Bridenstine Reassures SLS/Orion Workforce

1. I wonder if he received a call from someone down Alabama way…

   1. Bridenstine will soon discover why we are stuck in LEO for decades now. I really doubt he will have enough political power to pull off a commercial EM-1. Because, once you do it once, and it proves to be much cheaper than SLS (an obvious outcome), you’re killing it for good, no matter what you write the workforce about… Is Congress going to allow the pork to end? Doubt it.

   2. I was thinking the same thing.

   3. I’d rather think the call would have come from just up the street at Capitol Hill.

      1. Doubtful. This Administration wants things to happen faster than they are at NASA. If a commercial option can do that, they’re going to support it.

         Edit. Yes, fcrary is right.

         1. He wrote, “Capitol Hill.” Most senators spend more time there (or near there) than in their home states.

2. NASA Administrator’s Office @ 7:18 AM

   Ring, Ring..
   NASA Administrator: “ Hello, can I help you?.
   NASA Administrator: “ Yes, good morning Senator Shelby”

3. Some one please help me understand.

   “Launching two heavy-lift rockets to get Orion to the Moon is not optimum or sustainable.”
   If that’s true then how can SLS be optimal or sustainable if one launch will cost more than two commercial available LV launches?

   “Docking crewed vehicles in Earth orbit to get to the Moon adds complexity and risk that is undesirable.”
   How is this any more complex or risky then docking crewed vehicles to the ISS in Earth orbit?

   1. I’m all for getting rid of SLS, but to answer your questions: Money aside, launching two vehicles is more complex and risky because it essentially doubles your chance of Loss of Mission, assuming all the vehicles have similar reliability. It requires procuring two launch vehicles (possibly from separate vendors) and requires both launches to proceed on a tight, coordinated schedule. Docking with ISS doesn’t have these risks because it is already in orbit, and so only needs a single launch per mission.

      1. “assuming all the vehicles have similar reliability”. Which they don’t. As ASAP and many others have pointed out, SLS will never have the flight rate to be as demonstrably safe as rockets like Delta IV, Atlas V, and Falcon 9. And all of them have pretty good records as to launching within a couple days from first attempt. This is all FUD.

      2. Let’s assume the successful launch probability of an F9 is 98%. Conditional probability of two successful launches is therefore 96%.

         How likely is it that the real LOM % for SLS at any time it conceivably flies is greater than 96 percent?

         1. Given its lack of a launch record any number for SLS is a pure guess. Also the F9R reliability is irrelevant since the Orion is too heavy. It would be a combination of a Falcon Heavy and Delta IV.

   2. I concur. Indeed if memory serves we have been docking crewed vehicles in Earth orbit since the Gemini 8 mission. And I think when the Lunar missions were launched there was a requirement for separating the LEM stowed behind the main capsule and re-docking it to the front of Apollo so this is almost precisely the only way we have ever gotten to the moon. Of course we did it on the way to the moon as memory serves, but doing it on orbit seems to me a much safer idea then doing it when you’re already heading away from Earth. Seems like an emergency de-orbit from LEO would be safer than trying the same stunt during a lunar swing around (even if Apollo 13 did manage it) Thus the “safety” issue to me looks like a straw man argument at best.

      1. Yes, but it was designed that way. And that is the key problem, the Orion was designed specifically for the SLS and so is just too wide and heavy for any other launch system to send on the EM-1 mission. A Delta IV should be able to get it into LEO, but then you need to dock it to a booster for the EM-1 mission.

         The problem is that the booster would have to dock to the docking module in front on Orion and boost it towards the Moon backwards. There is serious the question of if the docking module on the Orion being strong enough to withstand the stress. You would also be boosting the stack backwards and that will create a stress pattern opposite of what it was designed for. The other alternative would be a complete redesign of the service module to allow a booster to dock with it.

         What this means is that because of the design decisions already made the only way for the Orion to be sent on a EM-1 mission will be with the SLS. The two spacecraft are as dependent on each other as the Shuttle Orbiter and ET.

         So the only option for an EM-1 mission being done by the schedule date would be to replace both the SLS and Orion with a Falcon Heavy and Dragon2 and declare that flight to be EM-1. And of course if you do that, then there is no longer any justification for SLS/Orion since the FH/Dragon2 would be able to fly astronauts to the Gateway just as easily, and for about a 1/10 of the cost per mission.

