Keith’s note: On Friday NASA distributed memo to the entire workforce titled “Workforce Directive: Restoring NASA’s Core Competencies“ accompanied with a video that was posted on social media. (full text below)
Workforce Directive: Restoring NASA’s Core Competencies
Background
NASA’s ability to deliver on its mission has become increasingly dependent on external vendors and contractors for core functions and workforce talent—from engineering and operations to manufacturing and repair. While partnerships remain vital, this trend has eroded internal capabilities, increased program risk, reduced flexibility in addressing emergent technical challenges, and added well more than a billion dollars in annual overhead—diverting resources from science and discovery.
Factors contributing to this reliance include concerns over exceeding artificial civil servant hiring ceilings, and assumptions that outsourcing would provide greater workforce flexibility. Even if these assumptions hold in some cases, the overall effect deprives NASA of critical institutional knowledge, and limits resources essential for mission success.
As a result, it is not surprising that multiple programs have experienced suboptimal outcomes in cost and schedule. Multiple prime contractors, hundreds of sub-contractors, tens of thousands of contract employees, and duplicative layers of management create complexity and inefficiency. Variances in policies, tools, and systems across this spectrum further challenge budgets, timelines, and outcomes.
To achieve the President’s national space policy and maintain U.S. leadership in space exploration, NASA must urgently restore and retain in-house engineering, operational, and scientific excellence, and reclaim technical autonomy. This directive establishes actions to rebuild internal talent, strengthen contractual provisions, and foster a culture of technical resilience.
Vision
NASA will expand with a strong core of civil servants, staffed and equipped to lead the most complex engineering and operational challenges, ensuring expertise, resilience, agility, and innovation in every mission. This includes the ability to build and repair critical components to reduce external dependencies when necessary. Restoring and sustaining these core competencies is essential to steward taxpayer resources, align investments with agency priorities, and ensure mission success.
This foundation will be strengthened by contractors in non-core areas and for surge requirements, complemented by our extensive network of international and commercial partners. Together, we will deliver on NASA’s world-changing mission of science, exploration, and discovery.
(1) Directive Actions
NASA recognizes that contractors have and will continue to play a vital role in achieving mission objectives. This directive focuses on correcting over-reliance on outsourced engineering and staffing that diminishes NASA’s core competencies and resources essential to agency priorities. The future state aims to use contracted workforce primarily for limited-term assignments, surge staffing, and specialized functions outside NASA’s core competencies.
Within 30 days, Center Directors, Mission Directorate leadership, and the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer shall:
- Conduct a Work Assessment: Identify engineering, operational, scientific, manufacturing, and other mission-critical work currently outsourced, and provide a proposal for what should be brought in-house, aligned with the workforce assessment.
- Conduct a Workforce Assessment: Identify outsourced or missing technical and operational expertise and provide a proposal to convert core roles to civil service. Categorize proposal by priority, mapping to core competency and current contracting mechanisms. Emphasize solutions that enable mission execution without introducing additional redundant layers of management.
Within 60 days, the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, Office of Procurement, and Office of the Chief Financial Officer shall:
- Develop Transition Strategy: Consolidate workforce assessments and create an implementation plan to convert or add targeted roles to civil service, addressing contract changes, renegotiations or terminations, timelines, and cost implications.
- Establish Rapid Onboarding Process: Implement streamlined process that ensures candidates can be rapidly brought into civil servant positions without disrupting operational capacity, minimizing gaps in mission-critical support.
- Strengthen the Talent Pipeline: In collaboration with the Office of Personnel Management, develop strategies to attract industry and academic talent and embed civil servants with industry partners to accelerate learning and knowledge transfer aligned with national space policy objectives.
- Enhance Training Programs: Assess and develop internal training and mentorship initiatives to ensure continuity of knowledge and technical depth across generations of
NASA engineers, operations personnel, and technicians. - Focus Internship Opportunities: Develop a plan to expand the current internship program with a focus on standardizing and enhancing experience, to develop in-house technical talent focused on the highest priority agency requirements.
