Double GAO Reports: SLS and Orion Cost and Risk Estimates Are Still Unreliable
Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle: Action Needed to Improve Visibility into Cost, Schedule, and Capacity to Resolve Technical Challenges, GAO
“GAO found that the Orion program’s cost and schedule estimates are not reliable based on best practices for producing high-quality estimates. Cost and schedule estimates play an important role in addressing technical risks. … For example, the cost estimate lacked necessary support and the schedule estimate did not include the level of detail required for high-quality estimates. Without sound cost and schedule estimates, decision makers do not have a clear understanding of the cost and schedule risk inherent in the program or important information needed to make programmatic decisions. … NASA and the Orion program have made some programmatic decisions that could further exacerbate cost and schedule risks. The Orion program is executing to an internal schedule with a launch readiness date of August 2021, which has a lower confidence level than its commitment baseline. This means that NASA is accepting higher cost and schedule risk associated with executing this schedule …. The lack of cost reserves has caused the program to defer work to address technical issues and stay within budget. As a result, the Orion program’s reserves in future years could be overwhelmed by work being deferred. Program officials told GAO that they have not performed a formal analysis to understand the impact that delaying work might have on the available reserves since the program was confirmed. Without this type of analysis, program management may not have a complete understanding of how decisions made now will affect the longer-term execution of the program.”
NASA Human Space Exploration: Opportunity Nears to Reassess Launch Vehicle and Ground Systems Cost and Schedule, GAO
“… the SLS program has not positioned itself well to provide accurate assessments of core stage progress – including forecasting impending schedule delays, cost overruns, and anticipated costs at completion – because at the time of our review it did not anticipate having the baseline to support full reporting on the core stage contract until summer 2016 – some 4.5 years after NASA awarded the contract. Further, unforeseen technical challenges are likely to arise once the program reaches its next phase, final integration for SLS and integration of SLS with its related Orion and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) human spaceflight programs. Any such unexpected challenges are likely to place further pressure on SLS cost and schedule reserves. … NASA officials stated that this review will have limited discussion of cost and schedule. Proceeding ahead without reassessing resources, however, could result in the EGS or SLS program exhausting limited resources to maintain pace toward an optimistic November 2018 launch readiness date. … In July 2015, GAO found that SLS’s limited cost and schedule reserves were placing the program at increased risk of being unable to deliver the launch vehicle on time and within budget.”
Earlier posts on SLS and Orion
With a new president coming in just about 6 months from now it is time to be proactive and admit the current journey to Mars mirage is nothing more than a hashtag. Instead of waiting for the coming blue ribbon panel and revector let’s take the hard look at the situation and get out infront of things by being honest and laying out a more thoughtful strategy for achieving Mars in 20 years. It may garner a knee jerk reaction from certain circles but if they are truly in it for exploration and not just jobs/contracts then they can find their way through to actual deep space exploration not just lobbying about it.
Step 0: Give up building launch vehicle and orion. They are albatrosses around our neck. A heavy lifter for use 20 years from now sucks up way more budget than relying on multiple launches and robotic assembly which is needed anyway. Plus since we are going with a reusable Mars transit vehicle crew loading and unloading can occur in earth orbit serviced by one of the many commercial crew vehicle coming online. How much more Mars technology could we fund if we free up SLS/Orion funds. Don’t worry congress folks and old space wanting to suckle at the government tit of cost plus contracts there will be plenty of pork to spread around with the new plan. Don’t bring up the suck cost fallacy cause continuing to pour money for something 20 years down the road while you starve all the tech that is truly needed for Mars is only going to continue the myth that going to Mars is within the next 20 years. Staying the course is not the answer if you really want to actually make progress.
Forward plan Step 1: Best case we plan for upcoming commercial heavy lift like falcon 9H worst case we design for existing HLV. Either way we can cross that bridge to pick a launcher 12 years from now when we start locking down the design . Since crew rotation occurs in LEO it should be no different than what we will be paying for astronauts to the ISS in the next couple of years and entry speeds will be similar as well.
