Sierra Nevada's CCtCap Scorched Earth Policy – Fizzles
Sierra Nevada Files Suit To Reinstate Hold on Commercial Crew Contracts
“In filings with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in Washington, Sierra Nevada filed requests for both a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to overturn a NASA decision Oct. 9 lifting an order stopping work on Commercial Crew Transportation Capability (CCtCap) contracts awarded Sept. 16 to Boeing and Space Exploration Technologies Corp.”
– Why Sierra Nevada Did Not Win Any Commercial Crew Funds, earlier post
– NASA Tells Boeing and SpaceX to Proceed Despite SNC Protest, earlier post
– Sierra Nevada Protests Commercial Crew Award, earlier post
Court says space taxi work can go on as Sierra Nevada disputes contract, Denver Post
“Boeing and SpaceX will not be forced to stop work again on NASA’s commercial crewed spacecraft program. Federal Judge Marian Blank Horn on Tuesday denied Sierra Nevada Corp.’s Louisville-based Space Systems’ request for a federal injunction to force NASA to order the work stopped while the awarded contracts are under protest. If granted, the work stoppage would have been the second in two months.”
I think calling it “Scorched Earth” is a little harsh. Given the contract magnitude, it is not unreasonable for a losing bidder to contest the award. It happens all the time in government contracting. SNC call for an injunction also makes sense. Continued work by the winning bidders could create a real or perceived advantage when the GAO reviews the protest. According to the source selection memos that are going around SNCs major weakness was in the area of concept maturity and schedule credibility. Allowing Boeing and SpaceX to start work gives them an opportunity to further increase this difference. NASA could then tell the GAO “look SNC is actually even
further behind than when we made the decision”.
Furthermore, NASA’s decision to allow work to continue because of its criticality is disingenuous. I believe the GAO needs to rule on the matter within a period of 90 days. Given how long NASA has delayed commercial crew and the likely delays Boeing and SpaceX will both experience (taking history as a guide), delaying the start of the work by an additional 3 months will not make a significant difference in the operations of the ISS.
It’s not unreasonable to contest the award, but I believe he’s calling it “scorched Earth” because forcing Boeing and SpaceX to stop work for several months could cause the commercial crew program to miss NASA’s 2017 deadline for delivering crew to the ISS, which was (if I understand everything correctly) the primary reason why Sierra Nevada was not selected for CCtCAP (i.e. it would have been unable to deliver crew to the ISS by 2017).
In other words, SNC is saying that “if we go down, we’re bringing everyone else down with us,” which could reasonably be considered a “scorched Earth” campaign.
Wouldn’t it also put NASA in a position to once more have to sign a contract for passenger transportation services from Russia when they are in a monopoly?
We absolutely need to move away from dependance on the Russians. SNC should get some funding but this court process is not in the Space interests of the US. SNC and Boeing need to think very carefully on this.
That’s not what SNC is doing. What they are doing is to light a fire under the process to get it resolved with focused expediency.
Who at SNC told you that? What makes so sure that this process will be expedited and won’t get dragged out like so many protests of government contract awards in the past?
It’s my opinion.
How has NASA delayed commercial crew? It is congress calling the shots on funding and funding has been driving their schedules.
A 100 day halt work until GAO reports back is a 100 day delay to the entire Commercial Crew program.
I would have liked to have seen SNC get the crew contract but given where they are in development and testing I think it was reasonable to not select them. Remember that they and SpaceX still have outstanding milestones from the CCiCap contracts.
Everyone touts the “successful” Approach and Landing test of Dream Chaser. Well the approach may have certainly been successful but the crash landing certainly wasn’t. It was so bad they never released video of it. It was so bad they didn’t do a repair on the ship and try again.
Meanwhile, SpaceX Dragon has been to the ISS 5 times. Which leads to another point. SpaceX has a track record of success but Boeing has PowerPoint and endless documentation and use this to justify their higher bid. And NASA values the latter more than the former. That is what is wrong with NASA today.
The landing was flawless. The rollout was not. SNC has been in the process of repairing the vehicle, and was planning to fly it again this fall. It wasn’t the 6M Dollar Man intro landing that everyone seems to think it was. It would be nice if SNC would finally put this myth to bed with a release of the full video.