(2) Strengthen Framework for Technical Autonomy
Within 30 days, the Office of Procurement shall:
- Ensure Repair and Operation Autonomy: Incorporate right-to-repair provisions in all future and applicable existing contracts, guaranteeing NASA access to specifications, parts, tools, schematics, software, and technical documentation necessary for internal manufacturing, repair, and operations.
- Remove Restrictive Clauses: Eliminate contract language requiring NASA-fabricated replacement hardware to be returned to vendors for inspection after delivery of out-of-spec hardware.
- Address Intellectual Property Barriers: To the extent reasonable under existing and ongoing procurements, review and propose modifications to eliminate IF restrictions that prevent NASA from performing internal repairs or redesigns, as needed to meet urgent Presidential space policy objectives.
Within 60 days, center directors shall:
- Propose Makerspaces at Each Center: develop plan to create a makerspace at each center to enable rapid prototyping and proposal development. Include an assessment of potential funding mechanisms, such as sponsorships from partners and critical vendors, to support implementation and sustainability.
This Directive does not reflect any intent or commitment, implied or otherwise, to take any action regarding any particular existing or future contract with the agency.
Jared Isaacman
NASA Administrator
Social media post
After 50 days on the job, visits to every NASA center, a dozen town halls, and reviewing thousands of workforce submissions, it is clear there is much we can do to better empower our people and focus resources on the most pressing objectives.
Getting back to the Moon means getting back to the basics. NASA must regain its core competencies in technical, engineering, and operational excellence, and in doing so, we’ll save up to $1B a year to fund more missions of world-changing science and discovery.
With the directive issued today, we are strengthening the NASA team and executing urgently on the President’s national space policy.
Video Transcript
Today marks 50 days on the job, and in the lead up to two historic crewed launches, I’ve gotten to visit every single center.
At each of these stops, I was able to speak with you, the most talented workforce our nation has to offer.
I heard where the roadblocks are and what challenges you face, and now I’m taking what I’m learning and putting it into action. The list is long, but we have to start somewhere.
Today, I’m implementing a workforce directive to restore NASA’s core competencies. NASA has outright lost or outsourced many core competencies in engineering and operations that once enabled the agency to undertake the near impossible in air and space.
Many of you, approximately 75% of the workforce, are contractors working alongside multiple primes, hundreds of subcontractors, utilizing different systems with excessive management layers anchored by a small civil servant workforce.
Not only is this highly inefficient and leads to continuous program delays, but it’s costly to the tune of nearly $1.4 billion a year in needless expenses.
That funding could go to more astronauts in space, building a moon base, and launching more missions of science and discovery.
We are tearing down artificial civil servant hiring ceilings and bringing the teams we need back to NASA to execute on President Trump’s vision.
First, rebuilding internal talent. Within 30 days, every center and mission directorate will assess which technical and operational roles need to come back in-house. Within 30 days, every center and mission directorate will assess which technical and operational roles need to come back in-house.
Within 60 days, we’re implementing rapid onboarding. To ensure the funnel of new talent is always filled, we are supporting OPM’s TechForce initiative, bringing in term-based hires from industry and academia, and launching robust internship training and mentorship to develop the technical talent we require.
Second, we’re empowering you to get the job done. We are incorporating right-to-repair provisions in all future contracts, guaranteeing NASA access to specifications, parts, tools, and technical documentation. We’re eliminating restrictive clauses that prevent us from doing our own work and addressing intellectual property barriers that have tied our hands.
Third, fostering a culture of technical excellence, hands-on engineering, and continuous learning,recognizing technical contributions, and creating makerspaces at every center.
We’re restoring in-house engineering and operational excellence to reclaim technical autonomy and concentrating our resources on the most needle-moving objectives. This is how we achieve the President’s national space policy.
And if we succeed, returning to the moon and building a moon base will seem pale in comparison to what we’re capable of achieving in the years ahead.