Step 2: time to stop iterating on an evolvable Mars campaign and hand out a design to the agency to start building.
We need a clean sheet 90 day study to pick a design so that the technology investment can start working towards putting things together. This gets divided up among the centers (see Congress we will spread things around) and gets everyone on the same path and garners support for the pivot from congress and incoming president.
It will help focus on what can be commercially sourced versus what needs internal development. We dont need to be spending money on our limited use case for something the commercial market is going to far surpass our needs down the road. We just need to have a viable onramp plan for the cots 10+ years from now. the study will provide the focus needed so no more centers working on what they think they should instead of what the politics/HQ wants. If we are infusing $3B in tech we need to make sure the design is anchored so that they are building the ins/outs/size/volume/power for the integrated systems/ mission operations parameters.
We can reevaluate every four years to ensure the tech tree is bearing fruit or if we need to pick a new branch and what the launch vehicle situation is. For now we start with existing HLV and it only gets better from here at the next review in 4 years.
Step 3: Develop LEO to Lunar cycler
Now that we have SLS out of the way the plan is whichever HLV we use just has to get the mass to LEO. Our solar electric propulsion tug will move it out to the lunar shipyard. This gives us run time on sep that will eventually grow to the transit vehicle size. The cycler also gets to test out deep space navigation (like pulsar/x-ray) and autonomous deep space rendezvous and docking.
Step 4: Use Cycler to build out lunar shipyard
Robotic assembly, radiation protection methods and testing of “MCC in a Box” autonomy gets shaken out as the the two Mars Transit Vehicles are built up. Eventually there could be living quarters for science and telerobotics to lunar surface it would require a hab attachment for the cycler since we scrapped orion but that becomes a long term closed loop eclss test bed so bonus points. The human occupation of the shipyard appeals to the international partners as it gets them closer to lunar surface
Step 5: Large scale technology investment
With the SLS/orion money freed up that gives us about $3B a year to put towards the major hurdles for Mars like radiation, EDL, autonomy, ISRU, closed loop ECLSS, robotic helpers, fecal processing, nuclear power and more. These tech are currently on the slow road to Mars due to budget restrictions that would go away with a $3B infusion. At least a portion of this should be to try out Moonshots that may fail but if they succeed are 10X leap forward to Mars.
Step 6: at the shipyard build two reusable transit vehicles
First is cargo delivery for all the preposition of assets for upcoming human missions. We can use an opposition class mission since it is unmanned and 30 day stay in Mars orbit should be enough time for precision placement of the necessary hardware. This robotic hauler will deploy early EDL and isru test beds while testing out larger class SEP, navigation and autonomy.
Second is crew transit vehicle the culmination of tech investment and precursor testbeds. Allows for longer conjunction class missions for a crew to spend 500 days on the surface.
If we as an agency, country, world really want to move up the gravity well to exploring Mars then let’s take a hard look at where we are and pivot to get there.
A great technical discourse on an alternate plan forward – unfortunately, it will never work; spending $3B a year on technology development sounds great – in fact, its what the Obama administration first proposed as the alternate to Constellation; technology development does not have enough political support for that size of an investment – it didn’t in 2010 and it doesn’t now.
After investing over $10B in the current plan, you think you can just throw it all away and start over – what credibility will NASA have if they essentially say: “hey, Mr. Chairman, I know we told you for a decade to do SLS and Orion in your district – now we really need to do new technology and rely on Elon Musk; the guy who’s built 50,000 Tesla Cars at a loss over the past four years and claims he will build a half million more by 2020”
The money for SLS and Orion is not NASA’s and if it didn’t go to SLS and Orion, it could just as easily go somewhere else; politics requires compromise and while you may not think SLS and Orion are the best technical solution, space advocates may need to live with them as the best thing that Congress will support. Shuttle wasn’t the best solution for a reusable space plane nor is ISS the best approach to a LEO space station and both cost too much and took too long. But they made it and we are much better off than if some genius decided in 1977 or 1990 that a new Administration should have killed them midway and started over.
