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Commercialization

GAO Reports Significant Delays in Commercial Crew Launch Dates (Update)

By Keith Cowing
NASA Watch
February 17, 2017
Filed under , , ,
GAO Reports Significant Delays in Commercial Crew Launch Dates (Update)

Shotwell to GAO: “The [heck] we won’t fly before 2019”, SpacePolicyOnline
“SpaceX President and COO Gwynne Shotwell reacted to GAO’s report yesterday that commercial crew flights may slip from 2018 to 2019 by expressing utmost confidence in her company’s schedule. At a Kennedy Space Center (KSC) press conference today in advance of SpaceX’s commercial cargo launch tomorrow, she said the company’s response to GAO is “The [heck] we won’t fly before 2019.”
NASA Commercial Crew Program: Schedule Pressure Increases as Contractors Delay Key Events
“Both of the Commercial Crew Program’s contractors have made progress developing their crew transportation systems, but both also have aggressive development schedules that are increasingly under pressure. The two contractors – Boeing and Space Exploration Technologies, Corp. (SpaceX) – are developing transportation systems that must meet the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) standards for human spaceflight – a process called certification. Both Boeing and SpaceX have determined that they will not be able to meet their original 2017 certification dates and both expect certification to be delayed until 2018. The schedule pressures are amplified by NASA’s need to provide a viable crew transportation option to the International Space Station (ISS) before its current contract with Russia’s space agency runs out in 2019. If NASA needs to purchase additional seats from Russia, the contracting process typically takes 3 years. Without a viable contingency option for ensuring uninterrupted access to the ISS in the event of further Commercial Crew delays, NASA risks not being able to maximize the return on its multibillion dollar investment in the space station.”

NASA Watch founder, Explorers Club Fellow, ex-NASA, Away Teams, Journalist, Space & Astrobiology, Lapsed climber.

33 responses to “GAO Reports Significant Delays in Commercial Crew Launch Dates (Update)”

  1. Henry Vanderbilt says:
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    We’d really rather not have this “We Told You So” about the Crew program’s transition to cost-plus (later correction, sub “FARs-based” for “cost-plus”) with attendant insertion of NASA bureaucrats into the middle of the contractors’ design processes. But, as predicted almost four years ago ( http://www.space-access.org… ) it’s happening as expected.

    From the GAO report leadoff summary:

    “The Commercial Crew Program is using mechanisms laid out in its contracts to gain a high level of visibility into the contractors’ crew transportation systems.”

    “..but the level of visibility that the program has required thus far has also taken more time than the program or contractors anticipated.”

    “Moving forward though, the program office could face difficult choices about how to maintain the level of visibility it feels it needs without adding to the program’s schedule pressures.”

    Which is more diplomatically worded than last summer’s NASA IG report, at https://oig.nasa.gov/audits…, which said

    “..both companies must satisfy NASA’s safety review process to ensure they meet Agency human-rating requirements. As part of the certification process, Boeing and SpaceX conduct safety reviews and report to NASA on potential hazards and their plans for mitigating risks. We found significant delays in NASA’s evaluation and approval of these hazard reports and related requests for variances from NASA requirements that increase the risk costly redesign work may be required late in development, which could further delay certification. Although NASA’s goal is to complete its review within 8 weeks of receipt of a hazard report, the contractors told us reviews can take as long as 6 months. We also found NASA does not monitor the overall timeliness of its safety review process.”

    • RocketScientist327 says:
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      Brilliant as usual Henry.

    • Michael Spencer says:
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      After the previous SX loss- the one with the internal strut issue- Gerst said that would havve taken NASA 6 months just to empanel the experts. SX solved the problem a lot sooner than that.

      This piece of frank honesty has remained in my mind, especially when I see reports like this one.

      • Daniel Woodard says:
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        I agree. It’s not the paperwork that keeps you alive at Mach 25.

        • fcrary says:
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          Yes, and I’ve said the same thing about unmanned missions. Don’t do massive, pre-launch work to eliminate problems. Instead, build in the ability to deal with problems when they come up after launch. Unfortunately, that is considered a defeatist attitude.

          • Mal Peterson says:
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            Wow! If the engineers know about a problem prelaunch, they should fix it. (Caveat: unless the launch is required to respond to an emergency and the risk is understood.)

