Another NASA Exploration Report (Re)States The Obvious But Lacks True Exploratory Energy

Keith’s note: NASA has issued another report (“New NASA Report Looks at Societal Considerations for Artemis“). Titled “Artemis, Ethics and Society: Synthesis from a Workshop“ the report “seeks to foster discussion about how the agency can make such dramatic progress in a way that takes ethical and societal considerations into account”. I have read through it and decided to make an annotation of the overall findings with my usual snark. This is a typical NASA report – one that spends a lot of time in less than normal stilted and cautionary English talking about the process of writing the report – and less time on providing useful information. It is mostly ‘OMG we’re actually going to do this whole Artemis Moon thing for real and we jumped into this without thinking things through ahead of time. Or maybe some other part of NASA has done this for other programs and lost that report or who cares this is different. But we need bullet charts and action items in boxes to show that we are serious’. To be fair some people involved actually rose to the occasion and said some smart things – but in many cases NASA punted because they were afraid to step outside of their sandbox or look out of their organizations’ stovepipe. In addition, NASA, as an agency is risk adverse in every imaginable way. And when to comes to public affairs, education, and public outreach or talking to real people on the street they are terrified of bad results. So they stay in their cubicles and have meetings about sentences and do not venture out beyond what the groupthink sees as safe. This whole Artemis thing is about going to live on the Moon long-term and then go to Mars. That is a bold undertaking – on steroids. NASA needs to stop finding excuses not to interact with the real world and new partners and instead “go boldly” into this endeavor. Back when the whole exploration re-visit/reboot happend post-Columbia, the Exploration AA Craig Steidle had a simple exploration logo with the latin phrase “audaces fortuna juvat” – “Fortune favors the bold”. I see nothing remotely “bold” in this report. Below is a stream of consciousness annotation of the four main observations starting on page iii:

Observations for Considering Ethical, Legal, and Societal Implications of Artemis

We drew four main observations from the workshop discussions.

Observation 1

Participants identified key questions across cross cutting areas: a) Sharing the benefits of space activities: How should NASA work to the “benefit of all [humankind],” which is part of its mandate under the original Space Act that created NASA? Who is included in that statement and how should they be involved? How can NASA know who benefits from Artemis?

Keith’s note: It is good that the participants read the enabling charter for NASA but it is a bit baffling that the participants had to figure out “Who is included in that statement””. Duh, The answer is: everyone – at least everyone in America who pays taxes to support NASA and also the way that the rest of the world is affected by/benefits from what NASA does. Then there is “How can NASA know who benefits from Artemis?” After 60 years NASA still cannot figue out what education and public outreach is and how to do it? Yet another committee has to ask the obvious question. NASA has a bad habit of only transmitting – never receiving. Small wonder that yet another study group has to ask how NASA can figure out what the benefits are of what it does.

Note: Before I go on – it is obvious that the study group was given little structure by NASA or whomever is responsible for this. NASA should already have simple one or two sentence answers for basic questions like this and provide them as given facts. The reason why NASA exists and why it does what it does and for whom should have been in a basic briefing kit in 1959 or so.

b) Reflecting on core values for exploration: How do we ensure that the values we bring to space are those we want as the basis of future exploration? The principles and goals that organizations use in their practices represent the values that are most likely to shape new engineered systems. It can be difficult to identify these values, especially those held by non-space actors.

Keith’s note: you’d think by now (again) that the basic “what are we doing and why are we doing it this way” sort of thing would have been worked out by NASA years ago. Why is this question being asked yet again – unless everyone has (once again) forgotten it from the last time someone did a report like this.

c) Sustainability: Defining sustainability on the Moon is a complex challenge, as sustainability discussions in a terrestrial context, with questions of balancing conservation against societal needs, do not necessarily apply. The workshop also cited environmental impacts of space activities (including launches) on Earth.

Keith’s note: NASA has been using the whole ‘sustainability’ meme with regard ot Artemis for what – 6 years? No one has figured out what that means yet? Is this the first time NASA is trying to answer that? If so then how is it that they are already years down the road of designing a “sustainable architecture” for Artemis? Just wondering.

d) Balancing shared access: Participants identified many operational challenges to prioritizing access to key sites, deconflicting activities, avoiding contamination, and maintaining heritage sites. A recent OTPS analysis explored many of these practical concerns, which feed into broader ethical and societal implications.