The crash didn’t look as bad as you might think, and the vehicle is already repaired and will be flown again later, from what I’ve been told by a *very* reliable source. Desires of rubberneckers notwithstanding, no purpose is served by releasing the video.
Then why not release the video? SpaceX releases videos of its accidents.
KC, have you ever made that enquiry? If so, did it very recently?
Maybe shoot for an exclusive? … as for have far they have come … would like to see it.
Hiding your failures seems too much like the old Soviet space program. We should have the right to see what happened to something we all paid for if it’s not a matter of national security.
I wonder if SpaceX had a problem with its water landing on the last flight. Typically they release whatever they have, either on-board or chase plane videos.
They did release with NASA awesome thermal video of the re-entry burns, but what about the splashdown? Was there a problem? Did the lack of landing legs result in excess spin?
http://www.youtube.com/watc…
That is awesome! I’ve been kind of wanting to see something like that but didn’t know if it was done or would come out.
That seems to equate touting the success of the first Dream Chaser test flight with touting the success of the Titanic (“a very successful crossing with the exception of the iceberg incident towards the end”)
In contrast the very first test flight of Dream Chaser was a resounding success from beginning to end, and yes to the end because it touched down smoothly on the centerline at which point the flight test effectively ended. The flight successfully completed what was the remaining CCDev2 milestone for Sierra Nevada. The purpose of the flight was to test the aerodynamics, flight control and glide-slope capability of Dream Chaser as well as gather data, all of which it did.
The only failure was when the left main landing gear, which by the way was a stand in for the actual gear design that will be used, failed to deploy. Without a pilot to correct for it, and with an early software version which was apparently not programmed for such an anomaly, the vehicle skidded off the runway. What if the gear had collapsed while they were towing it back to the hanger? Wouldn’t have been any different in terms of relevance to the test flight it just wouldn’t have made the news.
As for not repairing it, that’s not all that surprising since the first model was only supposed to make two flights. The next set of drop tests will be conducted using the second model which will have upgraded avionics, control systems and software.
Steve and PF,
The test was “Approach and Landing” NOT “Approach and Crash Landing” test. What do you think would would have been said if Enterprise would have had a landing gear failure during its approach and landing tests? The approach may have been successful which I acknowledged but the landing wasn’t. I stand by my assessment.
I finally found an explanation from SNC about what caused the landing gear deployment problem. According to Mark Sirangelo in an interview with Popular Mechanics in March of this year he stated that the problem was with the hydraulic fluid that was pumped into the vehicle which had some contamination of small pieces of metal, which caused the left main gear to deploy too slowly.
In the interview he also stated “One of the compromises in building a vehicle that wasn’t going to go to orbit was that we said, we’re not going to waste the time to design a full-on landing-gear system right now. That’s being designed for the orbital vehicle. For the purpose of what we need, we can borrow an aircraft landing gear, which is what we did”.
Did that mean they didn’t care if the vehicle landed and rolled out safely? Of course not. They selected a proven F-5 landing gear. And during the towing tests they tested the braking and steering. And during captive-carry they tested deployment of the landing gear. The weak link in the chain turned out to be contaminated hydraulic fluid, which I assume was a lesson learned in terms of their processing.
Comparison with Enterprise in my opinion is not all that valid because at the time of the 1977 flight tests Enterprise was considered an actual orbiter, not just a test article. It was expected that after the aerodynamic tests Enterprise would go back to Palmdale to be outfitted with engines and TPS, and be the second Shuttle to fly in space after Columbia. Also Enterprise was testing the actual Shuttle landing gear design. Another difference, no taxpayer dollars were lost when Dream Chaser skidded off the runway, which would not have been the case with Enterprise. So to answer your question it would have been a much bigger deal if Enterprise was damaged in a landing incident.
I stand corrected about the name of the Dream Chaser test which was ALT (approach-and-landing test). I think our difference of opinion is about what constitutes a successful test. The purpose of a test is to gather data. After the crash of F9R-Dev it was revealed that Elon Musk had previously lamented to his staff that they hadn’t yet crashed a test vehicle. In fact prior to the F9R-Dev crash Gwynne Shotwell had publicly stated “In some ways we’ve kind of failed on the Grasshopper program because we haven’t pushed it to its limit”.
