SLS CDR: Not As Smooth As Advertised
Space Launch System Program Moving Forward with Critical Design Review
“Milestone reviews like the critical design review are just that — critical. The critical design review demonstrates that the SLS design meets all system requirements with acceptable risk, and accomplishes that within cost and schedule constraints. It also proves that the rocket should continue with full-scale production, assembly, integration, and testing and that the program is ready to begin the next major review covering design certification.”
Keith’s note: As you may have heard, NASA has been conducting the CDR for the SLS. Well, despite all of the happy talk about how the review went toward enabling NASA’s #JourneyToMars sources report that this CDR suffered from some of the common things that such reviews are prone to suffer – especially at MSFC. According to sources two participating entities – FSO and IV&V (raised objections/concerns – or “reclamas” – that the SLS design is not totally mature – yet. At one point MSFC management had a meeting wherein FSO and IV&V reps were told that having independent reviewers at the CDR was a mistake since their staff simply did not know enough about the vehicle’s design. I saw this behavior with my own eyes during Space Station Freedom design reviews at MSFC in the 1990s – its in the drinking water down there. No one from outside their center or organization could, by definition, know enough to have any value at a MSFC CDR. Then there’s the last big rocket they worked on at MSFC a few years back …
Ares PDR Was Not As Smooth As NASA Says It Was, earlier post (2008)
“NASA sources report that there are some red faces in Huntsville and that there is the obligatory witch hunt under way at MSFC to find guilty parties and to try and figure out how this information got outside of NASA. Suffice it to say that the way this post-PDR “survey” was done is laughable – and that this witch hunt will simply cause even more embarrassing information to surface.”
CDR, schmeeDR.
Pork barrels don’t need no stinkin’ CDRs!
If you don’t know where you are going, it doesn’t matter which road you are on.
Keith, great work as usual. Though I would point out a slight typo flaw in the article. Instead of “nature”, I think you meant “mature” in the following sentence:
“the SLS design is not totally nature – yet”
Hope you will change it soon because I want to quote you (with proper attribution, of course.)
CDR is intended to review the technical aspects of the design. The principle challenges faced by SLS are in the areas of cost and mission relevance.
These measures, technical and cost, are by necessity inseparable. A project really never understands it’s technical aspects until it understands the many implications of these, one big implication of which is cost. Costs may later rather easily cause changes and unintended consequences in what is technical. How nice it would be to live in a world where we just ignore what the things we are designing might cost up-front, or if they will be able to produce flight rates and be operated as promised! So that’s the world of a NASA CDR?
No, cost is part of the NASA design review world. At least, it is in the part of the NASA world I have experience with.
A CDR isn’t about reviewing the program’s budget, or guessing if Congress will fund the program at the expected level in future years. But an important part of a CDR is to identify potential, technical risks. And to make sure the program has sufficient resources (e.g. money) to deal with them. So money is part of the review. As in, “X could end up being a problem. If it does, what are you going to do about it? Will dealing with that push you over budget? (Assuming you get the planned budget in future years)”
With that said, I’m not sure about this SLS review. My experience is with SMD (unmanned, scientific missions.) From the sound of it, this SLS review isn’t what I’m used to. As reported, the review panel is mostly or entirely from the institution responsible for the program. By the standards I’m used to, that would be a “red team” review. Essentially an internal, dress rehearsal for the actual review. The real, official CDR ought to be conducted by a panel with few, if any, institutional conflicts of interest. This does not seem to be the case, so I assume the manned space side of NASA has different standards.
TMK CDR is in practical terms a review of the work of the contractor as evaluated by the contracting agency (NASA). Since the program was initiated under the direction of Congress NASA is not going to question its basic goals.
I was simply pointing out that the primary challenge the SLS program faces is that it is not clear if there are any applications for which it is an optimal or even an affordable solution. Good program management should include continuous evaluation of whether the program will meet useful goals for the nation at an affordable cost, whether or not this is formally part of the CDR.
“The principle challenges faced by SLS are in the areas of cost and mission relevance.”
Anyone who thinks building one of the largest rockets ever is not a challenge will soon be watching a giant fireball where their rocket is supposed to be.
I think the implication is that actually building the SLS is more of a secondary challenge. Personally, I’d say building a rocket that large is right up NASA’s alley. A difficult feat of engineering, yes, a mighty task that will take the coordinated efforts of thousands of people to accomplish, but certainly it is doable. So I think it is correct to say the biggest obstacles that the SLS will face is its cost and finding enough missions for it to perform.
When they fly the SLS first stage back to the cape after dumping the solids, where will they land it? Do they recover the second stage too?
And how much will it cost to recycle the SRBs? Do the SRBs land on land or do they fish them out of the water? And how many times will they be able to reuse the Orion capsule after they soft land it in the desert?
How many reusable SLSs will be in the fleet?
This is great, a giant reusable rocket to take us to Mars.
See, all this up front cost will be worth it!
Thank you NASA of the practical Smart design!
Who is responsible for this brilliant practical futuristic design anyway? NASA or Boeing?
The SLS is entirely expendable. First stage and SRBs will both wind up on the bottom of the Atlantic.
Orion is designed to be reused 10 times.
Please let me know when SpaceX’s parlor trick acutally works with an appropriate payload…remember that is the goal right….mass to orbit and beyond.
I will send you pictures of a booster on a barge to keep you entertained 😉
I await them with bated breath. Oh yes, let me add a word also; appropriately “sized” payload, not a Snicker’s bar and a ball cap. 🙂
You forgot a word!
Please let me know when SpaceX’s parlor trick acutally works with an appropriate payload…remember that is the goal right….mass affordably to orbit and beyond.
Fixed it for you 🙂
“certainly it is doable.”
Doable, yes.
But, as recent launch failures have shown us, technical details, even the smallest or trivial ones, are what make the rocket go up. A CDR is where one goes over the details with a fresh set of outside eyes to make sure all aspects and solutions are correct or viable.
MSFC’s dismissal of external reviewers means they either did a poor job in preparing the presentations or don’t really appreciate the technical challenge they are facing.
A design review reviews only the paperwork. This can be useful since it gives every organization involved the opportunity to make sure the program is meeting their particular requirements.
But the potential failures are in the actual hardware, and an infinite numbers of eyes on the paperwork will not identify them. It takes engineers and technicians with hands-on-hardware experience, judgement, and craftsmanship.
No offense but this kerfuffle between MSFC, FSO, and IV&V seems very minor compared to the travails of Ares I. As you yourself said this kind of thing happened back in the 90s and ISS was built and has worked fine for a decade and a half.
SLS has had a much smoother road and is coming together quite nicely.
Does anyone know of a recent credible cost and schedule estimate for SLS from NASA or some other government source?