            Designing the capability to fix “known unknowns” and “unk unks” problems that may develop after launch is tough enough. Ergo, redundancy built into the design from the outset coupled with software reprogramming capabilities, etc. Where performance/mass/size — and cost/schedule — constraints make it feasible to add such capabilities, that is done and has been done for many decades on all but the least costly spacecraft.

            But, if they proceed to launch with a known problem detected during testing or prior flights, a redundant system using the same hardware design may have the same problem and loss of mission may result….As for unk unks, the Hubble’s mirror flaw was not known prelaunch, but the Shuttle servicing design decision allowed repair capability on orbit. That decision, controversial at the time, enabled the mission to be saved.

          • fcrary says:
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            Edit: I just realized you and I may not be taking about the same sort of “fixing in flight.” My experience is with planetary missions, so sending up a repairman isn’t an option. I meant diagnosing the problem and finding work-arounds which restore the intended functionality (or as much of it as possible.)

            I wasn’t necessarily talking about known, pre-launch problems. (Although you might want to consider a known problem with a low probability of coming up in flight, and very high cost to fix. E.g. 1% risk of minor loss of science data versus 20% increase in mission cost to fix.)

            I was talking about hypothetical problems, which sometimes consume a large amount of prelaunch work. That is, problems which may or may not be real, but where someone pointed out that it’s theoretically possible and the risk should be studied or mitigated. That’s fine to some extent, but it can get out of hand.

            In terms of fixing problems in flight, I’ve done that quite a few times and it isn’t fun. What you describe isn’t always the usual practice. I will, for example, never let someone design telemetry which is a instantaneous value measured every N seconds (where N can’t be changed by command.) That’s how most housekeeping on Cassini works (N=64 in that case) and it’s often useless when problems come up. You can have a voltage transient lasting a tenth of a second and never see it. I’ve become a strong fan of returning a minimum, maximum and average.

            Software isn’t always reprogrammable, or more properly, some of it is firmware burned into a FPGA or something similar. If you design it with problem-solving in mind, you can get almost as much flexibility by having most things configured by reloadable data tables.

            Those are examples of relatively easy things to do, but which aren’t always done. I think it would be better to do things like that, than spend lots of time and effort trying to solve a hypothetical problem which may never actually occur and which won’t be too harmful if it does.

        • Bill Housley says:
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          You rhymned, Daniel. That was cool. Did you mean to do that?

    • Jeff2Space says:
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      Wow, that’s pretty scathing wording in last summer’s NASA IG report. More proof that excessive NASA “oversight” is detrimental to both cost and schedule.

    • NewSpace Paleontologist says:
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      SpaceX and Boeing do not have to satisfy NASA requirements to launch crew. All they have to do is get the FAA launch and reentry license and have willing passengers/crew. Similar to commercial payload launches all the government approval you need is the FAA license showing you adequately worry 3rd party damage. The customer and his insurance must be convinced you represent a reasonable risk vs cost of the payload vs cost of insurance.

      In NASA Commercial Crew, to be paid by NASA to carry NASA astronauts, they must satisfy the NASA safety requirements for the launch vehicle and crew vehicle and prove there is acceptable risk. If they dock to ISS they must satisfy the visiting vehicle requirements. Same basic premise as commercial payloads.

      Both SpaceX and Boeing had extraordinary control over the requirements and contract provisions. They are even getting progress payments, They even set the schedule.

      No whining. If the providers think NASA is too stringent then let them launch a few strictly commercial (non-NASA) crews, build a history, then approach NASA.

      • Henry Vanderbilt says:
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        An interesting point there: The ISS visiting vehicle requirements are not trivial, but they are set and finite and with enough effort practicable. They were politically forced to be written so, since international partners have to deal with them.

        (This is a major reason for Commercial Cargo’s success, by the way – they had only set, finite, practicable standards to meet.)

        NASA crew safety requirements, not so much. For the longest time they were never even codified in one place in a set form with internal contradictions resolved – they were in effect whatever NASA said they were.

        I understand that has at least in theory been fixed, that they are in theory codified, set, finite, and with enough effort practicable. (I have serious doubts about that.) I do not envy the Commercial Crew contractors currently getting to be guinea pigs for the first test of that.

