GAO On Artemis: Behind Schedule, Over Cost, Lacking Clear Direction
GAO: NASA Human Space Exploration – Significant Investments in Future Capabilities Require Strengthened Management Oversight
“What GAO Found
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) again delayed the planned launch date for Artemis I, the first uncrewed test flight involving three closely related human spaceflight programs–the Orion crew vehicle, Space Launch System (SLS), and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS). Together, these programs aim to continue human space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit. The most recent delay, to November 2021, resulted in part from manufacturing challenges and represents a 36-month slip since NASA established a schedule to measure performance in 2014. This new launch date does not account for the effects of COVID-19. According to NASA officials, COVID-19 delays and schedule risks will place pressure on NASA’s ability to achieve this launch date.
Development cost estimates for key programs also increased. The cost of the SLS program increased by 42.5 percent and the EGS program by 32.3 percent since 2014, for a combined increase of over $3 billion, bringing the total to $11.5 billion. NASA does not plan to complete revised estimates for Orion, which are tied to the second, crewed test flight (Artemis II) before spring 2021.
NASA awarded billions of dollars in development and production contracts to support flights beyond Artemis I, but the flight schedule has changed frequently due to a lack of clear requirements and time frames for planned capability upgrades. Limited NASA oversight also places efforts to plan and execute future flights at risk of adverse outcomes, such as increased costs or delays. For example, NASA is committed to establishing cost and schedule performance baselines for these efforts, but it plans to do so too late in the acquisition process to be useful as an oversight tool. In addition, senior leaders do not receive consistent and comprehensive information at quarterly briefings on future efforts, such as a program to begin developing a more powerful upper stage for SLS. This is because current updates provided to NASA management focus primarily on the more short-term Artemis I and II flights. This approach places billions of dollars at risk of insufficient NASA oversight.”
Keith’s note: As you can see in the GAO report there is a series of dominoes that will fall and will push Artemis well past 2024: Green Run delays; shrinking times between Artemis I, Artemis II, and Artemis III, and less assurance that funding will be inplace to keep the whole party going. Also, there is a growing concern about flying Artemis II with full-up ECLSS and a crew for the first time and significant heartburn about flying a lunar lander with a crew for the first time on Artemis III. NASA now says that Artemis III will land without the Gateway – but that Gateway is needed in order for the Artemis program to be “sustainable”. Yet Gateway will actually make the Artemis program harder to be “sustainable” given the delays and overruns experienced thus far. This cannot go on forever – can it? Nothing about this program has ever happend on time or within budget. If NASA can land humans on the Moon without Gateway in 2024 then it may actually be more “sustainable” to keep doing it that way.
Then there is this part of the report that reeks of naive faith-based program management. After a decade of delays and cost overruns, NASA is now hoping that “Boeing develops more expertise and certainty in the production of core stages and EUS.” Why would Boeing want to change from a winning formula filled with cash and acceptance of delays?
“The contracts are predominantly cost-reimbursement type, under which the government bears the risk of increases in the costs. NASA is taking steps to control long-term program costs by planning to transition to fixed-price type contracting and other cost reduction strategies, but it will be years before NASA is in a position to do so. … The SLS program plans to control long-term production costs of SLS core stages and EUS by structuring the SLS Stages Production and Evolution contract to allow a transition from costtype to firm-fixed-price deliverables. Program officials told us they expect the first series of core stages and EUS under this contract to be produced under cost-type orders, but they expect to eventually transition to the use of firm-fixed-price orders as Boeing develops more expertise and certainty in the production of core stages and EUS.”
True! So are we ever going to take the logical next step and cancel it or are we too corrupt?
https://uploads.disquscdn.c…
He once told me he loved NASA, but loved MSFC more.
I love the term “Naive faith-based program management”. I don’t think the Project Management Institute has a credential for that track yet!
Worked for the Great Pyramid.
I remember thinking I should put a bet that SLS will not fly before 2021… no one took me up on it and frankly I was excited. I figured it would have flown by now.
anything that relies on Orion and SLS is going to be “Behind Schedule, Over Cost, and Lacking Clear Direction”. Some people have been saying this since 2010 – but what did we know?
The political figures dictate (under the worst conditions) deadlines and the civil service just tries to make that look possible. Everyone knows that the 2024 landing was impossible but no one wanted to fall on their sword over that – so far out.
The question remains – would NASA have found the courage to speak up if we had been getting closer to launch and the impossible goal had still be policy?
Now that the adults will be back in charge, NASA can come up with a reasonably safe schedule and hopefully some budget will appear to support it.
It’s highly unlikely but maybe, just maybe this lame duck will die.
But on the bright side, it’s provided all those high paying jobs that Congress loves even if they are totally supported by the taxpayer.
Cheers
Neil
If “the adults” haven’t spoken up by now they’re never going to. And any reasonable safe schedule would preclude solid rockets for manned launches anyway.
The adults that we are talking about are President Biden and his experienced team. Hopefully his NASA Administrator will be as highly qualified as his other appointed leaders. The Civil Service might have found the courage to speak up but they have not yet and we will probably not need them to do so now.
Were we talking about solid rockets? Like the Shuttle flew with?
NASA just choose SpaceX as thier contractor for the new lunar lander. You wont see a moonwalker in JBs term.
I am very glad that we will not try to land a person on the Moon in the next three years – we need more time to fly tests and make sure that we can bring our crews home alive. We should land on the Moon but it is very irresponsible to rush and accept far too much risk.
GAO On
ArtemisSLS/OrionSLS/Orion does not equal Artemis.
Yes it is. Why are we building SLS/Orion? Can Artemis happen without SLS/Orion?
Depends on when, not whether, SpaceX can launch a Spaceship to the Moon, including landing, takeoff and return. Oh, they might be able to use the Blue Origin lander in there…somewhere.
Keith – are you aware of any plans to use the J-2X that we spent billions developing?
No. Why would NASA want to use and engine that it spent $1 billion testing and upgrading? 🙂
Sadly, this is what I thought.
“by planning to transition to fixed-price type contracting and other cost reduction strategies, but it will be years before NASA is in a position to do so”
And the pork train to nowhere keeps on rolling ..
Train kept a rollin’ all night long, train kept ah rollin’ all night long – a little Aerosmith.
1st steps to ending SLS: Today, NASA awarded Blue Origin a NASA Launch Services II (NLS II) Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract to launch planetary, Earth observation, exploration, and scientific satellites for the agency aboard New Glenn, Blue Origin’s orbital reusable launch vehicle.