         This is the real decision that needs to be made on EM-1.

         Now the end run that could accomplish a flight without directly threatening SLS/Orion would be to just forget about the EM-1 mission and instead propose funding a FH/Dragon2 mission as a demonstration of how the Commercial Crew Program could be used to serve the Gateway. Instead of EM-1 call it CG-1, for Commercial Gateway 1. Make the same offer to both Boeing and SpaceX to do a demonstration flight with their respective spacecraft around the Moon at the earliest possible date. SpaceX would of course easily be able to do so. Boeing would probably have to use an Atlas V Heavy, but they might be able to accomplish it as well, just not as fast. But giving the money to try would probably make it possible, politically, to fund the FH/Dragon2 CG-1 flight.

         They could just call the program CCP 2.0

         1. The selling point would be redundancy similar to the policy of having two different capsules going to ISS. It would cost more for the development budget, that would be a hurdle, but it wouldn’t cost that much more, and long term it would lower operational costs by having some or even most of the crew missions to the Moon using cheaper alternatives, and it would increase the available flight rate of crews to the Moon since the SLS flight rate will be limited.

            Only thing is it wouldn’t end SLS, at least not immediately. But the direct competition would not be to its benefit.

   3. The argument is moot: by which I mean the argument regarding the relative advantages, or not, involved in the docking that would be required in using something other than SLS.

      Dr, Crary pointed out a few days ago that these two modules are not designed for on-orbit docking; too many intricate and variable connections, I suppose (though Dr. Crary didn’t specify).

      Some will say that this particular issue is a feature, because it locks in the use of SLS. There being no way to know, I stay away from that point, except for this: the designers working on the Orion gear, and the designers working on SLS, would correctly assume that their particular piece of kit was part of the bigger system, and would progress from that point.

      Put another way, early design decisions regarding the mating of the Orion modules are entirely defensible.

      1. Let’s be clear about this. I was talking about the Orion Crew and Service modules. I don’t think launching those separately and docking them is an option. I’m not basing that on any detailed knowledge of the design, just looking at the schedule and considering the number of person-days of work it implies. And that’s person-days on the ground, by people who aren’t wearing bulky spacesuit gloves and with plenty of tools, fittings, jigs and so on.

         But the idea of a separate propulsive stage isn’t unreasonable. It would have been a good idea. At this point, it’s still possible but that schedule is awfully tight.

         It does assume the current Orion CSM has the ability to maneuver and dock. If they have deferred that, to a later flight and model of the service module, that would be a problem. And automated docking isn’t trivial just because SpaceX did it with a Dragon 2 doesn’t help. Even if you could port the software (which I doubt) the control laws would be totally wrong. It’s not like you can upload the autopilot software from a 787 onto a Learjet and expect it to work. But Orion is, eventually, supposed to be able to dock with something, so let’s assume that capability exists with the EM-1 hardware.

         The most straight-forward solution would be to build two very simple docking modules. Give them all the electronics and hardware needed for docking (cameras, radar ranging, whatever) and only install mechanical connections. Put one on the top of a Centaur (or similar) upper stage. That’s already designed with a load-bearing interface on top, to connect it to a payload. So installing the docking module shouldn’t be a problem. Put the other on the bottom of the Orion service module. It’s already designed to be bolted into the payload interface of a launch vehicle, so again, that shouldn’t be a problem.

         Launch the two stacks separately to a low Earth parking orbit and then dock them. You get a fully fueled Centaur, docking module A, docking module B, Orion service module, Orion crew module stack. Fire the rockets to get on a lunar transfer orbit. Then separate them at the docking mode/Orion service module interface (which would just be a standard payload interface and designed for separation.) Now you have a Orion CSM on a lunar transfer orbit, and that’s what SLS is supposed to provide.

         But that’s designing, developing, building and testing two of those docking modules. In just over a year. Even though they could be very simple and largely stock parts, we’re talking about NASA flight hardware for a class A mission. I just don’t see this happening on that schedule.

         1. Thanks for the clarification: muddiness in my explanation comes from me, not my source.

            “It’s not like you can upload the autopilot software from a 787 onto a Learjet and expect it to work.”

            Reading your comment, I wondered why, or if, standards wouldn’t be useful in so many of our space endeavors. In historical terms, though, our space efforts are very rough around the edges. Technologically and scientifically, a couple of additional decades of experience would be helpful.