        BUT. The chief point of the OIG and GAO reports is that, regardless of whether NASA crew safety requirements are finitely practicable, NASA is _failing to provide the contractors with feedback and decisions about those requirements on any timely basis_.

        _Egregious NASA bureaucratic failure is a leading source of the current Crew Program delays._

        Which I would take as a clue that even NASA doesn’t understand their own current crew safety standards. YM, of course, MV.

        • savuporo says:
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          > NASA bureaucratic failure is a leading source of the current Crew Program delays

          This is quite unsubstantiated. Both contractors have run into a ton of technical issues fully their own making. And, blowing up launch pads and the very same customer’s payloads is not helping, either.

          • Henry Vanderbilt says:
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            “We found significant delays in NASA’s evaluation and approval of these hazard reports and related requests for variances from NASA requirements that increase the risk costly redesign work may be required late in development, which could further delay certification.”

            – the NASA OIG report.

            Sounds pretty substantiated to me.

      • Paul451 says:
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        No whining. If the providers think NASA is too stringent

        Just to emphasise one point: OIG and GAO are Federal bodies, they are not “the providers”.

        The agencies appointed by the government to oversee it’s own spending lays much of the blame for delays at the feed of NASA, not “the providers”.

      • Bill Housley says:
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        The day will come when that will be true in practice. But right now NASA is the only paying customer for this service, and this stuff costs money. Boeing would likely not even be building their capsule without a paid contract. SpaceX is motivated differently, but NASA is internationally recognized as experts in human spaceflight, the FAA isn’t (yet). So NASA is not only the customer to please, but they are also the University and the folks handing out the diplomas.

    • fcrary says:
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      When did Commercial Crew “transition” to cost-plus funding? As far as I know it is, and has always been, funded by firm fixed cost contracts.

      • Henry Vanderbilt says:
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        My bad. In haste, I used “cost-plus” as an equivalent for “FARs-based”, having run into the combination so often in the past.

        The actual transition in question was in 2014, from Space-Act-Agreement based contracts where NASA was kept at arm’s-length from contractor internal processes, to FARs-based contracts where NASA is apparently dead in the middle of the processes gumming things up.

        Worst of both worlds, really, when you don’t get paid any more no matter how much the customer micromanages and delays. Been there, didn’t enjoy it.

    • Bill Housley says:
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      I like Gwynne Shotwell. She’s spunky with a cool name. However, getting things done a little slower will not endanger the company…blowing up another rocket will.

  2. BlueMoon says:
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    NASA is going to pay more money to Boeing than to SpaceX, and more than they wouid have paid Sierra Nevada, in expectation that Boeing’s expertise would make it the provider with the lowest technical and schedule risk. That has not been a good bet by NASA so far, based on technical performance to-date (I have some insight into CCP efforts, from the Gov’t-side) and the projected schedules.

    • Mal Peterson says:
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      Re: Your “in expectation….” comment. Facts are: Space-X asked for less financial support in their proposal. Received what they asked for. Boeing, in their proposal, asked for a higher amount. Received what they asked for.

      • fcrary says:
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        Which means one of two things. Either cost was not a factor in the rating of the proposals (I really doubt that) or that some other factor compensated for high cost in the Boeing proposal. Lower technical and schedule risk is a very plausible, compensating factor.

        • Henry Vanderbilt says:
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          I could argue that a perception of lower schedule & technical risk for Boeing in this was mistaken, even at the time.

          I can sum that argument up as, what corporate experience advantage over Sierra Nevada? Fifty years ago North American was prime on the Apollo capsule, then North American much later was absorbed by Rockwell, which was then absorbed by Boeing.

          Hard to argue that the current remaining Boeing “Apollo capsule heritage” consists of anything more than their marketing department having the basic competence to utter that phrase with a straight face…

          (I’m pretty sure I actually did so argue at the time, but blest if I know where at this point.)

  3. Matthew Black says:
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    To the surprise of probably no one… 🙁 Very disappointing.