What credibility will NASA have if SpaceX succeeds with landing an unmanned Red Dragon on Mars using a Falcon Heavy? If that happens, it will be crystal clear to journalists that the SpaceX approach is far faster and cheaper than the Congressionally mandated SLS/Orion way. And just how will NASA answer the slew of questions that will result?
I think the fascinating thing about Red Dragon is that while landing a ton on Mars has been an extreme stretch, RD is 8-10 tons in one pop (including tons of payload), and using essentially modded assembly-line hardware (and all at a small fraction of the cost of the status quo).
Agreed. NASA admits that landing large payloads on Mars is still an “unsolved problem”. This is why they’re willing to provide support for the Red Dragon mission in exchange for mission data. In particular, it will provide valuable data on supersonic reentry and propulsive landing of large payloads on Mars.
“After investing over $10B in the current plan, you think you can just throw it all away and start over – what credibility will NASA have if they essentially say: hey, Mr. Chairman, I know we told you for a decade to do SLS and Orion in your district – “
Exactly. That’s what they need to do. The first step in regaining credibility is to make statements that are accurate and correct.
I can’t get out of my mind Gerst’s comments about investigating the SpaceX launch failure (it would take NASA six months just to organize a committee, but by getting out of the way SpaceX resolved the issue in weeks).
And I can’t help but extrapolate this observation and the underlying assumptions into the larger picture, not only of NASA, but for the government in general.
As I’ve said elsewhere, it make this old Democrat very pensive.
We are still stuck, really, at step “-1”, while Mars looms large these days the Loonies are about there and they are vocal.
The concept of a Lunar Cycler makes so much sense- build an actual spaceship; and knowing that’s the goal, develop the infrastructure needed to support it.
The devil is in the details 0 – Cancel SLS/Orion
1- LEO Gas Station LV independent architecture
followed by L2 and Mars Depots
2- EP cyclers from L2 to Mars
EP from LEO present numerous challenges
Prepositioned propellant required to reduce crew trip time
and mitigate crew health issues
3- Multiple uncrewed science missions to test
evolvable deep space transportation architecture
4- Technology maturation to step up to Grand Challenges
Reuse is the goal and includes reduced costs,
landing heavy objects on Mars; asteroids ISRU,
variable gravity, radiation mitigation, closed ECLSS,
multiple design reference missions shake down…..
5- Set a long term goal for HSF ‘to Mars’ by 2030s,
Only after a cost effective detail plan with demonstrated
technology is presented by NASA, peer reviewed
Less than 90 day studies without peer review have restricted NASA to operating decades old expensive hardware.
Update all studies to *exclude* SLS and Orion.
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archiv…
I have to admit that hearing Gerst say that we are making good progress towards a manned Mars fly-by in the mid 2030s really does not excite me. My questions are (1) so we are spending $3 billlion a year for the next 20 years, $60 billion, so we can enjoy an hours long fly-by? , the equivalent of Apollo 8-which few even remember anymore. (2) and then what? As he said, to do anything more than a flyby costs a lot of money NASA does not have and wont be getting. (3)and we are using a throw away spaceship-each of which costs billions of dollars? Whose lame idea was this?
It was the former NASA Administrator Mike Griffin. Since before he became NASA Administrator, he was convinced that NASA building the biggest launch vehicle possible was the only way to get to Mars. When Ares I and Ares V were cancelled, it was quickly replaced by Congress with SLS, to preserve jobs.
Indeed the evolution from the cancellation of Constellation to the decision to build the SLS is one of the strangest episodes in the history of NASA. What’s peculiar is that the GAO doesn’t question it, nor do they question the goals and cost of the program, only its ability to meet planned cost and schedule.
A Mars fly-by is difficult to understand in the context of available or planned equipment, none of which will support people for the required 600± days from either running out of air or going batshit crazy inside a spam can.
It’s a really dumb idea, another example of Apollo – think extrapolation. What are these guys drinking?
Get. Out. Of. The. Box.