            1. I think the lack of standards is typically a matter of cost and flight opportunities. Standardized designs tend to be less efficient than custom built ones. When trying to get everything out of a particular piece of hardware you can, you don’t want a one-size-fits-none standard.

               That said, there are real and, I guess, philosophical differences. I mentioned whether or not avionics software could be ported from Dragon to Orion. SpaceX likes using multiple, radiation-soft processors in a voting system; NASA likes one (or two for redundancy) radiation hard ones. That basic difference in approach could easily make any sort of software portability impossible. And that’s just one example. Almost everywhere you look, there are things one institution does one way and another does another way.

               But there are some standards, and small satellites and large constellations are making progress in that direction. Even for big spacecraft and missions, things like communications protocols are standardized (mostly… I have no idea if the Russians or the Chinese use CCSDS packets and standards) and there are a small number of electrical interfaces between subsystems (even if I don’t like some, like the MIL-STD-1553, at least it’s a standard, and you’re never going to a find standard everyone is entirely happy with.)

         2. From what I’ve been told elsewhere online, the EM-1 Orion does not have any docking hardware. And to date, I don’t believe that Orion’s prime contractor (Lockheed Martin?) has proven it can perform automated rendezvous and docking.

            1. Why am I not surprised? My suggestion was to add some docking hardware, in the simplest way I could think of. But the Orion CSM would need to maneuver and control its attitude (it can) and do so with sufficient precision and accuracy for a safe docking (who knows?) and software to control it sufficiently well (software capabilities have a nasty tendency to deferred to later versions…)

               In terms of automatic docking, you’re right about Lockheed Martin (the crew module contractor.) They don’t have experience with automated docking. But Airbus Defence and Space (the service module contractor) does have experience, having inherited Astrium. They built the ATV, and the Orion service module is an ATV heritage design. Of course, heritage is a horribly abused and misused concept.

4. If Bridenstine frees up the first Orion flight to be with the Falcon or Delta Heavy then it will be the best move made by a NASA administrator in decades. If the silly lunar orbiting vehicle is dropped and the BFR is used as the go to vehicle then he may be known as a visionary. I am jumping the gun here, I know, but I am eager for mankind to be out of low earth orbit where we have been since the early 1970s.

5. The mule has been smacked with the two-by-four. Now it’s time to see if it takes the hint, or tries to take away the Administrator’s two by four again as in 2011. Either way, no point in hitting it again right away.

   1. We need to kill the mule (SLS), stop giving the mule hints as we have for decades, and buy a tractor (Space X).

      1. If I were NASA, I wouldn’t use only a single provider. NASA has many options for “heavy-lift” both now and in the near future:

         SpaceX – Falcon Heavy
         ULA – Delta IV Heavy and later Vulcan
         Blue Origin – New Glenn
         Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems – Omega

         Competition is a good thing. Pick commercial HLV providers the same way we picked commercial cargo and commercial crew: multiple providers paid when the meet milestones.

         1. Yes, let’s bring back the “stick” (aka Omega), after all that is where this mess started. 🙂

            1. I personally hate Omega, but if Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems can get its cost down to where it’s competitive, more power to them. I’d never want to launch people on the thing (or even an “expensive” piece of hardware), but for launching something like propellant to a depot, it’s perfectly fine.

      2. Not a good analogy

6. There is a lot of questioning going on from politicians, senior bureaucrats, and engineers alike. This wasn’t supposed to happen. Many “deals” were cut between 2010 and 2016. Congressmen and women did deals that they never would have done. Mostly Republicans bought into this Mangalitsa.

   This is not to say that SLS cost them their seats, but to quote my kids, “dad ‘he gone'”.

   The SLS mafia is still wielding power. More “deals” will continue to be made until Blue Origin or SpaceX do the do. Patience…

   edit: spelling

7. In yet another surprise announcement today, NASA reports that the agency’s EM-2 test mission, featuring the first crewed flight of the SLS rocket and Orion spacecraft, will now fly its planned 21-day mission in low Earth orbit in what NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine is calling “Apollo 7 on steroids.” “Not going to the moon reduces costs and keeps the mission on target to fly sometime in the early-to-late 2020s,” says Bridenstine.

