A Waste Of Space, Scientific American
“More likely, Kelly’s and Kornienko’s tests will just confirm in greater detail what we already know from several previous long-duration missions: Our current space habitats are not adequate for voyages to other worlds. The lack of money to build these habitats, more than any lack of medical knowledge, is what keeps humans from Mars and other off-world destinations. … It would be unfair to blame NASA alone for this shortsightedness. Integrating artificial gravity and better propulsion into its human spaceflight program would require many billions of dollars, and that money is not forthcoming from Congress. So NASA has struck a pragmatic course, tinkering with well-worn technologies instead of spending the financial and political capital to develop new ones.”
Keith’s note: Will NASA learn anything from the one year space twins study? Yes, of course they will. Will this knowledge help us “go to Mars”? (gotta use that phrase once a day, right NASA?). Who knows. Not likely. The studies are superficial and scattered in their focus. As this article notes NASA will, at best, simply understand their collective lack of capability to semi-safely send humans to Mars slightly better. Meanwhile, NASA will still kick the can down the road to Mars (I used the Mars meme twice, NASA!). NASA does not have the money or the scientific strategy to actually answer the questions it needs to answer. So they grab everything they can slap a Mars label on it and proclaim progress on the road to Mars (three times!).
As was the case with John Glenn’s mission to solve aging problems in space we will never see the results of this research – in any form – that NASA uses to justify the hype surrounding this otherwise ho hum stay aboard ISS. And we will still be in Earth – not Mars – orbit. And the news media will still be confused which twin has the moustache.
The ISS still has an amazing untapped potential to actually address these very real issues of human physiology and long duration spaceflight with direct applicability to Mars. But NASA is simply not up to the task of using these resources in a concerted, strategic, long-term fashion – and assembling the resources to do so. They just make it up as they go. And their poorly equipped junior partner CASIS is simply clueless.
– NASA Astronaut Scott Kelly Available for Interviews before One-Year Space Station Mission
– Correcting NASA’s Inaccurate Budget Infographic, earlier post
Personally I see this experiment as a bit of a stunt. The Kelly’s may be identical twins, but they are not identical. They are different individuals, have led different lives since birth, and most importantly have flown different amounts of time in space. Maybe the study is well thought out, but my gut tells me that there are too many other variables that will be hard to control for.
Their identical genomes are expressed differently – and that expression increases in difference the longer that they are separate individuals. Yes they will likely have a much greater similarity in response than non-identical twins to environmental factors, but different life histories, times in space, diet, and a thousand other things will also decrease the similarities in response and adaptation. It will be interesting – if the data are ever actually release that lets us see how each one responded – but astronauts are notorious in their refusal to allow the release of any data in a fashion that can be traced back to an individual. In a study like this, that’s the interesting data so … what’s the point?
Actually no, it won’t, except to say that much more will be known about these two particular people; generalizing ‘up’ is a very risky endeavor not favored in scientific research.
When I read that story in SA I finally realized the answer to a long-held question: “why isn’t NASA using the station for something productive?”
The answer is now obvious: they haven’t thought of a productive use.
“Hey, kids! Let’s put on a show! Heck, I know it’s not Hollywood or nothun’, but nobody will notice!
Why, I can dance, and Molly over here why she’s a darn good little singer! An’ I know tons of folks would come! So, wadda ya say!?”
It does, actually, when n=1.
These are well grounded arguments which generate one of many questions. Mine is: how does the appointment of an MIT engineering professor as the Deputy NASA Administrator help NASA’s cause in exploring Mars? NASA needs very strong leadership (political guts) from its administrators and the Congress in order to guide the Agency to Mars and beyond. This leadership also brings with it the vast financials resources that will turn dreams into reality. Is Dr Newman a strong leader with political guts? Or, will she just tow the party line of PR BS that we have all seen thru the past decades?
As long as the can gets kicked down the road, NASA will never travel anywhere beyond LEO. China will get to Mars first before any other country. She will do it because she has discipline, political guts, patience , and lots of money.
Correct on the first three factors. As to the fourth, check the relative budgets, and then substitute ‘more thoughtful use of available funds’.
[You could add ‘stealing tech from the west’, I suppose, but that’s another thread.
Twin studies of one sort or another have been going on for a hundred years. I’m not a doctor and I know that “identical” twins aren’t identical. If find it highly unlikely that the researchers involved in this study don’t know this as well. Having the same genomes removes a lot of variables and the researchers probably know what is relevant and what isn’t.
Keith’s point about the data not be released because of privacy concerns is a good one. I can only hope that the data is made available to other researchers. What control protocols NASA has for that data are probably already established.
You’ll never see any data that can be attributed to John Glenn’s mission where there was an n = 1 when it came to research specimens since you’d know that the data referred to him.
This mission is a publicity stunt. To get valid results we need valid statistical data and a sample size of 1 is an anecdote, not data. The Russians could provide us with a sample size of 2 if they get or release data, but that is probably not going to happen.
The “John Glenn” mission was also a publicity stunt and contributed very little to usable scientific data.
This is the best NASA can do, or thinks they can do, with what they got (or think they can get.) We need a proper propulsion module for the ISS ASAP (probably solar-electric) or we really will lose the ISS (unbelievable as that sounds); and as soon as possible after that, a proper crew centrifuge module where we can actually study the long term effects of sub-earth gravity levels. Can’t even begin to design a mission for Mars without that.