“NASA has outright lost or outsourced many core competencies in engineering and operations that once enabled the agency to undertake the near impossible in air and space.”
That loss, particulary at Goddard, was inflicted by management’s premature interpretation of the budget.
Many of us didn’t want to leave.
We were told with certainty that we’d be fired or released independent of a real RIF process if our project did not show funding in the President’s Budget Request.
Folks want to come back.
Consider finding a way.
Umm,
Congress sets the national space policy (and NASA’s vision moving forward) via the budget (and the recent reauthorization bill), not the president. Now that mirrors what Trump desires, but that’s beside the point. So why is this so hard for even the NASA administrator to understand? Or maybe I should say why doesn’t he respect the role of Congress in this, clearly he doesn’t based on this and his other public pronouncements. (Oh, I forgot, Isaacman has to bow and scrape before his fearless leader like everybody else in this administration does. Never mind….)
Yes, congress does, though our leaders weren’t willing to look at that.
Leaders didn’t stand up for people.
They told them to leave.
Goddard scientists were literally told by Center Leadership in a town hall about DRP/VSIP/VERA to get employment in Europe. We know of
some who ended up in other countries.
We got to this point because leaders, who are still there, told people to leave and used the PBR as justification to close labs.
Something also to think about –do these senior leaders get rewarded for making a mess that has to be cleaned up vs waiting for Congress to do their job?
Solution to a problem of this administration’s own making. The workforce and core competency issues have been a concern for at least a decade, and NASA management failed to seriously address it. So what does this administration do in 2025? Great idea to incentivize your talent to not only leave, but leave early with a very good separation package.
Thousands of super experienced, talented civil servants left under the pressure of the turmoil of the last 12 months. And now NASA needs to staff up to restore core competencies? Oops.
Well, 2025 was stupid and we all know it, but this is single handedly the best thing a NASA administrator has done in my lifetime. I’m serious.
Engineering support services contracts have been bleeding programs dry with mid-career, hard-working (but let’s call them average production) employees costing $300k to $400k all-in, with limited ability to direct their work or train them for the future.
Goddard’s top managers exacerbated this problem by needlessly pushing out highly trained scientists and engineers before we had a real budget approved by the congress. In some areas they are still implementing the PBR. Substituting these managers is a necessary first step.
Couldn’t agree more. Goddard cannot function until a full inquiry is performed. A few people ruthlessly seized control, forcing out managers who tried to defend core capabilities. They were using the PBR as an excuse to scare the remaining managers, but it’s pretty clear that they wanted to do this long beforehand.
Even more important to get rid of those responsible for Goddard 2025 now that there’s a budget that funds a bunch of critical programs there.
That “full inquiry” should include a criminal investigation to understand what happened to all the government property that disappeared during the October furlough and why building moves had to unexpectedly occur in just 3 days during that shutdown. Goddard management has said the annual mandatory property audit won’t happen in 2026, but make them do it ASAP to reveal just how much equipment is now missing. Also, investigate how much space-flight hardware being stored in labs was trashed and quantify the impact on projects.
JSC has far too many people in operations-have have had far too many for decades. JSC has few left with core competencies in engineering and hardware development. I am not certain how they rebuild that with no one that is competent to lead the way. Those people left long ago.
Manned Spacecraft Center (now JSC) designed, developed and built Mercury, Gemini, Apollo CSM and LM, Space Shuttle, Mir modules and much of ISS. For the last 25 years, development of Orion has been scattered around to multiple centers with no one leading and maybe that is why its taken so long and no one is even sure if it will work-we definitely know it is not designed to meet the requirements of the mission. Maybe the Administrator should re-establish the Manned Spacecraft Center?
Agreed.
Does anyone have any details about the OIG investigation of Goddard? I haven’t heard anything for weeks.
I think our most essential Core Competency is keeping projects going with no support, encouragement, or funding. We’re barely dogpaddling to keep our heads above water, and here come more unfunded mandates. We’re getting a lot of practice.