CASIS Had A Bad Week In Washington
Keith’s note: CASIS (Center for Advancement of Science in Space, Inc.) came to Washington this past week to talk about their management of science and commercial activity aboard the International Space Station National Laboratory. The first stop for CASIS was an event at the National Academy of Sciences on low Earth orbit commerce on Wednesday. The presentation that CASIS gave was their standard Powerpoint chart collection totally lacking in any meaningful information other than what you’d expect to see in a brochure.
As it always does, the presentation glossed over some important facts yet contained some outright inaccuracies about funding that CASIS avoided discussing. Since the Academy audience – as well as most of the other audiences that CASIS presents to – was not inclined to ask probing questions, CASIS sailed through their presentation and then sat down.
The next day the CASIS entourage, led by President and Executive Director Greg Johnson, showed up at the NASA Advisory Council (NAC) meeting. Things did not go so well for them at the NAC. Within minutes of starting to talk, NAC members started to pepper Johnson with questions- questions that he was unable and/or unwilling to answer. It went downhill from there.
The CASIS presentation to the NAC did not provide the basic answers that the NAC membership sought. Committee members repeatedly asked CASIS’ Johnson what the CASIS budget was, where it came from, and how much money CASIS had raised. You could hear the growing frustration in the voices of the NAC members the more that CASIS dodged their questions. Eventually CASIS’ Johnson admitted that their budget was $15 million a year and that it all comes from NASA. When probed about fundraising that they had been so overt about in their presentation charts, Johnson eventually admitted that philanthropy had not worked for CASIS (in other words simply asking for money was not working). Johnson, with help from David Roberts, their lead scientist, then immediately started to crow again about all the money that CASIS had raised. This contradicted their prior statements. Further questioning eventually got Johnson and Roberts to admit that the money that they raised did not go to CASIS but rather, that funds from a sponsoring company went directly to the payload developer (which is not a bad thing).
CASIS’ repeated refusal to speak clearly on the topic of its income, funding, grants, and operations became problematical for the NAC. When pressed further on their income CASIS said that they were not allowed to generate “revenue” (even though their IRS returns clearly show that they did generate revenue albeit only a little). When the NAC members asked for more details on what CASIS was funding CASIS emphatically stated that they are not a “funding” organization. Moments later CASIS staff showed slides that talked about funding.
After the NAC members had pushed CASIS multiple times on this, HEOMD AA Bill Gerstenmaier jumped in and said that the era of offering grants (by CASIS) was at an end and that CASIS was now trying to work toward getting external entities like companies to provide direct grants to payload developers to offset their costs. NASA would still be paying for payload integration, launch, and crew operations, but that this initial step would hopefully be followed by larger grants that would start to chip away at these other costs. The ideal goal, according to Gerstenmaier (and to some extent by CASIS), was to entice private companies to spend more money on space research after seeing that these initial efforts had borne fruit. Building upon this initial success, so theNASA/CASIS plan goes, companies with larger funds at hand would be prompted to spend much more money and these funds would be used to offset costs that were traditionally borne by NASA e.g. launch and operations.
Given that CASIS staff were consistently oblique in the way that they answered simple questions, the NAC was left with some residual skepticism about what CASIS is and what it does at the end of the CASIS presentation. This led to a discussion by the NAC that then led to the formulation of a NAC statement suggesting that CASIS be subject to a review by an external organization with demonstrated expertise in managing a national laboratory and its scientific activities. Another issue that arose was how CASIS picked the projects that it funded. Other than saying that they did multi-level peer review there was no clear description of the “why” of the CASIS selection process other than making life better on Earth. DIscussions about the lifetime of the ISS and how it should be used to prepare for human missions to Mars led to another discussion as to whether CASIS research is aiding that long term goal or interfering with it. No clear answer was forthcoming from CASIS.
The NAC resumed their discussion of CASIS issues on Friday. After some word smithing they adopted this recommendation:
Recommendation: Finding on Allocation of Resources for ISS Research Required for the Journey To Mars
Recommendation:
The Council recommends that NASA conduct an internal evaluation of the top priority research ISS directly related to the Journey to Mars and determine whether some portion of the resources (including crew time, up-mass, and dollars) applied to the ISS National Laboratory could be used to more rapidly advance the Journey to Mars.