So it’s still hard for me to see how skidding off the runway made the first Dream Chaser test flight less successful. That being said, am I happy about their attempt to block Boeing and SpaceX from proceeding? No.
Cargo Dragon and crew Dragon V2 share only one thing, the name. The crewed version is a completely new vehicle as much as CST-100 is to Apollo
You should not make illogical statements. If they share the materials they are constructed of, then you are wrong, if they share a nut or bolt, then you are wrong. They do share a lot of things.
Cargo Dragon and crew Dragon V2 share only one thing, the name. The crewed version is a completely new vehicle as much as CST-100 is to Apollo
That is totally untrue.
The Dragon V2.x is an upgrade ov V1.x.
The heart and soul of the craft – the airframe and structure are the same. The external disposable trunk section is new, but most of the difference is additions to the cargo Dragon.
http://outer-space.org/wp-c…
Please justify your comment.
Different heat shield, different avionics, different ECLSS, different OML meaning different aerodynamics for both ascent and entry, addition of Super Draco Engines means completely different plumbing, docking instead of berthing, Ascent abort capability requires different GN&C. And note since the plumbing is different, then the airframe would had to have changed too.
Modified heatshield. The superdracos are housed externally. Yes there are modifications. The Dragon V2.0 is a lineal upgrade.
As I said: The heart and soul of the craft – the airframe and structure are the same. The external disposable trunk section is new, but most of the difference is additions to the cargo Dragon.
If you look at the sequential crafts as they move down the production lines, you will see the virtual identity of the structures under the shroud.
As you stated “The crewed version is a completely new vehicle as much as CST-100 is to Apollo”
Really??
Except for a rough similarity in shape of the command module, they are totally different craft separated by more than 50 years.
Do you really stand by your statement that Dragon V1 to V2.x differs to that magnitude? Really??
Which are Dragon V1’s and which are Dragon V2.0s?:
(Click to expand image)
http://www.spacex.com/sites…
These are simple pressure vessels none are spacecraft. They are akin to a chassis on a car, that’s all. Without the miles of avionics, engine plumbing, ECLS systems, heat shields (both main and backshell), Ascent Abort capabilities, Parachutes, GN&C systems, batteries, trajectory design, aerodynamics, aeroheating, RCS jet location, plume interactions, etc. you have no craft. All these things have changed on the V2.x and as such have to be re-certified for flight. There is nothing from the cargo certification that will be taken at face value, or even done as a delta-cert for the V2.x.
Take a look at the CST-100, Orion, and Apollo pressure vessels; they are all very similar, yet each is a totally different spacecraft.
The CST-100 and Apollo pressure shells are of totally different structural design and materials.
The Dragon 1 and 2 are identical off the same production line.
Lets see:
Cargo Dragon and crew Dragon V2 share only one thing, the name. The crewed version is a completely new vehicle as much as CST-100 is to Apollo
So, you’re wrong right off the bat.
Hmmm. lets see:
You: “parachutes … All these things have changed on the V2.x”
Musk: “Dragon V2 still retains the parachutes of Dragon V1″
repeat: Cargo Dragon and crew Dragon V2 share only one thing, the name. The crewed version is a completely new vehicle as much as CST-100 is to Apollo
SpaceX: “Currently Dragon carries cargo to space, but it was designed from the beginning to carry humans. Under an agreement with NASA, SpaceX is now developing the refinements that will enable Dragon to fly crew.”
“To ensure a rapid transition from cargo to crew capability, the cargo and crew configurations of Dragon are almost identical. This commonality simplifies the human rating process, allowing systems critical to crew and space station safety to be fully tested on unmanned cargo flights.”
Guess you’re wrong again.
Lets see.. Hey! the (identical) dracos are RE-POSITIONED a few inches on the new shroud! Wow! That certainly clinches your argument: Cargo Dragon and crew Dragon V2 share only one thing, the name. The crewed version is a completely new vehicle as much as CST-100 is to Apollo
Yeah, the Dragons 1 and 2 both using triple redundant computers running C++ on Linux and retaining the zillions of lines of code used for spacecraft management, guidance, navigation, propulsion, rendezvous, reentry, etc, but enhanced for crew life-support, docking, propulsive landind. etc., are certainly as mutually different as the computers on the CST-100 in 2015 and the Apollo of 1965 with its computer less powerful than a coffee machine. Certainly demonstrates the correctness of: Cargo Dragon and crew Dragon V2 share only one thing, the name. The crewed version is a completely new vehicle as much as CST-100 is to Apollo!
