SpaceX and Boeing delays could mean more money for Russia, NASA watchdog says, Washington Post
“Boeing has already said it would have to push back its first crewed flights to early 2018. SpaceX has maintained that it would fly by the end of 2017. But the IG investigators weren’t buying either of those timetables: “Notwithstanding the contractors’ optimism, based on the information we gathered during our audit, we believe it unlikely that either Boeing or SpaceX will achieve certified, crewed flight to the ISS until late 2018.”
Commercial crew now delayed until at least 2018, report finds, Ars Technica
“Sources at Johnson Space Center, which plays a secondary role in managing the commercial crew program to Kennedy Space Center, have privately told Ars for months that neither Boeing nor SpaceX would fly in 2017. Moreover, these sources have said, it will be fortunate if either company launches test flights, with crew, during the second half of 2018. The key factor to watch now is whether NASA procures additional seats from the Russians to deliver NASA astronauts to the International Space Station in 2019 and beyond.”
NASA OIG: NASA’S Commercial Crew Program: Update on Development and Certification Efforts
“Moreover, both companies must satisfy NASA’s safety review process to ensure they meet Agency human-rating requirements. As part of the certification process, Boeing and SpaceX conduct safety reviews and report to NASA on potential hazards and their plans for mitigating risks. We found significant delays in NASA’s evaluation and approval of these hazard reports and related requests for variances from NASA requirements that increase the risk costly redesign work may be required late in development, which could further delay certification. Although NASA’s goal is to complete its review within 8 weeks of receipt of a hazard report, the contractors told us reviews can take as long as 6 months. We also found NASA does not monitor the overall timeliness of its safety review process. Given delays in the Commercial Crew Program, NASA has extended its contract with Roscosmos for astronaut transportation through 2018 at an additional cost of $490 million or $82 million a seat for six more seats. If the Program experiences additional delays, NASA may need to buy additional seats from Russia to ensure a continued U.S. presence on the ISS.”
Although NASA’s goal is to complete its review within 8 weeks of receipt of a hazard report, the contractors told us reviews can take as long as 6 months.
This is a common problem with any review of a document by NASA. If a contractor was 1 hour late in delivery, we got dinged. NASA can blow deadlines by months and there is no consequence – even if it drives up costs.
“But we’re understaffed! And we are over-worked!”
I’ve seen that quite a bit with technical requirements for hardware, and from contractors as well as NASA. If someone provide a number (whether it’s six months for a review, or “the 30 V line will really be 30 V, +- no more than 1%”) they will get in trouble if they can’t deliver on that number. So there is a large tendency to error on the side of caution. To say six months, even if you only expect it to take two. To say 30 V +- 10%, when you really expect you can manage +-0.5%.
But yes, you are entirely correct about the cost impact. And, for flight hardware, there are also mass and power penalties. That voltage stability requirement example is a real one. One that forced instruments to deal with the non-existent possibility of a noisy input power line.
I wonder about your observation: do you see the same thing in private industry?
If anything, at least with respect to schedules, in the case of Mr. Musk schedules are over-stated, probably due to an inherent sense of personal optimism. I wonder if the same thing translates down the ladder.
Take your example of 30 volts. Guys learn they can provide that but there could be a spike at some point during the ride up, a spike that could be handled quite nicely with existing suppression technology. SpaceX has the ability to weigh the options. I wonder what NASA would do in this situation.
I’ve been on the pointy-end of the governmental spear from time to time; when an agency will require a change in a planning submittal that has no real effect on the project while the agency insists on compliance. One gets the sense from reading many posts from people who know that there is a certain level of low-level CYA that is by the nature of the organization multiplied as the project develops.
The current price of “$82 million a seat” is a heck of a lot more than when NASA first started flying on Soyuz.
seller’s market.
It’s getting to the point where there won’t be enough crew rotations left in the life of the ISS program to make Commercial Crew worthwhile.