Major reasons for Proposing the Recommendation
As articulated by the Administrator and various NASA public documents, the journey to Mars is NASA’s top exploration goal.
Research for the Journey to Mars that utilizes the International Space Station (ISS) must be concentrated in the next 8 years, before NASA’s human exploration focus shifts away from ISS utilization. Beyond the operational funding, launch up-mass and crew time for ISS research are the most limited resources.
The Council notes that the ISS National Laboratory has been allocated launch up-mass and at least 50% of ISS crew time for research that may eventually have potential for commercial benefits. The Council has also been told by NASA that a successful transition from the “Earth Reliant” phase to the “Proving Ground” is dependent at least in part on the success of attracting future commercial users of the ISS and/or the availability of commercial LEO laboratory capability that NASA could use. The Council therefore feels that it would be beneficial for the agency to better understand the effect that the resources being devoted to the ISS National Laboratory might have on the important research need to reduce technology and human health risk for the Journey to Mars.
As additional information we provide a section of the original legislation that allows for the allocation to the ISS National Lab to be altered as needed 1
Consequences of No Action on the Proposed Recommendation:
The Journey to Mars may be delayed as resources are deployed for commercialization.
1 That language is in section 504(d)(2) See bolded portion:
(d) RESEARCH CAPACITY ALLOCATION AND INTEGRATION OF RESEARCH PAYLOADS.
(2) ADDITIONAL RESEARCH CAPABILITIES. – If any NASA research plan is determined to require research capacity onboard the ISS beyond the percentage allocated under paragraph (1), such research plan shall be prepared in the form of a requested research opportunity to be submitted to the process established under this section for the consideration of proposed research within the capacity allocated to the ISS national laboratory. A proposal for such a research plan may include the establishment of partnerships with non-NASA institutions eligible to propose research to be conducted within the ISS national laboratory capacity. Until September 30, 2020, the official or employee designated under subsection (b) may grant an exception to this requirement in the case of a proposed experiment considered essential for purposes of preparing for exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, as determined by joint agreement between the organization with which the Administrator enters into a cooperative agreement under subsection (a) and the official or employee designated under subsection (b).
The “official designated under subsection (b)” is the NASA Liaison, who is Sam Scimemi.”
After approving this first recommendation the NAC moved on to consider a second draft recommendation that dealt with examining how CASIS operates – especially how it set priorities, makes decisions, and measures results. This is the draft recommendation under consideration:
“Recommendation: NASA should initiate a study by a qualified industrial development organization to inform CASIS of best practices in the development of new industries.
Major Reasons for Proposing the Recommendation:
The commercial development of Loe Earth Orbit space is an integral part of NASA’s vision. The CASIS organization has been developed to, among other goals, facilitate the development of commerce in Low Earth Orbit. During the CASIS presentation to the Council, it was not apparent that the goals of the organization are being effectively prosecuted. The Council believes that CASIS could be more effective if it were to receive the best advice possible from organizations which have been successful in related activities.
Consequences of No Action on the Proposed Recommendation:
The development of low cost facilities and transportation for NASA use in LEO may not be available in a timely manner to support the needs of NASA’s Mars exploration activity.”
Some of the NAC membership felt that this recommendation was being a bit too proscriptive and that it should be watered down or not issued. Many more NAC members supported a firm stance on this issue. Given that there is a shrinking window whereby the ISS will be operation NAC members felt that it was important to review the situation and, if need be, make recommendations to NASA how to adjust things with CASIS.
The wording in the first recommendation gets into the issue of prioritization, so other NAC members started to look for a third alternative. The NAC eventually decided to table this second recommendation for the time being and to send a “fact finding mission” to CASIS to examine these issues are report back to the NAC. Some NAC members discussed making the CASIS issue one that the NAC might take on as a project for several years and that the NAC might need to be adjusted to bring on commercialization expertise.
A number of NAC members stated rather bluntly that they were disappointed with the presentation that Greg Johnson and CASIS had made and that it was not the presentation that they expected or deserved. NAC members also said that Johnson et al were simply not answering some rather basic questions and that this reluctance/inability to answer such basic questions caused the members to become concerned about CASIS’ ability to prioritize and manage the tasks before it. Members also faulted the NAC for not being more specific as to what they wanted CASIS to talk about.