According to the reports, while there is progress being made, no one is sure whether it translates into real progress according to the planned schedule. In fact the report says the first manned flight is like late 2024 and likely it will slip to sometime in 2025. And if they decide not to fly until Block 2 is ready, then they wuill start with block 2 slips and they’ll be lucky to make 2030. Talk about a jobs program with no products.
It is nice to see the words “cost” and “schedule” appear frequently in this GAO report. They are crucial to a real program and, alas, NASA has been very persistent in not providing them beyond EM-2. Not even those as much as one would like, but zip for EM-3 and beyond.
What difference does it make if SLS or Orion go over budget or get behind schedule. Both programs are the darling of powerful congress persons. The Prodigal NASA will simply go back to the well and unashamedly ask for more $$ or time, like they did with JWST. These programs have become white collar welfare and voter pork.
I guess. And from that perspective maybe not so bad. I’ve never been opposed to ear marks; the total amount was never very much, and at the same time ear marks built libraries and water treatment plants around the country. This particular ear mark is building a rocket ship. And seriously the whining isn’t over the fact that they are working on a rocket but that it’s the wrong rocket.
For those of us who remember, for instance, decimation of the Los Angeles area aeronautical industry, the on-going monies spent keeping a generation working isn’t so bad. And in the larger perspective while we regularly complain about the money, it’s just peanuts on the floor.
“And seriously the whining isn’t over the fact that they are working on a rocket but that it’s the wrong rocket.”
While I do agree with your assessment, I don’t think that the actual rocket is what some people are whining about. The rocket (or should we say, architecture) is simply the end result of the political will/decision to keep the prime Shuttle NASA contractors and workforce occupied after the Shuttle program was shut down.
I am not saying the men and women at NASA who work on SLS are unreliable – I am saying the government has given NASA a very bad deal with SLS and the good people at NASA are getting hosed.
Many people outside and inside government, the GAO and NASA, are skeptical. The only reason SLS is the unreasonable requirements (and requirements creep) that makes space unrealistic for the private sector.
NASA’s future is not in rockets anymore – it should truthfully be in Aerospace and SMD. The private sector can hash out rockets.
The private sector needs help with building a “faster than sound” airplane.
The private sector cannot build an horizontal take off and landing vehicle that can achieve LEO with the lift capability of shuttle.
You will find that most people love NASA and realize what a treasure NASA is to not only the United States, but western civilization. NASA is stuck… but not by its own accord… We need to find more public and private partnerships that use Space Act Agreements – and where possible – remove FAR based contracting.
Please understand there is a time and a place for the FAR but SLS is not it.
They are looking for meaningful work to do on/with ISS. No one thinks throw away systems are the way to go. So instead we are spending billions on a nonsensical mission decades in the future. Even the first manned flight, according to the latest data, will not happen until 2 full decades after the start of Orion.
If the goal is #1 to keep people working, then there is plenty that could have been in work to support ISS and future planetary missions; The longer before this thing flies, the more likely it will all be cancelled and then we will have wasted decades and $$billions.
Is any Science Mission PI going to design their spacecraft so large that it can only be launched on the SLS??
That’s not quite how it works. The announcements of opportunity usually specify a range of possible launch vehicles, and the PI (well, the proposal) just say what capabilities the mission would need. There are incentives for needing capabilities at the low end of the range, and penalties for needing capabilities at the high end of the range. NASA picks and pays for a launch vehicle which satisfies the requirements of the mission they selected.
But a proposal which needs something outside the specified range is just non-compliant and wouldn’t be selected (technically, NASA wouldn’t even have to review it.)
For the last round of Discovery missions, an Atlas IV heavy was definitely off the top of the list, and I think most of the higher-capability Atlas V configurations were as well. So it isn’t a question of what the PI of a proposal would do. It’s what NASA would allow in the AO. I’m not seeing a SLS getting on the list for a Discovery, or even a New Frontiers, AO.
Just to cause trouble, I wonder how a Falcon Heavy will fit in, once they become available. The wording in past Discovery AOs talked about high and low “performance” within the allowed range. I think a Falcon Heavy would be low or intermediate cost to NASA, but technically “high performance.” I wonder if a proposal would be penalized for requiring that.