Keith’s note: According to NASA PAO: “As NASA develops a blueprint for space exploration throughout the solar system for the benefit of humanity, the agency released several new documents Friday updating its Moon to Mars architecture. The roadmap sets NASA on course for long-term lunar exploration under the Artemis campaign in preparation for future crewed missions to Mars. Following an Architecture Concept Review, the 2024 updates include a revision of NASA’s Architecture Definition Document which details technical approaches and processes of the agency’s exploration plans, an executive overview, and 12 new white papers on key Moon to Mars topics.” More

Keith’s note: There is an Artemis media thing at NASA today at 1:00 pm EST. Tune in here. During the tenure of Bill Nelson at NASA the Artemis program’s schedule has slipped by several years, costs have continued to balloon out of control, and both OIG/GAO continue to point out chronically unresolved managerial and contractual issues with the whole Artemis/SLS/Orion/Gateway thing. It will be interesting to see what spin Nelson puts on this whole mess today in his exit presser – and how often he will say #SpaceIsHard.

Keith’s note: this editorial by Mike Bloomberg “NASA’s $100 Billion Moon Mission Is Going Nowhere“ certainly does not mince words. “A celestial irony is that none of this is necessary. A reusable SpaceX Starship will very likely be able to carry cargo and robots directly to the moon – no SLS, Orion, Gateway, Block 1B or ML-2 required – at a small fraction of the cost. Its successful landing of the Starship booster was a breakthrough that demonstrated how far beyond NASA it is moving.Meanwhile, NASA is canceling or postponing promising scientific programs – including the Veritas mission to Venus; the Viper lunar rover; and the NEO Surveyor telescope, intended to scan the solar system for hazardous asteroids – as Artemis consumes ever more of its budget. Taxpayers and Congress should be asking: What on Earth are we doing? And the next president should be held accountable for answers.”

“The program has made progress, but the Artemis schedule poses challenges. Artemis II and III launches (planned for September 2025 and 2026, respectively): EGS is making progress refurbishing the Mobile Launcher 1 – the structure used to transport and launch key systems – and modifying elements to support crew during these missions. New capabilities are taking longer than planned, and the program has only limited time to address potential issues. Artemis IV launch (planned for September 2028): EGS has made some progress toward this mission, such as modifying facilities to accommodate processing and launching the larger Space Launch System (SLS) Block 1B launch vehicle. However, much work remains, some of which cannot start until after the Artemis III launch.” Full report NASA Artemis Missions: Exploration Ground Systems Program Could Strengthen Schedule Decisions

Keith’s Note: When Senator Administrator Bill Nelson walked in the door at NASA they thought Mobile Launcher 2 would cost $500 million. NASA OIG now says that it will have cost $2.7 billion by the time Bechtel delivers it. Add in delays and cost overruns in the overall Artemis project and the ever slowing launch cadence between missions and you have to wonder why NASA is building something that it simply does not need and probably never did. And when OIG suggests that NASA convert this to a fixed cost contract to nail down the final costs NASA says “no”. Bill Nelson gets mad about China beating the U.S. (back) to the Moon when NASA is doing a great job of allowing that to happen. According to OIG: “NASA projects the ML-2 will cost over three times more than planned. In 2019, NASA estimated the entire ML-2 project from design through construction would cost under $500 million with construction completed and the ML-2 delivered to NASA by March 2023. In December 2023, NASA estimated the ML-2 project would cost $1.5 billion, including $1.3 billion for the Bechtel contract and $168 million for other project costs, with delivery of the launcher to NASA in November 2026. In June 2024, NASA established the Agency Baseline Commitment (ABC)—the cost and schedule baseline committed to Congress against which a project is measured—for a ML-2 project cost of $1.8 billion and a delivery date of September 2027. Even with the establishment of the ABC, NASA intends to keep Bechtel accountable to the cost and schedule agreed to in December 2023. Despite the Agency’s increased cost projections, our analysis indicates costs could be even higher due in part to the significant amount of construction work that remains. Specifically, our projections indicate the total cost could reach $2.7 billion by the time Bechtel delivers the ML-2 to NASA. With the time NASA requires after delivery to prepare the launcher, we project the ML-2 will not be ready to support a launch until spring 2029, surpassing the planned September2028 Artemis IV launch date. NASA officials disagree with our analysis and expect cost growth to lessen over time now that Bechtel has started construction of the launcher. The Agency believes this is an area of expertise for the contractor. While progress has been made with the beginning of construction of the ML-2, it is still too early to determine the impact on the contract’s continued cost growth and whether Bechtel can achieve and sustain an improved level of performance throughout the construction phase.” Full report: NASA’s Management of the Mobile Launcher 2 Project

