Orion who could/would fire them?????
Fixed that for you.
Thanks Paul! It seems so hopeless!! The system Does not work it has to change!
Remember the first inaugural parade; the NASA display came dead last, after the show was over. You’re adrift when you don’t care. They don’t care. oh yeah people, were going to Mars, the asteroids, with heavy lift, that will be developed in 15 years, sometime later, maybe, but it will be dynamic, and bold, and fresh. The Moon, oh, been there done that. Ugh.
NASA doesn’t need “leadership” from Washington. If Washington would give them a goal: “Go back to the moon” – and then GTFO of the way, NASA could probably still do it. The problem is that the whole agency is overlaid with a thick paralyzing blanket of bureaucracy. Burn that off, and the machinery probably still works.
So many here post stating that NASA is the one that should lead and not to wait on the WH. The fact is that the WH is the one that leads and NASA follows. Just look at the rollout of the Constellation cancellation and its replacement. The AAs from ESMD and HEOMD were notified the Friday before the Monday when the 2010 Budget was rolled out. And because the WH leads and their is currently no leadership coming from their you get a chaotic result as we have at NASA today, a NASA adrift.