   1. It would allow them to dock with the ISS if there are any problem. And it could be done with a Delta IV.

      1. NASA can call the test mission “Skylab on steroids.”

         … and to further reduce costs, NASA could switch out the Orion with a Boeing Starliner. ?

      2. That would require launching into that exact orbit, as well as having docking capability. In that case might as well make it an ISS docking mission.

         I actually wonder if that will be a concern anyway, that was more of a Shuttle thing because of the fragile TPS.

         1. The Orion is suppose to be able to dock to a future Gateway so it could be a test of the Orion docking system. And the cameras on the ISS could be used to do a visual inspection. Yes, the Shuttle was restricted by its TPS, but there are probably failures that would benefit from having the ISS near. It would also give the future international partners for the Gateway a chance to check it out at the ISS.

            1. It’s an interesting question and I’m just wondering how it will be considered as we finally start launching astronauts to space again after a nearly decade long gap. Prior to Columbia, all the way back to Mercury, it was normal to make space flights with no rescue capability. When it was realized just how vulnerable Shuttle was to TPS damage during launch (and even on orbit) it was only allowed to go to the station, or in the case of the final Hubble servicing mission have a rescue Shuttle on standby. Soyuz benefits inadvertently because that’s all they do anymore with Soyuz is go to ISS.

               But as we finally resume doing other things in space that don’t involve ISS, a decision has to be made whether lack of rescue capability will be acceptable again. Having to launch initially into ISS (or other future space station) orbits, or always having rescue vehicles available, will be a big limitation, and I predict that it will go back to rescue capability not being a requirement.

               I realize you are just talking about EM-2, but even then, will the low probability of not being able to safely deorbit warrant restricting the flight to an orbital profile that may not be what they would otherwise prefer for their test flight.

            2. If we insist on a rescue capability or a safe haven, as the post-Columbia Shuttle fights did, we might as well just give up and stay on the ground. Those measures were imposed because the Shuttle was an inherently unsafe vehicle. Let’s just not do that again. Eventually, we may have safe havens in many convenient orbits, just as aircraft have many available divert sites. That would be a good thing for safety, but Lindbergh didn’t have many divert sites when he flew across the Atlantic. Nor were there any rescue options for the Apollo 8, and 11 to 17 missions.

8. In another bold move today, Bridenstine announces that the EM-1 mission may be flown using a commercial Starliner or Dragon crew module instead of NASA’s own Orion command module.

9. It seems NASA’s chickeñs have come home to roost. Many of us more experienced, demonstrably capable program and project managers saw as Constellation formed 15 years ago how the top management was specifically putting inexperienced people in as new program and project mangers. Most of them had spent their careers in mission and flight ops, so they had zero experience in hardware DDT&E or in safety cert. It was apparent the leadership had forgotten that with zero experience there was no one from which the newbies could learn either the technical job or the ability to navigate through the bureaucracy. Its 15 years later, nearly a full generation has now passed, and NASA is still 5 years from flying that safe, simple, soon retro-capsule. Now Space X has lapped the government. There is no need for NASA to even demonstrate anything since others have shown themselves to be able to work so much more effectively.

   1. Your point reminds me of a question I’ve had for some time, and that involves the NASA skillset compared to rocket building. Many comments here and elsewhere make your precise point, which I understand as “current managers at NASA have never specified, tendered, and supervised building a new rocket.”

      Big Question: In what sense can we say that NASA “builds” rockets? And how has that sensibility changed with time?

      I’m thinking, of course, of Mercury/Gemini/Apollo vs. current efforts. During the moon race, the hardware was built by contractors, directed by NASA staff who were very much learning on the job.

      I am personally unable to characterize the relative design roles of NASA and the several contractors at any point; I’m simply interested citizen. Nor can I compare that relationship as it was in the design and construction of S5 (and predecessors) to the same now, between NASA and SX, Boeing, etc.

      I’ve imagined that performance specifications are prepared by NASA; and that, contractors chosen, the role continues in some sort of supervisory role. This would make the relationship miler to that of an architect and a contractor.

      In what sense, then, does NASA build rockets? And how is current staff different from previous?

      1. But keep in mind that key individuals in both industry and at NASA had been building rockets since the 1940’s. Just as Falcon 1 led to Falcon 9R, to the proposed Starship/Falcon Heavy, they knew by hands on experience how it worked and were able to pass those lessons on to the Apollo Generation at NASA.