NASA’s Management of Space Launch System Block 1B Development, NASA OIG: “Quality control issues at Michoud are largely due to the lack of a sufficient number of trained and experienced aerospace workers at Boeing. To mitigate these challenges, Boeing provides training and work orders to its employees. Considering the significant quality control deficiencies at Michoud, we found these efforts to be inadequate. For example, during our visit to Michoud in April 2023, we observed a liquid oxygen fuel tank dome – a critical component of the SLS Core Stage 3 – segregated and pending disposition on whether and how it can safely be used going forward due to welds that did not meet NASA specifications. According to NASA officials, the welding issues arose due to Boeing’s inexperienced technicians and inadequate work order planning and supervision. The lack of a trained and qualified workforce increases the risk that Boeing will continue to manufacture parts and components that do not adhere to NASA requirements and industry standards. We project SLS Block 1B costs will reach approximately $5.7 billion before the system is scheduled to launch in 2028. This is $700 million more than NASA’s 2023 Agency Baseline Commitment, which established a cost and schedule baseline at nearly $5 billion. EUS development accounts for more than half of this cost, which we estimate will increase from an initial cost of $962 million in 2017 to nearly $2.8 billion through 2028. Boeing’s delivery of the EUS to NASA has also been delayed from February 2021 to April 2027, and when combined with other factors, suggests the September 2028 Artemis IV launch date could be delayed as well. Factors contributing to these cost increases and schedule delays include redirection of EUS funds to the core stage during Artemis I production, changing Artemis mission assignments, maintaining an extended workforce 7 years more than planned, manufacturing issues, and supply chain challenges.”

Keith’s note: From GAO: “Two pieces of NASA’s Gateway program—the first space station to orbit the moon—are scheduled to launch together in 2027. NASA is taking steps to ensure Gateway will be ready. For example, the program plans to update a cost and schedule analysis that will help determine whether the launch date is feasible. But this program also faces some significant challenges. For example, the mass of the pieces is too high. So, if it isn’t reduced, they might not be able to reach the correct lunar orbit once launched. We recommended documenting the Gateway program’s plans to address this issue to help ensure it can meet the planned launch date.” Full report: Artemis Programs: NASA Should Document and Communicate Plans to Address Gateway’s Mass Risk

Source: PSI Planetary Exploration Newsletter: “As many of you will have seen, earlier this week NASA made the shocking decision to cancel the VIPER project following completion of the rover’s build. It now faces the prospect of being dismembered. We have organized an open letter to Congress from the wider science community asking them to refuse any request to cancel this mission, by ensuring that it continues to be included as a budgetary line-item. You can find this letter here: https://forms.gle/XDSzTra4NPSS1VC27 If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the letter’s organizers, Dr Benjamin Fernando ([email protected]) or Dr Parvathy Prem ([email protected]) who have organized this letter in a personal capacity.”

Keith’s note: In case you missed it while the Starliner thruster issue has been in the headlines, yet another EVA was canceled due to a spacesuit issue. First there was a problem with a suit’s comfort/flexibility. Then there was a water leak the other day. Scratch two EVA attempts. These suits are 50-ish years old – older than some of the astronauts who wear them. Now NASA is going to the Moon for long duration stays and new space suits are needed. Axiom and Collins had xEVAS contracts. Now Collins has decided to discontinue their work leaving only one company to produce the new spacesuits. Redundancy in terms of suppliers has been a smart thing that NASA has been doing. Now they will have only one spacesuit option and if it is delayed then that becomes a big pacing item for the whole Artemis thing – as if there are not already enough of those.

“Our review found that NASA deviated from its original, hands-off strategy for the initiative and from its plan for incremental progress towards larger missions. Rather, the Agency’s aggressive lander development schedules led to increasingly risk-averse practices and policies. For example, NASA insight and oversight increased, and more detailed vendor proposals were required. This resulted in higher costs and delayed delivery schedules while threatening the initiative’s ability to achieve its broad objectives. Specifically, inserting a larger lander to accommodate the Volatiles Investigating Polar Exploration Rover (VIPER) into CLPS’s early schedule interfered with a progressive development approach. This introduced the added risk of beginning the first large lander delivery before knowledge could be gained from the success (or failure) of smaller deliveries. NASA’s planned hands-off approach was also somewhat negated when the Agency added augmented insight and placed added requirements on the vendors’ development process. We found that NASA-directed changes, including augmented insight and landing site changes, led to $171.4 million in project cost increases. … Our analysis showed these challenges will continue to hinder NASA’s ability to meet the initiative’s objectives. While the initiative has a contract capped at $2.6 billion through 2028, increased costs on previous task orders jeopardize the plan to issue two task orders per year. … In the 5 years since CLPS began, NASA has not reassessed market conditions to better understand the Agency’s role and changing market conditions. Finally, we found CLPS lacks a detailed management plan that could outline a disciplined approach, promote accountability for how the Agency measures success, and help the initiative weigh competing priorities.” Full report