This is basic work that needs to be done before we can be serious about going to Mars (or even long-term to the Moon). People who care about human space exploration, and understand anything, need to be campaigning inside and outside of the government, to get these things into the program, scheduled, and funded.
“Will this knowledge help us “go to Mars”? (gotta use that phrase once a day, right NASA?)”
So sadly true.
It is perfectly possible to do human space flight that has nothing whatsoever to do with going to Mars, ever. In fact, it is not just possible, but quite pragmatic and laudable. Mars obsession is rapidly becoming the principle road block to actually making real and useful progress in human space flight.
Maybe they just felt the need to justify the oft-repeated claim that the ISS plays some role in the future of manned space flight beyond Earth orbit? That would be my guess. After all, it’s not like the ISS is actually flight testing any modules, technology, suits or anything actually flying to Mars in a direct or even derived form.
I hope there’s more than a few people in NASA rueing all the time that could have been used to test new hardware or procedures.
I do not agree. The closed cycle ECLSS and the Sabatier are major steps froward and likely to be prototypes for what will fly on a planetary mission. The modules, nodes and racks might all be used for future spacecraft and there are some modules left over, sitting in NASA facilities, waiting to be outfitted and flown.
It is true that in the past NASA has always built a spaceship, thrown it away, then started over. It need not be the case.
Good editorial, honest assessment. What more can one say?
The editorial reflects NASA’s failure of imagination since Shuttle. Apollo and Shuttle development both reflected bold new ways forward. NASA created what had never existed before. It was new, bold and exciting. Station started out looking at new systems and capabilities. There were solar dynamic power generators. Their were centrifuges. There was a free flying platform for conducting investigations that could not be conducted on the primary manned base.
Shuttle, once it began to operate, went into dormancy in development. Even though there were plenty of lessons being learned that demanded modifications and improvements, the entire management became engrossed solely in ‘operating’.
Even mission control, which during Apollo was made up of “flight controllers”, changed their outlook and the people on console became known simply as “operators”. Then the operators 100% moved into and took over program management and nothing new was done. The foam shedding problem, well known before Columbia, demanded attention but instead the operators turned their heads and looked the other way like it wasn’t their department or their responsibility.
After Columbia, instead of fix the problem, the operators decided it was best to throw it all away and start over. The problem of expense of operation was more because of an overly complicated and too large management structure, something which was made even worse and more inefficient with ISS and which continues today.
In fact NASA gave up on innovation and new development. They tried to hire innovation out to commercial operators. Space X is proving successful at it; mainly because they are bypassing NASA. As far as ideas for the future, there were concepts like Nautilus X and Cislunar Cruiser, but instead of new and innovative we went with old tech, Apollo on steroids, Orion. What a waste.
More like Apollo on vitamins.
Geyer revealed recently that the only way the Orion mission flew last year was because the missing systems got the spacecraft mass below the parachute capacity. They now have a serious problem to try and reduce the mass for the next flight while adding working systems and figuring out why the pressure vessel split during proof testing. Apollo on vitamins? Maybe it won’t make it quite that far?
Do have a source for Geyer’s comments?
This was a recent Geyer interview, though the problem has been well known for years and has been repeatedly identified in GAO reports.
They started out with a mass that was too high for the size of the parachutes, but there is no room in the parachute compartment to permit larger chutes.
They failed to control mass and systems size from the outset. The size of Orion was never optimized for the crew size. Orion started out too large for its mission. They repeatedly downsized the vehicle. Then they downsized the crew. But their downsizing efforts were inadequate and the vehicle mass is still too great for the parachutes.
The GAO reported that for the first flight, last year, mass would be OK but that with a fully functional vehicle with a crew, mass would prove a serious challenge. Geyer was reiterating this conundrum. Unfortunately, nearly 10 years into the program its tough to get the mass back in the envelope.
Well, it will certainly be interesting, then, to see what the final product will be, especially since it sounds as if Orion needs a serious revision or three.
Control of weight, cost and performance is critical in the development of a spacecraft or aircraft. As Kelly Johnson made clear, unless one lead designer has direct control of all these key variables you will get an aircraft designed by a committee.
In programs I have worked, a control mass was established that was below the capabilities of the systems, and a margin was maintained in the expectation that mass would grow.
In the case of Orion, the mass started at a level that was beyond the capability of the booster to launch and beyond the capability of the parachutes to carry, and ever since they have been trying to get the mass down to the capability of the systems.
This defies logic and good engineering sense. NASA now has a system that does not work.
If there is a real mission with scientific objectives behind the year long flight, its too bad NASA did such a poor job communicating what it is. Or maybe the bloggers on this post are correct and there is really nothing behind it?
I wonder why NASA cannot seem to get its communications act together. Are they really so disorganized and incompetent?
There is a difference between a case history and a population study. A study with only one or two subjects doesn’t allow prediction for an entire population but it can provide useful observations and increase our understanding. Much of science is incremental. The simple fact that people can remain in weightlessness for over a year without experiencing disabling problems is useful. An identical twin is not required for such a study, but provides a better comparison than someone of dissimilar background.