NAC Members expressed interest in having CASIS present to the NAC again, possibly at the next meeting, based on a more specific request for information and the upcoming fact finding mission visit by NAC members.
So the ball is now in CASIS’ court. CASIS staff clearly fumbled on the manner with which they presented themselves and how they answered some routine questions – questions that one would rightfully expect to be asked. It almost seemed at times as if CASIS had no idea what the NAC is or what it does. If CASIS can show the NAC that they do know what they are doing, that they are providing something of clear, measurable value, and be responsive to questions then they probably have a chance to restore confidence amongst the NAC membership. But if the arrogant and often ambivalent disinterest with which CASIS conducted itself at this NAC meeting does not disappear they may find that the NAC makes recommendations that will alter what CASIS does in the future.
The International Space Station is a terrible thing to waste.
Related stories:
For a recent examination of issues surrounding CASIS see “CASIS Is Not The Best Way To Use a Space Station”
For information about CASIS’ problems with cutting edge technology see “CASIS Still Ignores Commercial Research on ISS“, “NASA and CASIS Chase Old Research Paradigms In Orbit“, and “Sometimes NASA Has Technology SpinINs“.
For an analysis of CASIS outreach metrics see “Trying To Understand CASIS Press and Social Media Impact”
For an ongoing report on CASIS’ fascination with golf see “Important Golf in Space Announcement from CASIS“.
For more information on CASIS grants and awards see “Are CASIS Funding “Commitments” Just Smoke and Mirrors?“.
For more information on CASIS finances see “CASIS Has No Idea How To Raise Money – Only How To Spend It”
For more information on CASIS salaries see “Examining Staff and Board Member Salaries at CASIS“
Good to see CASIS formally reviewed and NAC taking a position.
“Since the Academy audience – as well as most of the other audiences that CASIS presents to – was not inclined to ask probing questions, CASIS sailed through their presentation and then sat down.”
This is very disturbing. The National Academies are chartered to ask probing questions, not just let this junk pass.
From their website: http://nas.edu/about/whatwe…
“The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine are the nation’s pre-eminent source of high-quality, objective advice on science, engineering, and health matters. “
They never ask probing questions. After 30 years of reading their reports, siting in their meetings I have yet to see that happen.
I’m afraid people do tend to think in terms of the old line, about people living in a glass house and whether or not they should throw rocks. I don’t know if Keith is right, when he says this has been going on for 30 year. I don’t think it’s 50, but I would have said 20.
In any case, one of the more disturbing parts is the Academies tendency to rely on outside “experts” (e.g. studies commissioned by the Academies) rather than the views of the members. These experts tend to be people actively working in the field, which implies more direct experience with the details. But it also involves more potential bias, or at least a tendency not to insult or offend colleagues. Even when those colleagues are saying things which really deserve some hard comments.
fcrary/Keith: AFAIK, the Academies don’t commission any studies on their own, they work for hire. They have a Congressional Charter to provide high quality unbiased advice, regardless of the sponsor. If they are asleep at the switch or biased into silence, that bears scrutiny.
Sources:
http://nas.edu/about/whowea…
http://nas.edu/studyprocess…
Yes, the NAS does most of its work under contract to the gov’t as a result of Congress or other agency requests – but they do a number of things on their own as well. This event last week as done for a variety of Space Studies Board subcommittees – and NASA pays that bill.
If CASIS hoodwinked the NAS and got out of NAC with only strong suggestions of an audit/independent review, I think it had a very good week. I’m quite sure that the congressional delegation that got the earmark will have no trouble deflecting any real independent assessment.
One can fumble all he wants if the refs are in the bag.
The National Academy of Medicine does some excellent work but their study on whether Agent Orange was responsible for all heart disease that occurs in aging (and smoking) Vietnam vets was an embarrassing farce which will cost the taxpayers billions. The problem was (as they freely admitted in the report) that they were commissioned by Congress to produce a particular result and given no say in the matter.
I am not familiar with this. But, give the Academies have been on the notional front lines for scientific ethics, they should have declined the funding if it violated the terms of their charter w.r.t. independence.