      2. The question is a good one and the answer is not well understood even by managers in he program. The Apollo era managers of the 1960s came out of the NACA or were recruited from Project management ranks in the military. NACA in particular was a hands-on R&D organization. In addition to many other projects, the first Mercury prototypes and the first Saturn rockets were built in house before they were turned over to contractors for production. Later in the 60s and continuing through the 70s both Manned Spacecraft Center and MSFC maintained systems development labs in which new NASA civil servant engineers were expected to ‘apprentice’ working on the development of new systems. There was also GFE, government furnished equipment, designed, built, maintained and certified in house by NASA civil servants. This continued thru Shuttle development. Beginning in the 1980s, operations managers, mainly flight directors, began to take over as top center managers. They had no understanding of the engineering processes and seemed to assume contractors had done all the development. Also in this time period MSFC was making a play to take over the design of the manned spacecraft since MSFC did not have any rockets to develop. Some of the unknowing JSC managers actively tried to give away systems R&D responsibilities. They would negotiae with MSFC to give sysems reesponsibilities from JSC to MSFC, then return to JSC and be read the riot act that theyd given away important JSC manned spacecraft development functions. In 1986 the same operations managers created USA to take over Shuttle operations. When they did that they shut down many of the remaining engineering NASA research labs and GFE functions and tried to eliminate NASA subsystem management responsibilities. This was at the height of Station development in the late 80s, early 90s, and was a prime reason Station was not getting done. Interestingly, when it came time to shut down the NASA CS operations functions the NASA people refused which meant NASA and contractors were duplicating efforts. Late in the 90s, having realized some of their errors, subsystem management was re-established though the GFE and labs have never been fully re-established.

         1. Interesting, you made me look that up, and indeed key early design and development managers and leads came from NACA, particularly on the capsule development side. On the propulsion side I’d think early on it was largely the Germans, no?

            Not particularly apropos, but as a result of my quick google I came across a slideshow on early shuttle concepts. In particular this slide:

            http://www.pmview.com/space…

            details shuttle trade-offs. I had a vague recollection of the cross-range requirement, but had forgotten where it came from and the details. Fascinating.

            1. Actually, a fair number of the managers on the rocket side came from defense contractors. They had previously managed missile development programs. That caused some differences over test philosophy during the Apollo program. The idea of a few all-up test flights of a launch vehicle is a missile (expendable) development approach. The NACA people were used to aircraft (reusable), where you can conduct multiple flight tests and gradually expand the performance envelope.

         2. +1 The best NASA Administrator was not an engineer but a career bureaucrat who was the best manager NASA has ever seen.

            Sadly, we named a poorly managed mission after him.

         3. As you relate the story (thank you), I am imagining that the equipment needed to build a rocket from raw materials – machine tools and other heavy gear – this equipment owned and operated by NASA. Much was distributed to the various Centers, but in the aggregate the NASA you describe is akin to the SpaceX labs in current Hawthorne.

            In addition to the needed kit of course there would be design engineers, assistants, and office support staff.

            And to the extent they still exist, these elements are no longer owned and operated by folks with NASA paychecks.

            It’s easy to see why this change wold seem smart, from the POV of some in government; alas, the result doesn’t match prediction.

10. How is Bridenstine going to reassure the workforce for PACE and Wfirst?

11. Please know that NASA is committed to building and flying the SLS for the following reasons:

    1. Launching two heavy-lift rockets to get Orion to the Moon is not optimum or sustainable.
    2. Docking crewed vehicles in Earth orbit to get to the Moon adds complexity and risk that is undesirable.
    3. SLS mitigates these challenges and allows crew and payloads to get to the Moon, and eventually to Mars, safer and more efficiently than any temporary solution used to get back on track.

    Let’s read between the lines, shall we:

    #1 – actually, launching two commercial “heavy-lift rockets” is far cheaper than a single SLS launch and that will not change.

    #2 – every single crewed vehicle that has ever visited a space station has docked with that space station. In addition, many uncrewed cargo vehicles and space station modules have been docked to space stations in the past. Docking is routine. We already depend upon it for all current crewed spaceflight missions. In the future, we will depend upon it for lunar missions (docking to Gateway, to landers, and etc.).

    #3 – SLS is not needed.

