Mocking Cost Overruns And Schedule Slips At NASA (Update)
Keith’s note: This Powerpoint chart (enlarge) was shown yesterday by NASA Astrophysics Division Director Paul Hertz to the Astro2020 Decadal Survey Committee Meeting at the National Academy of Science where they are working on the next decadal plan. At the heart of this plan is a strategic discussion of what resources can reasonable be expected to be available during the time frame under consideration and how to prioritize their wish list accordingly. We’re all familiar with the immense cost overruns and schedule delays for the Webb Space Telescope.
I have watched Paul Hertz make these sort of presentations over the years. It is obvious that he has spent far too much time inside the alternate reality bubble at NASA and is unaware how charts like this can be interpreted by external eyes or, via webstreaming, that his words can be heard by external audiences. To be certain this is one chart from a larger presentation that I did not hear. That is the problem with NASA Powerpoint charts and their stilted language. When they escape into the wild they stand on their own without context as this chart has. But the words say what they say. Nowhere do we see words to the effect that cost overruns and schedule slips are bad and are to be avoided. Why state the obvious, eh? Maybe if it gets stated more often people at NASA will start to pay attention to these delays/overruns.
As NASA Administrator Bridenstine noted in testimony before the Senate yesterday “NASA has not been good at realistic budgets and schedules. We need to get better at that. … We have a long history at NASA for cost and schedule not being set in a realistic way and that leads to a lack of confidence in people – such as this committee.” Whether it is Webb or Mars landers or SLS NASA has some major work to do to restore confidence in its budgeting and program management.
As such you would think that official NASA presentations would take the matter seriously and not be flippant or try and debunk cost overrun “myths” or negate their impact as not being all that bad. Moreover, one would think that the Administrator’s concerns would translate into a more serious tone about the budget realities that lie ahead and not feed the collective denial among space scientists who think that they are running all of their programs just fine and more money is always available.
Just sayin’
I sent a request to Paul Hertz, SMD, and PAO asking “Can you provide me with the background information used by SMD to reach the conclusions stated on this chart? Also: are there any charts in your presentation that state that cost overruns and schedule slips are bad and are to be avoided?” Hertz will ignore my request.
Keith’s note: Response from Paul Hertz (surprised me): “My complete chart set is posted at https://www8.nationalacademies.org/pa/projectview.aspx?key=51398#MeetingId11211.
You posted Chart 59.
“Are there any charts in your presentation that state that cost overruns and schedule slips are bad and are to be avoided?” — See charts 69-72.
“NASA has always spent 55%-70% of the annual budget on developing large missions.” – See Chart 58. This statement is only about Astrophysics (that was clear in the context of the presentation, but it is not explicitly stated).
“When a flagship overruns, it delays the next flagship. NASA protects R&A and the Explorers from flagship overruns to maintain a balanced program.” – See Chart 36 (amount of funding for R&A or Explorers during period of Webb overruns). This statement is only about Astrophysics (that was clear in the context of the presentation, but it is not explicitly stated).
“The reduction in Explorer launch rate around 2010 was due to a reduction in the overall Astrophysics budget.” – See Chart 36 (top line from FY09 to FY13).”
It sounds like a good argument against flagships, and for a higher flight rate on more standardized robotic spacecraft – and I say that as someone who really liked the flagship missions we’ve gotten.
The context of the slide was that some researchers in the astronomy community perceive that flagship expenditures have increased at the expense of smaller explorer missions or research grant programs. Paul was rebutting those misperceptions. That is all.
An interesting possibility I see is that if Bridenstine decided to correctly baseline the SLS project and then determines it has gone 30% cost over baseline, he can essentially cancel the project. If he makes that determination then Congress, by law, must reauthorize SLS with additional spending. Orion is pretty much in the same boat, though maybe less at risk.
The full presentation does have a few other things I find disturbing. There is an entire slide titles, “NASA is “Not a Science Agency””. It basically says the NSF is chartered to support science, and NASA is chartered to do things in space. Science might be what NASA does in space, but NASA is “mission-oriented”. The implication is that flying missions is the core goal. On a later slide, “Why Flagships” is three reasons are given:
Flagships drive science
Flagships drive US capabilities and contribute to US leadership
Flagships drive NASA budget and create stakeholder support
It bothers me that the science mission directorate is saying science isn’t really the primary goal of flagship missions. But the fact that one of the goals of flagship missions is to “drive” NASA’s budget is pretty appalling. Not necessarily surprising, but actually saying in a public presentation to the National Academies Decadal Survey panel is surprising.
Maybe the first part of draining the swamp is admitting there is one and Administrator Bridenstine is encouraging them to do so to build a foundation to change it at NASA.
“Myth-When a flagship mission overruns, it eats into the rest of the program.”
Sorry, that’s not a myth. Unless it’s a total coincidence that astrophysics missions I have been on (that were’t run by the same place running JW) were amazingly squeezed at the same time, to the level of having to go through the entire org chart to the last person, justifying every single thing they did, while they tried to squeeze every last dime.
Similarly it would be worth looking at the 2010, almost wholesale, disengagement of NASA from international missions such as EXO Mars & LISA with ESA. The explicit reasons given at that time were JWST budgetary pressures. So the position is a nonsense.
One also can’t help but notice that the cost comparison trying to justify JWST is made to HST, the most expensive by far of the flagship missions.
… and the most comparable from a mission and technology standpoint…
That’s too interesting! Hertz’s replies to your questions KC are all countered by his very own chart 79 in the package, where a simple budgetary view across the years in fact shows that Webb DID eat into the rest of astrophysics starting in 2010 and peaking in 2016.
His chart 59 you put up here where his myth busting was that NASA “always spent 55%-70% of the annual [astrophysics] budget on developing large missions” simply neglects that there’s a BIG difference between 55 and 70%. Which is it – 55 or 70%?! LOL. That “always” should have gone with a single percent rule of thumb or a VERY narrow percent range.
Funny, we see what we want to see.