Oh yeah, Dragons 1 and 2 both using the DragonEye Lidar/Thermal system is obviously makes them; Cargo Dragon and crew Dragon V2 share only one thing, the name. The crewed version is a completely new vehicle as much as CST-100 is to Apollo
Oh yes, I forgot… the Dragon 1 has a hatch that opens sideways and Dragon 2 opens vertically! Damn. You are so totally right: Cargo Dragon and crew Dragon V2 share only one thing, the name. The crewed version is a completely new vehicle as much as CST-100 is to Apollo!
The decision to award it to Boeing was purely political. Real NASA
had very little to do with it, it was all DC
The selection decision was questionable enough that I think SNC should use all means at their disposal to either rectify the decision or to understand the rationale for the selection.
The idea behind this program was a new means for funding development of spacecraft in an effort to lower costs and speed development processes. That is why it was called commercial. Boeing is just another old space contract award and the fact that it is the highest bidder on an old technology system makes their selection seriously questionable.
Why the sudden rush to get to 2017 or whenever the first flights will be? No one was in a rush in 2006 or 2007 when the decision was made to shut down Shuttle. No one was in a panic in 2009 or 2010 or 2011 when the Shuttle program was actively being shut down with no prospects in sight for a replacement vehicle. Now there is a sudden concern that we need a contractor we can more firmly rely upon for the new vehicle? This is at best disingenuous and at worse total hoakum.
Why the need for three different crew capsules? Orion flies this year (ha ha). It was the original crew sortie vehicle and was always the backup to commercial crew. Dragon has been flying for years and with relatively minor additions can already carry a crew. Why the new concern that Dragon and Space X cannot do the job? Of the 3 commercial crew, only the Boeing CST has never flown in any form. Why the great feeling of comfort and reliance on CST-because of the name Boeing? The people who designed and built Shuttle, Apollo, Gemini, Mercury, left the program decades ago. Boeing is just a corporate name with a lot of expense tied to it and a lot of ex-NASA managers in its employ. Based on the last 11 years, not a great feeling of comfort to me.
The design of Dream Chaser has a long history that extends well beyond SNC, Contrary to dbookers staement the vehicle did not crash land on its test flight. There was a single minor hardware difficulty. The DC vehicle offers so much more than the oldspace capsules that its development ought to be continued on just as have earlier NASA-developed research and experimental rocket planes and lifting bodies.
What is the aim of the program? Why the sudden issue or concern with moving the program along on a speedier basis? There was something fundamentally flawed in the selection decision and we need to get to the bottom of it. Was it a political decision? a technical decision? a personal decision aimed at protecting current or past NASA managers? I am all for discussing and discovering the real reasons.
because of the name Boeing?
Exactly. It is a well known fact in the aerospace industry that Boeing does not go over budget or schedule. If it looks like either or both will happen, Boeing gets the government customer via their Congress critters to cough up more dollars or slide the milestones to the right, and then contractually re-define the “baseline” program. A Boeing spokesperson will then publicly and shamelessly proclaim that everything is copacetic, and that those who question Boeing’s version of recent history should do a Orwellian “double-think” of their own sanity.
I’m not thrilled about Boeings award either but it’s worth keeping in mind that this is a fixed price contract, not cost plus. That makes a big difference.
it’s worth keeping in mind that this is a fixed price contract, not cost plus.
And Boeing made sure to “fix” the price at double what SpaceX wanted for the same mission. But that really doesn’t matter because NASA is not going to cancel Boeing’s contract on this no matter what or face the wrath of Congress. The price will just get “fixed” upwards to whatever Boeing needs. To the untrained eye it will look like a “cost plus” contract, but Boeing will loudly deny any shenanigans as they head to the bank.
Mark my words.
“And Boeing made sure to “fix” the price at double what SpaceX wanted for the same mission.”
Are you claiming Boeing had prior knowledge of SpaceX’s bid before the award was made?