I guess I should have been more specific. Yes, the Academies are paid or commissioned to do various studies and reports. But, for the most part, they pass on the work. I’m most familiar with the decadal surveys they do for NASA, but the other studies I’ve seen are similar. The research, analysis and actual writing of the report aren’t done my members of the Academies. They have some involvement, possibly as a chair or a ex officio members, but their primary role seems to be recruiting and supporting less senior/prestigious/impartial people who do the bulk of the work.
Well I know that I am right. I have lived in DC for 30 years and have been attending/participating in, and covering NAS events the entire time.
Keith, I think we’re talking about a gradual change. You can draw the line at 30 years if you like. I don’t see a big difference between that and my 20-50 years estimate. And, for reference, I’m from D.C., with a 578-XX-XXXX social security number to prove it. So this isn’t hindsight versus long experience watching how the process works.
Seems like another example of job entitlement behaviour. Will an investigation change anything? Methinks not likely.
Cheers.
I wonder if Gerstenmaier’s stated HEOMD position, that HEOMD will no longer sponsor basic scientific research through grants, is something that was evaluated and decided at a NASA level, or just by HEOMD?
At one time NASA was one of the largest sponsors of basic scientific research through Code U, Code C and others. This was done at least in part to ensure there would be science payloads to fly on Shuttle and Station.
Then NASA reorganized and most of that money was diverted to Station, ostensibly to the ‘Payloads’ Office, but actually diverted into development and operations. A lot of PIs had their funding stopped abruptly and I know of some who have sworn they will never work with NASA again since NASA proved such an unreliable partner. They had research programs and grad students left without support in mid degree.
Now if HEOMD is unilaterally deciding they will no longer support basic scientific research on ISS, is that a good thing?
No doubt the funding made ISS development and operations far more effective?
Well if he or his predecessor made that decision not to sponsor basic research on ISS several years ago, then I’d say the decision was premature and HEOMD has eaten the seed corn. Those basic research grants were intended to ensure there would be beneficial science on ISS and that they would have a training ground to get researchers and sponsors on board. Potentially commercially viable research or products might have followed.
Recently we’ve heard from the ISS management that now is the critical time to get researchers, scientists and sponsors on-board. It is the only way to truly assess demand. Station needs to stay operational in orbit long enough for researchers to take advantage of the opportunity it provides and for the demand to be assessed. Once the demand is assessed then industry forces can decide the size of the LEO market and how commercialization should proceed, including either maintaining ISS or creating a different follow on platform. The ISS manager has said that only after the market is fully assessed and market forces begin to take over the transition will NASA be free to abandon LEO and move towards exploration.
So it sounds like HEOMD may have turned off the potential market before the market had a foothold. HEOMD may have thrown away all that investment NASA was making through the last several decades in order to get a few extra dollars into the program office coffers for a few years-so they have now supported hardware and near term operations at the expense of long term growth and evolution.
If anyone is expecting CASIS to make up for NASA’s shortsightedness, then they are probably going to be disappointed. Even if CASIS had known what they would be up against and how to go about their sales job, they would have faced quite a challenge under the best of circumstances, and now it appears NASA expected a cold start using a neophyte ‘team’ of marketeers..
CASIS is left holding the bag when it finally has to be admitted microgravity research was a bad justification for a space station.
Microgravity (and life science) research was not the original justification for building the ISS, and it is not the best current use of the ISS. The ISS is and will be useful for Earth and space observation (even launching clusters of free-flying satellites) and potentially payload servicing as well.
.. thats a new one. For real, any substantiation ?
What payload servicing ?
ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/p… You have to track the budgets of different organizations by function over several years, and also look at what happens to the organizations as one subsumes another. Also look at recent statements of recent ISS management.
Micro-G was not the sole or even the most important reason. Space Station was approved by Reagan for commercial use and expansion of US industry into space, and to make use of the space environment and attributes (one of which is micro-G). Station was continued by Clinton for international strategy reasons, specifically engaging the Russians (the Canadians, Europeans and Japanese had been engaged since 1984).
National Labs in the US now are mainly the centers operated by the Department of Energy; many have employee counts in the thousands. NACA, NASA’s progenitor, had centers that were called ‘National Labs’. “Langley Aerodynamics Lab” was NACA’s first center.
The labs are there to conduct, support and coordinate basic scientific and engineering research, some of which may enhance American productivity and competitiveness.
So when I hear that someone like Gerstenmaier says that NASA is not going to support such basic scientific research, I have to wonder what side of the turnip truck he fell off of; apparently he doesn’t know why NASA was established in the first place.