  4. Saturn1300 says:
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    SpaceX needs to have a stable design to support
    certification. In addition to planned design changes, there could be
    unplanned design changes for the Falcon 9. During qualification testing i
    n
    2015, SpaceX identified cracks in the turbines of its engine. Additional
    cracks were later identified. Program officials told us that they have
    informed SpaceX that the cracks are an unacceptable risk for human
    spaceflight. SpaceX officials told us that
    they are working closely with
    NASA to eliminate these cracks in order to meet NASA
    ’s stringent targets
    for human rating. Specifically, SpaceX has made design changes that,
    according to its officials, did not result in any cracking during initial life testing. Great to hear they have that fixed. LF rockets just keep having problems. Try SRB NASA.
    They must have an auto abort. Tricky to recognize that one is needed. It took about 1 sec. for the Amos sat. to tip over. They need auto abort for sure. Bird strikes were mentioned. Nothing to protect damage to parachutes or tanks that I know of. Need to shoot a dead chicken at Dragon 2. The sides are steeply inclined. Should just deflect. How is a short crewed visit says it works, when Dragon will have to stay for 6 months?

    • fcrary says:
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      What additional cracks? The recent GAO report was just a restatement of the problem SpaceX reported in 2015, with details about how NASA and SpaceX were dealing with it. I’m afraid I can’t make any sense out of the rest of your comments.

  5. JadedObs says:
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    Two observations:

    1) Kudos to SpaceX for being in roughly the same position as Boeing who has done this type of thing for much longer.

    2) So much for “Commercial” being magic. Neither the old line company working under a commercial contracting arrangement nor the new start is delivering so much better than the other – or than expected!

    Space is hard and being “commercial” is no assurance of success – recall this when discussing SLS!

    • BlueMoon says:
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      Both Boeing and SpaceX are not delivering better than expected? Huh? Both are now projected to be about TWO YEARS behind the certification and flight milestones in the original contracts they signed. Some of that slippage may be due to less funding from Congress than requested by NASA. How much, I do not know. I wonder if Mr. Gerstenmaier is as satisfied with the contractors’ performance to-date as you are. I hope not.

      On the other hand, maybe NASA was over-optimistic about ability of any company to meet NASA’s CCP-unique requirements on-schedule and on-cost, so where we are now is completely understandable in hind-sight.

      Either way, as a taxpayer, I am less than pleased.

  6. Vladislaw says:
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    Gosh . maybe if the congress cut some more funding to the Commercial crew program it would speed it up …. https://uploads.disquscdn.c

    • Michael Spencer says:
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      Sure, why not? It works for taxes, apparently, the principle being the lower the tax rate the highest the return.

      • Vladislaw says:
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        Except that it does not always work. Reagan slashed taxes and then had to raise taxes 11 times to make up for the lost revenue. It is a myth that Reagan’s tax cuts increased revenue.

        “But we can get even more specific about the impact of the 1981 cut in rates. A Treasury Department study on the impact of tax bills since 1940, first released in 2006 and later updated, found that the 1981 tax cut reduced revenues by $208 billion in its first four years. (These figures are rendered in constant 2012 dollars.) The tax reform act of 1986, which was designed to be revenue neutral, reduced revenues by less than $1 billion four years after enactment.

        But Reagan’s tax increases in 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1987 boosted revenue by $137 billion. Overall, that’s a revenue loss from Reagan’s various tax bills, but it also shows that Moore is crediting to Reagan’s tax cuts revenues generated by Reagan’s tax increases.”

        What is more they knew this from the start.

        “That’s actually not readily apparent from the data. Certainly, the share of taxes paid by the top 1 percent went from 17.9 percent in 1981 to 25.2 percent in 1989, for an increase of 37 percent, according to IRS data. But the income share of the top 1 percent increased even more dramatically, from 8.3 percent to 14.2 percent—a gain of 71 percent. So a lot of the increase in taxes came from a more dramatic increase in wealth.

        Moore directed us to a paper he co-wrote in 1996 while at the Cato Institute, which offered a defense of the Reagan economic record. As we said, that’s for economic historians to sort out. But the paper says it was “an enduring myth” that Reagan officials believed tax cuts would pay for themselves. “This was nonsense from day one, because the credible evidence overwhelmingly indicates that revenue feedbacks from tax cuts is 35 cents per dollar, at most,” the paper says, noting that “the Reagan administration never assumed that the tax cuts would pay for themselves.””

        https://www.washingtonpost….