Are you claiming Boeing had prior knowledge of SpaceX’s bid before the award was made?
Not me. Boeing would never, ever stoop so low.
I was merely pointing out the obvious that Boeing’s cost was not even remotely competitive with SpaceX’s, yet NASA curiously did not hesitate to gush praise on them for a bloated program management and technically bland design.
Boeing can throw an army of bean counters, engineers and pretty girls buying drinks for info .. yes .. I am pretty confident Boeing had a back of the napkin estimates at what their competitor was going to bid.
Guessing what your competitor’s bid is going to be and having actual knowledge before the award is made are two very different things.
and making a wild uneducated guess and a “guess” utilalizing everything the corporation has learned over the last 50 years and every concievable outlet for gaining an insight is also two different things
I fail to see your point. Are you saying Boeing (or any company for that matter) should not try to figure out what their competitors are going to do? I don’t see any problem as long as they don’t step over legal lines. Do you know for a fact that Boeing has done something on this bid you don’t consider appropriate?
No, I am simply not going to rule ANYTHING out. Considering what Boeing has already been willing to do it the past for multi billion dollar contracts, moving forward I would not be surpised about anything Boeing would be willing to do.
Yeah, they were caught with hundreds of proprietary LM documents on EELV, an event that led to the loss of many of their missions and eventual unification into ULA as the junior partner.
Over forty years ago, after a decade of trying, NASA was forced to conclude that the lifting body was impractical. Wings and fuselage have such different purposes that one structure cannot fill both roles efficiently.
(from Wikipedia) “The historical antecedents of the Dream Chaser go back over 50 years in the US; with the 1957 X-20 Dyna-Soar concept and the 1966 Northrop M2-F2 and Martin X-23 PRIME lifting bodies.[15][16] Its design is derived from NASA’s 1990 HL-20 lifting body design which was itself similar to the 1980s Soviet BOR-4, which in turn was considered by NASA engineers as influenced by the late 1960s HL-10,[17] and Soviet Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-105 military spaceplane concept,[18] a spaceplane studied as a means to develop a Soviet counterpart to the US’s X-20 Dyna-Soar.[19].”
But the X-20 had conventional wings and fuselage. The lifting-body concept began with NASA in the 1960’s. Why make a plane without wings? For the same reason the Mercury capsule entered blunt end first; because a sharp leading edge concentrated the thermal energy of the shock wave and no known material could tolerate the heat.
But the thick airfoil and very low aspect ratio inevitably resulted in too much drag and not enough lift, a problem that would get rapidly worse as the vehicle grew from single-seat prototypes to the 100 ton Shuttle. The Soviet BOR-4 design was analyzed at Langley and had some advantages in stability. A similar design was proposed for the crew return vehicle program. But there was no solution to the problems of poor lift and excessive drag.
And more important, the original materials problem that required the wingless lifting body had been solved. RCC and more recent materials which are more flexible and tougher have been developed that indeed permit a spacecraft to have high-lift low-drag wings and control surfaces with sharp leading edges. The Shuttle took this route, as did the X-37 and the Orbital Sciences Prometheus concept proposed for the Orbital Space Plane Program.
As is so often the case, ideas develop momentum. The astronauts liked the DC concept because the wide cockpit allowed two pilots to sit side by side behind a windshield and (in theory) hand-fly the landing. But the concept has no room for growth and is on the ragged edge of what can be accomplished with a gliding approach. The noncircular pressure hull increases structural weight. Off runway landings are likely to be nonsurvivable. For a vehicle of this size, a capsule and parachute are safer and more efficient. For a vehicle too large for a parachute, separate wings and fuselage permit higher lift, lower drag, and a wider margin of safety.
Orion lacks credibility as a logistical vehical for ISS as it is so expensive that it can be launched at most once a year.
“Why the sudden rush to get to 2017 or whenever the first flights will be?” Because the current contract extension with the Russians projects only through to the end of 2017. From NASA “This firm-fixed price modification covers comprehensive Soyuz support, including all necessary training and preparation for launch, flight operations, landing and rescue of six space station crew members on long-duration missions. It also includes additional launch site support, which was provided previously under a separate contract. The modification will allow for a lead time of about three years Roscosmos needs to build additional Soyuz vehicles. These services will provide transportation to and from the International Space Station for U.S., and Canadian, European or Japanese astronauts.” This cost $424 million. Wonder what the Russians would charge for another year? Not to mention the necessary lead time needed.