The research and technology budgets the Space Station took control of ostensibly to support research totaled more than $3 billion per year in the late 1990s. The ISS Program apparently decided this money was not needed for research. Now NASA is allocating $15 million per year through CASIS. I think somewhere along the line someone’s accounting and accountability needs to be investigated.
…and those R&D-ish budgets, became the construction and today the operations of the space station. ISS “R&D” today is around $300M a year (not $3B).
Perhaps not the primary justification, Daniel, but there was an awful lot of talk about ‘growing crystals in micro’, if you recall?
Truthfully ISS was built with no real justification. Let me explain: like many space-related efforts, the ISS program isn’t supported by a single and obvious purpose.
Consider Mars: there’s no single reason to visit Mars. Like Mars, ISS answered to many masters, including a desire to improve relations with our Russian friends, the sense that Mr. Reagan’s ‘legacy’ was involved, a destination for shuttle launches, among others. There was also a sense that ‘corporations’ would glom on to the opportunity to do unique research; the pharmaceutical industry was frequently mentioned.
Did I leave something out?
Semiconductor crystals can be grown with essentially no defects on Earth. There are some advantages for protein crystallization in space to confirm or refine structures, although in someapplications it has been displaced by computational chemistry for structure determination.
ISS isn’t all that well-suited for remote sensing or satellite/payload servicing. There are some fundamental design choices that would have been made differently, if that had been the goal.
I don’t really think there is a technical or scientific justification for ISS. If you go back to the design work in the 1980s, or the later re-design work in the 1990s, you’ll see that the decision to build a space station pre-dated the decisions about what the station should do. There were 1980s studies which, basically, addressed the question, “Now that we have decided to build a space station, what should it do?” Form did not follow function.
Well! Good thing we didn’t start building a hugely big rocket before we knew exactly what it was for. No sense making the same mistake twice.
If one has unlimited funds a free-flyer in sun synchronous orbit is ideal. But one never has unlimited funds, indeed money is the most limited resource for university and commercial projects. The needs and technology for Earth sensing are rapidly evolving and require quick response and low cost. The nanoracks exposed facility can be populated by a sensors alone, with launch, installation, power, data/comm, pointing and even periodic replacement and return to Earth provided by the ISS infrastructure. Automated observation requires almost no crew time, the most limited ISS resource.
Most Earth-sensing needs do not require or even study the entire planet, and the ISS overflies over 98% of the Earth’s population.
As to space observation, the external ISS environment is surprisingly clean and again launch and recovery of even fairly substantial external payloads can utilize SpaceX scheduled flights. Small and medium aperture instruments in the far UV and other bands that are difficult for ground observation are obvious candidates.
Thanks for the rundown, Keith. As I listened to it I wondered why the hell he didn’t just answer the questions.
And I still don’t know why Jonson kept dancing. I really don’t. The CASIS budget is no secret, after all.
And I don’t know what to make of the slide showing all of the supposed ‘activities’ across the country; there is so much truth-stretching here that it is hard to know what to believe.
And again: why? Why not just tell the truth? And why for god’s sake did they decide the ISS needed a new model rather than look at the other decades-long labs?
It’s almost as if they are dancing to the B-side of the record. I was completely stumped by the obfuscation and, in the end, just plain lies. Motivation remains a mystery.
The questioners gave him hell, as if they were just loaded for bear. Maybe they were.
Hi Michael. Your eternal innocence is very sweet and touching. Motivation? THEY’RE HIDING SOMETHING! Will they ever be held accountable? I doubt it.
SFAIK the proposal to operate ISS as a “national lab” originated within NASA and I cannot see much in the way of justification other than an attempt to gain prestige and visibility, and potentially additional federal funding. Obviously a “national lab” needs more than six people and more funding for actual research than ISS currently has.
The question about CASIS’ organizational model was asked; CASIS’ stunning answer- that they decided to create an entirely new model, eschewing the way other labs are run– wasn’t further probed.
My own sense is that the decision to ‘invent it here’ comes directly from NASA and is an example of the hubris both so important to the Agency and at the same time so blinding.
As a prior CASIS contractor I can attest to the lack of cohesion & vision, self serving practices and ethical grey areas.