Keith’s note: apparently they found a report (“Lunar Landing and Operations Policy Analysis. NASA Report ID 20220015973.”) that already looked into this. Someone on the committee must have used Google since NASA’s search engine will not find this report.

e) Addressing cultural sensitivities: Participants identified cultural sensitivities surrounding payloads and activities on the Moon, which is viewed as sacred by many cultures worldwide. This may affect perceptions of increased NASA activity on the Moon for resource utilization and other goals.

Keith’s note: Yup. But NASA will tell people what it means – to NASA. They will not bother to take the time to properly survey actual people outside of the space bubble nor will they talk to anyone outside of the U.S. since that requires gogin through several organizational stove pipes and sandboxes at NASA HQ.

Observation 2

Participants mapped out many cultural and practical challenges to identifying and addressing ethical and societal implications of Artemis and Moon to Mars activities.

a) Cultural challenges integrating social science with space engineering. Social scientists, humanities scholars, and technical staff initially struggled to communicate effectively due to the vastly differing languages of the expertise at play. Many NASA staff lacked a framework to engage on these ethical issues, and some social science and humanities scholars lacked context for how decisions are made internally at NASA. A recommendation from some participants was to increase cross-pollination between the social scientists and NASA Headquarters personnel.

Keith’s note: Finally – a NASA report that admits the obvious. Space people listen to each other inside the space bubble when it comes to space – and NASA has its own special bubble inside the space bubble to further isolate them from the real world. In a 12 step program the first step is to admit that you have a problem, right?

b) Cultural challenges toward engineering versus reflection. NASA and other space organizations have a culture that often prioritizes moving forward efficiently versus more careful reflection and public engagement. Getting space practitioners to focus on long-term societal impacts, versus narrower scientific or technical problems, requires an attempt at culture change.

Keith’s note: See above. With regard to the “culture change” remedy – how many times has NASA thrown that into a discussion as an excuse as to why something does not work inside NASA the way that it might otherwise work in the real world? Pick a number – any number.

c) Practical challenges in enabling reflection. Dedicated resources to study the ELSI of Artemis might be drawn from resources needed to accomplish a mission. Some participants also noted that NASA can have many unfunded mandates, despite large budgets for space activities. Dedicating resources or staff time to focus on societal and ethical challenges requires balancing to accomplish NASA’s planned missions.

Keith’s note: if NASA is actually serious about whatever this report says it should do then someone has to pay for it. If there is not a willingness to grab some FTEs and give up some billets and have a budget for talking to the real world then the committee should just stop here and forget about finishing the report.

d) Practical challenges with diffuse responsibility and control. Many Artemis ELSI are outside of NASA’s full control due to the involvement of international and commercial actors. These ELSI include questions about who might get access to specific lunar surface regions first, and whether those sites are maintained for future generations.

Keith’s note: For an organization that has boldly sent things into interstellar space NASA is hopelessly afraid of its own shadow back on Earth. If the whole premise of this study is understanding the social aspects of SETTLING AND EXPLORING ANOTHER WORLD and NASA shies away from interacting and getting along with others then forget about the sustainability thing. Do Apollo sorties instead. If something is “outside of NASA’s full control due to the involvement of international and commercial actors” then grow a spine and reach out and try to fix these issues. Really NASA – grow a pair.

e) Practical challenges in anticipating future ethical and societal concerns. Pressing ethical issues may emerge unexpectedly as a second-order effect of NASA decisions. In light of this, proactive exploration of future ethical and societal issues is needed. For example, a cultural sensitivity about commercial payloads with human remains flying alongside NASA Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) deliveries is a key example discussed in the report and involves diffuse responsibilities. While NASA has said it would not send human remains to the Moon without consulting U.S. tribal nations, the CLPS initiative’s funding of commercial deliveries on private landers has enabled non-NASA payloads, including human remains to become manifested on these private flights. Some cultures see the Moon as having spiritual significance and believe placing human remains on the Moon can disturb the sanctity of the Moon.