I don’t disagree with what you say however this was poor planning and poor management on NASA’s part with poor support by the Administration and by Congress. It is several years too late to start rushing now.
There’s a great article on Quartz about Musk and SpaceX, which illuminates “Why Boeing,” particularly from NASA’s perspective.
Boeing knows how to build a program that NASA is comfortable with. It’s the paperwork they want to see. Flying hardware is not as important as mountains of documents recording each decision and design.
You can be upset about that, but that’s why NASA favors Boeing.
http://qz.com/281619/what-i…
That happiness with design paperwork ends about 1 year after a Dragon V2.0 docks with the ISS.
Have you ever seen that sign some people are fond of hanging in their offices? The one “Lack of planning on your part does not constitute an emergency on my part”.
Does anyone really believe Boeing or Space-X would not be doing the same thing had they not been selected?
It doesn’t matter who is or would be doing it. It’s the “it” that is being done, that could very well significantly push back Commercial Crew such that buying more flights from the Russians is required. This action would be questioned no matter who was doing it.
Look I know and maybe you don’t know Boeing used their political power to get this period! If they didn’t get a piece of this it would have been “the Sky is falling why don’t we get what we want”
Your guess as to what Boeing did might be right, but you don’t know because you don’t have facts in hand. It’s unlikely that you were present for any wheeling and dealing that might have happened.
Like I said Boeing throws a fit because they won’t get what they want…..Freaking NASA Leach
I wonder how hard it impacts SpaceX. They had a number of things on the ledger from the previous contract that are still in process. They should be able to complete those and be deep towards completion. Some of those same milestones Boeing has in the final contract and may be on hold.
I checked and the COTS appeal lasted the full time. This GAO one will probably do the same. I thought at first that DC, since no parachutes, would survive a Atlas solid destruct in the first minute. I do not think it would clear the cloud of debris and would run into some and be destroyed. SNC should get there mini DC going. NASA requires 4, so if they shrink it, it might get light enough for Atlas without SRBs to launch. Boeing might be able to reduce the diameter(15′) to 10’or 8′ of CST-100 and lower the weight enough not to use SRB’s. Much safer. I would love to see a real abort where they use a linear charge and see if they clear the cloud. It is not a real test to just fire the abort motors. That Titan 4 abort was only off a few degrees in heading when they destructed it. But I am sure NASA will do what is needed. They will not change any thing and there will never be a real abort and I will never get to say I told you so. But at least I am on record and I can’t blame myself if anything goes wrong.
Doing more research, Bigelow came out with the Orion Lite. He said that he could get the weight down to 27,000lbs. He said that is what Atlas, no SRB, and 2 Centaurs could launch. CST-100 weighs about that much. They might be able to launch without SRBs. Why would Bigelow come up with this? It is the Dirty Little Secret in the USA. Bean Counter an Aussie, spoke up. He did not say. No one has commented on that SRBs cannot be used on HSF. If they could be vented so that flameing chunks did not come out, it would work. I do not see the capsule clearing. An abort has to been done quickly. Destruct the SRBs and launch the capsule. The USAF report says it would remain with the chunks. The chunks are faster than the capsule. They would hit it, then pass, then rain back down on the parachutes.
Boeing and SNC must know all of this. They will not say how the abort will go. If they would, no problems and I can relax or they will have to change. Don’t say anything and it will go away does not always work. The fix might be in. An agreement between them and government not to say anything. I wrote Sen. Nelson and House Science Committee informing and complaining.
A little late in the game to start all over.
Without parachutes a DC abort on launch will not be survivable as it cannot land on water and lacks the propulsion to reverse course and return to the landing site. That’s why the bail-out system was developed for the Shuttle, a system that had limited chance of success and left individual crewmen scattered across miles of ocean. It would be even more difficult to bail out from the cramped and rapidly descending DC. The capsule, in contrast, provides the crew with a reasonable chance of landing intact and surviving at sea. This might have factored in the choice, though it wasn’t mentioned,
These were all – and it should be obvious – thoroughly investigated, and even tested in some cases for DC. Assertions and assumptions are being made here that bear no resemblance to the facts. You have to remember that many of the people on the program have a long history with shuttle.
