OIG Thinks NASA Has Too Much On Its Plate
NASA Inspector General Testimony on NASA FY 2014 Budget Request
“While acknowledging these and other achievements, we believe that NASA will continue to be challenged to effectively manage its varied programs in the current budget and political environment. We agree with the observation made by the National Research Council in its 2012 report examining NASA’s strategic direction and management that, in effect, too many programs are chasing too few dollars at NASA. Accordingly, we continue to view declining budgets and fiscal uncertainties as the most significant external challenges to NASA’s ability to successfully move forward on its many projects and programs.”
– NASA’s Top Management and Performance Challenges 2013
Keith’s note: NASA OIG dumps on NASA for IT issues but they can’t even post documents such that their text can be copied and pasted.
The hilarity of this is that a person that can balance a checkbook could figure this out.
Or, looked at another way: NASA doesn’t have enough plate.
Without SLS/Orion the plate would at least have more room.
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The IG ought to look into how different procurements are run. Commercial cargo and crew, for instance, in comparison with something like Orion or SLS. Let them figure out how/why one procurement takes millions of dollars and the other takes billions. Is this a lesson learned.
The IG, like Bolden a week or 2 ago, seems to be saying that NASA needs a lot more money. Do they still need a lot more money if NASA moves to a different procurement model? Just how applicable would it be?
It would have been nice if the OIG would have expanded on the first two bullets of concern on their list. From the report –
–>Considering Whether to Further Extend the Life of the International Space Station (ISS)
–>Developing the Space Launch System and its Component Programs
The SLS starts at some metric tons of payload capability (around 60), in it’s interim cryogenic stage configuration, which is to say purchasing Centaur stages that are small given the SLS (but at least available). The program has to wait on the ISS to be de-orbited (or otherwise off the NASA books) to get more money for everything after this initial configuration.
That is, SLS needs more money for everything from the final
configuration of core stage engines (after the old SSME’s run out), to advanced liquid rocket boosters (essentially whole new rocket developments, considering the scale), to large upper stages (of an Earth Departure Stage scale). Oh, and the engine for that EDS. Oh, and money for anything to go atop the SLS, with Orion, on actual exploration missions, like a Lunar Lander, a Habitat, etc. The math trying to add this all up, even after an ISS de-orbit, will look atrocious on a business as usual model, just given the time alone to accomplish all those new steps.
A romp here or there, and Mars whenever, one day, maybe? That’s not a plan. That’s just denial. That’s avoiding doing math. So yes, the procurement model has to change. I could not agree more.
The title of this report should have been “duh” (sorry my 80s upbringing coming out 🙂
What do they recommend NASA cancels?
I also assume that it is something useful rather than overhead.
“NASA OIG dumps on NASA for IT issues but they can’t even post documents such that their text can be copied and pasted.”
Feature, not bug. Increasing trend.
Somewhere, a long time ago, Eli wrote that administrations manage NASA by piling on new programs. If NASA is doing something that the administration of the day does not care for instead of killing that program (bad publicity), they think of a new sexy program whose start up funding dries up the money for the other.
What the OIG said is the result of 40 years of this