Keith’s note: Cultural sensitivity is a sign of maturity and acceptance of other’s beliefs and values and it is the key to understanding and collaborative exploration. We will not explore the universe in person unless we master this. Full stop. That said, I lived at Everest Base Camp for a month. I witnessed two of the largest avalanches in climbing history and one of them killed several people while I watched. Another person died near my tent. My good friend risked his life on the mountain while I listened on a radio. The bodies of the people who died in the avalanche were not transported immediately. Meanwhile many dozens of climbers lay where they died on the mountain over the past half century. Somehow everyone works through this with respect and focuses on the task ahead of them. We can do this on other worlds if we pay attention to how we do it here on Earth – and NASA needs to spend a little more time out in the real expeditionary world so as to understand that. Fewer reports – more real life data.

Observation 3

A community of researchers working on ELSI is interested in ongoing engagement with NASA and the space community on these topics.

OTPS brought together many disciplines across social science, humanities, and technical fields. These disciplines haven’t worked together before in the context of space exploration. The workshop helped integrate these external disciplines, enabling participants both inside and outside NASA to understand each other’s perspectives. Several participants discussed creating their own non-NASA community to build on the discussions at this event

Keith’s note: Duh. NASA is just figuring this out after 60 years? It is good to revisit these topics but NASA always seems to think that each committee that addresses these issues is the first one to address these issues. Its is like Sisyphus reinventing the wheel.

Observation 4

Participants discussed a range of options that NASA and the space community may use to address the ethical implications of Artemis. These reflect participants views and are not recommendations from NASA:

a) The following are examples of methods suggested by participants for how NASA could address ELSI:

i. Policy: ELSI expertise can be integrated into existing policy structures such as federal advisory committees, creating incentives for responsible actions, and using public values to determine NASA goals.

Keith’s note: of course.

ii. Management: NASA’s internal management can better focus on ethical/societal implications through clarity about the importance of ethical reflection, recognizing societal impacts in systems engineering, better utilizing the formal NASA Strategic Plan and Performance reporting processes to capture ethical issues, and budgeting to support ELSI capability.

Keith’s note: again this is blatantly obvious and NASA should have already done this on a wide range of programs. In fact they are – but one part of NASA rarely talks to another. And all the prior examples are gathering dust in NASA HQ’s basement.

iii. Research: NASA can establish a capability to address research questions in this area, and – to access this appropriately – create frameworks to help guide future activity, such as sustainability, stewardship, and equity. The workshop identified participatory assessments with the public and other key stakeholders to create a map of public values as a way to get relevant information to decision-makers.

Keith’s note: see above. Mavbe some NASA NPD policy directive or baselined document is called for once and for all. If NASA is going to send people to the Moon and then to Mars for long visits then there needs to be something captured in formal documentation. Right? Or is NASA going to just wing things, use waivers, and bury issues in small cloistered working groups?

iv. Conversations: This refers to engaging with the public, social science and humanities experts, and under-represented groups as well as those in technical fields. These conversations matter symbolically and practically as a way to exchange ideas and values between NASA and others and can indirectly shape management and policy.

Keith’s note: No kidding. However at NASA saying that you need to engage with “stakeholders” and groups in a meeting and then putting that in a report is often seen as actually doing it. NASA really does not do much in the way of quality education and public outreach.

v. Education: There are ways to improve insight on ethical/societal issues for existing space practitioners, students, and the general public.

Keith’s note: yes, yes, yes there is always room for improvement but in many cases NASA has no existing standard or guidance or good practices to look at in order to improve. Its all ad hoc, seat of the pants and the people assigned to do it at NASA rarely have the actual skills and training to do it.

b) Participants suggested that key models that NASA and the space community can consider are the U.S. Human Genome Project’s funding of ELSI research and the European Commission research programs for Responsible Innovation.

Keith’s note: there are abundant examples outside of NASA how to do this whole outreach thing. But NASA always comes back with ” but we’re NASA and … “

c) Some of the policy options discussed in the report would require no dedicated funding (such as changing decision processes), whereas others, such as public consultations or dedicated research, would. Some combination of these activities seems likely to be of value, but also would come with a tradeoff of impacting already budget-constrained programs and projects at NASA and elsewhere.

Keith’s final note: NASA has no idea how to do this. Maybe now is the time to finally do it. IMHO this should be a level Zero requirement levied across absolutely everything that NASA does – everywhere – now and forever. If you cannot explain what you are doing and why you are doing it in a way that does not make people’s brains hurt and allows them to appreciate what NASA does then you need better explainers – which is what this whole report is about, right?

Ad Astra, audaces fortuna juvat, As Only NASA Can, Dare Mighty Things, Beam me up, etc.

Keith