By all means please explain. We are all here to discuss and learn the facts, not to argue. I’m just giving my opinion, I’ve read some material on the DC abort system (see below). However it does not explain whether the vehicle will be equipped with parachutes. As we learned with the Shuttle, there are substantial parts of the ascent trajectory where neither RTLS nor TAL are likely to be successful unless the failure is limited to the loss of a single liquid-propellant engine. Any more serious loss of thrust would put the Shuttle (or the DC) in the water. What happens then?
http://www.parabolicarc.com…
Given the methodical nature of NASA reviews, my belief is that anything that played a material part in the decisions to award contracts or not would have been explicit.
The laws of motion problem. The same as F9. The HL-20 had parachutes.
According to Wikipedia, the Dream Chaser masses 11.3 metric tons, which is less than the 13 metric tons that a Falcon 9 can put in LEO, and of course, the F9 has no booster stages. The wiki page also states that “It could use any suitable launch vehicle…” Whether 11.3 mt is too close to the F9’s limit, I don’t know.
Aside from a human-rated F9 (which will be happening anyway) and Atlas V (also happening regardless), there’s the Delta IV Heavy (also no SRBs, although variants of the Delta IV “medium” do use the little GEMs motors), or the coming-next-year Falcon Heavy.
As for the abort scenarios – the DC’s integrated escape system seems similar to that of Dragon Crew, in that it uses low-latency liquid-fueled rockets for pad- and launch-abort scenarios, which would propel it rapidly away from the disaster behind it, and then glide back for a landing. Assuming they’re launching from the cape, there’s a ginormous runway there to land on.
Gliding back to the cape might be possible for the first minute or so of ascent but they would very quickly be too far downrange and with too much velocity in the wrong direction to be able to reverse the momentum using just LAS rockets.
I’m not sure what control surfaces they have, but I’m assuming they wouldn’t need to reverse the velocity using the LAS rockets – they would bank for turns, using that velocity to then continue back to the launch site (depending on altitude and speed) like an aircraft (or more accurately, a glider). At a hundred miles downrange, an altitude of 20 or 30 miles would make it pretty easy to glide back.
Three things increase with every second of flight – altitude, velocity and range. The first two are generally in your favor for RTLS. However the third one, range is the enemy. Unfortunately range wins out very soon into the launch.
As with any aircraft that has to make an emergency unpowered landing the more altitude the better. And speed can be converted into altitude so speed is generally good also. However in a launch scenario some other dynamics come into play. As altitude increases the ability to steer using aerodynamics alone is greatly diminished. And while more speed is generally good because it gives you energy, unfortunately in a launch the increasing speed is in the wrong direction requiring an increasingly large turn radius to reverse course, during which time you lose a lot of that precious altitude, and when your turn is completed you are far from shore without enough altitude or energy to make it back to the coast.
A study was done for the HL-20 on this very topic for launches from Cape Canaveral pad 40. In case of RTLS a solid rocket motor would be fired to separate the HL-20 from the booster. If RTLS abort occurred between launch and 20 seconds the HL-20 would have landed at the Shuttle Landing Facility. Between 20 and 64 seconds HL-20 would have landed on the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station skid strip. Between 64 seconds and 430 seconds the only abort option would have been to parachute into the ocean. After 430 seconds TAL would be possible.
Does anyone know the outcome of the injunction hearing this morning? I’m surprised there has been no news on this at all today.
Has anyone considered that a “stop work” — or, more accurately, “Don’t expect to be paid for any work you do before being told to go to work” — places Boeing at a much greater disadvantage than SpaceX?
I suspect such a stop-work order would knife Boeing in the back (their bean-counters will, in order to maximize share-holder value, tell the management to lay off workers until they were assured of payment) as Boeing is publicly traded (vs SpaceX’s privately held) corporation.
Musk, I believe, is a “may hay while the sun shines” kind of guy. Such a stop-payment-for-work would give SpaceX so much of a lead that there is no way Boeing could, once money was flowing again, catch up.
“Leadership maximizes gains, management merely minimizes losses”