    If I were working on SLS, I’d be updating my resume’.

    1. Jeff: I have to disagree with you here on your assessment. Not because I think SLS has a role; but because I think that efforts to push back on SLS must be grounded in facts. So, here goes:

       #1: Yes. However, one the “government cost” of launching commercial rockets is added, the difference will be smaller (but still considerable). And this: money is only one criteria.

       #2: “Docking is routine:” So true! As a kid I remember hundreds of articles in “Life”, or “Time” or newspapers or novels, all speculating on questions now resolved. Examples: could we swallow in zero G? Could we go #2 in space? Would food move through our bodies properly? And: Given the huge velocities, could we ever learn to dock?

       But this isn’t a case of docking. I mentioned in another thread that fcrary points out the huge impossibility of connecting these two pieces of kit mostly because they weren’t so designed.

       #3: Is SLS needed? Yes and no. With all of the numbers that are thrown around here and elsewhere, and sometimes with less accuracy than desirable, I’ve come to see that a rocket with the throw characteristics of SLS or greater would greatly facilitate exploration plans. Yes, gear can be docked on orbit, but on the ground is better.

       1. Re #2 about suitability for docking. Sure, they weren’t designed to do so. Could one make appropriate mods and manufacture/test them cheaper/sooner than other alternatives. Or, in parallel as a schedule risk management approach.

       2. Meet New Glenn and its 7m diameter fairing:
          https://www.blueorigin.com/…

          True it can’t throw as much payload mass into LEO as SLS can, but you can do things like launch your lunar lander empty and load propellant in LEO.

          Super large heavy lifters are “nice to have”, but not “necessary”. As fcrary points out, even SLS block 2 isn’t really big enough to do the sorts of things on the moon that NASA wants to do in a single launch (since it’s not much bigger than Saturn V in terms of how much it can throw at the moon). And that’s to say nothing of mounting a crewed mission to Mars which would take many more HLV launches (and with SLS limited to at most two flights per year, it’s simply unsuited for mounting a Mars mission by itself).

          So, we have to learn how to perform missions using docking, propellant transfer, and etc. I’d rather see us doing that now using the launchers we have now (and in the near future) than waiting for SLS, which won’t solve all our problems anyway.

          1. It was quite an eye-opener reading how useful in-orbit refueling can be. You can launch something “dry” on a Falcon Heavy or New Glenn-scale launcher that would require a Saturn V if launched ‘wet”.

    2. Actually, the problem with those three points isn’t the details. You’re right about the logic being dubious. But what’s the point? I mean, what is NASA trying to accomplish after Lunar Outpost-Gateway? Even its Block 2 configuration, SLS can not get significantly more to the Moon than the Saturn V did. From all the vague statements from NASA Headquarters, I assume the ultimate goal more than flying Apollo 18, possibly with an extra astronaut or two and an extra day or two on the lunar surface.

       That means:
       1) Launching two heavy-lift rockets to get to the Moon had better be sustainable.
       2) We need to figure out how to dock crewed vehicles in Earth orbit to get to the Moon, without undue complexity and risk. Figuring that out is highly desirable.
       3) SLS does not mitigate these challenges, since it does not allows crew and payloads to get to the Moon, and eventually to Mars, without additional in-orbit operations.

12. People@ MSFC are waiting for a “X-33 moment” to happen on SLS (a rupture/destruction of some core stage hardware during test). That may be closer than folks think. With core stage flight hardware getting ready for test @ MSFC. It wont take much of a flaw to demand replacement and add years and years to the schedule. One NASA manager stated that fear is part of the reason for the delays. To put that moment off. Keeping a decision on program viability form having to be made.

    1. SLS just isn’t a good vehicle given its extremely high cost and extremely low flight rate (one or two a year). The program has been a dead man walking since the very beginning. It’s just a matter of total years wasted and tens of billions of dollars total spent to date before it’s cancelled and relegated the the dustbin of history.

13. President Trump wants something up and around the moon before 2020; hence the shift to commercial.

14. NASA should let the SLS die and go back to what they do best: The interpolation of weather data to fit their narrative.

15. If a second FH were launched with no payload, how much fuel would remain in the second stage when it reached orbit? Enough for the TLI? If so, either the payload could be transferred from the first second stage to the second second stage, or the propellant could be transferred from the second second stage to the first second stage.

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