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Commercialization

GAO Report On Solid Rocket Motor Industrial Base

By Keith Cowing
NASA Watch
October 26, 2017
Filed under
GAO Report On Solid Rocket Motor Industrial Base

Solid Rocket Motors: DOD and Industry Are Addressing Challenges to Minimize Supply Concerns, GAO
“The consolidation in the SRM industrial base has also been accompanied by a decrease of suppliers throughout the supply chain. For example, one SRM manufacturer estimated a decrease in suppliers, from approximately 5,000 to 1,000, over the last 20 years. This increases the risk of production delays and disruptions in the event that key components and materials available from a single source become unavailable from that source. GAO found that DOD and industry are taking steps to identify and mitigate these risks, such as by establishing alternative sources and requiring advance notice when suppliers are considering exiting the market.”

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3 responses to “GAO Report On Solid Rocket Motor Industrial Base”

  1. Daniel Woodard says:
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    For actual missiles up to the Trident that must be ready on a minute’s notice unfortunately liquid propellants are not practical, and some kind of production capability is needed. For space launch the new generation (Falcon, Glenn) dispense entirely with solids. That leaves SLS…

    The smaller SRMs used for missiles are complex, but not that complex. If one SRM manufacturer had 5000 suppliers, it suggests that maybe some things are being contracted out that could more economically have been done in-house. Maybe this is the company resulting from the merger of Hercules, Thiokol, Alliant, and Orbital.

  2. numbers_guy101 says:
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    At the end of the day, DoD leadership has to ask themselves if they are going to address being left as a last and unique user of any technology like solid rocket motors by (A) assuming national wealth will always just fund ever increasing budgets for ever increasing costs, on an Augustine’s Law cost curve, or (B) undertaking management approaches that reward ever lower costs for more product. For the later, preserving competition is key, prohibiting mergers, investing in and rewarding totally new players or approaches that show they can do what’s needed much more cheaply, and avoiding lock-in with entrenched contractors, state and political stakeholders. Barring the later, because political interests are too powerful, or because we accept that “the system” just can’t move that fast, spells out how you have to assume
    (A) will always work, a questionable assumption close to burying your head in the sand to avoid danger.