“NASA at 40”: Written Congressional Testimony by Keith Cowing, Editor, NASA Watch

Written testimony submitted by Keith Cowing, Editor, NASA Watch before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, House Science Committee
“NASA at 40: What kind of space program does America need for the 21st Century?”
1 October 1998

Mr. Chairman: Thank you for the opportunity to express my views on the future of NASA and our space program on the occasion of NASA’s 40th birthday. I come to this task by a curious route – the Internet. I am a former NASA civil servant and space life scientist who now runs a small business that develops the content for Internet. I also run several news oriented websites at my own expense, one of which is called NASA Watch

NASA Watch sprang out of an earlier, somewhat ad hoc Internet effort to provide information to NASA employees about looming threats of layoffs – something NASA was loathe to publicize. Since its debut several years ago, NASA Watch seems to have become a virtual destination where thousands of people in and around NASA visit daily to exchange (or just read) information about NASA. Much of the information on NASA Watch is composed of items NASA either does not bother to release or wishes would not be released.

I do not profess to be an expert in space policy and will readily admit that I usually just type what I think or feel as the thought occurs to me. Suffice it to say I used to work at NASA, and I talk to many people daily who still do. I am worried that our space program is not being operated or supported as well as it could be, and I decided to speak out.

Summary

My premise is simple: NASA excels when our nation has a clear, binding, national space policy. Absent such a policy, our space infrastructure fragments into dueling factions. Without a clear mission NASA now seeks to maintain its own existence with various missions serving as a means whereby to accomplish this end. Meanwhile, the relationship between all of the players has gotten worse over the years and is now highly dysfunctional.

This hearing is aimed at NASA and its future. Unless fundamental aspects of how NASA operates today are fixed, NASA will be unable to meet the challenges of the next century.

Indeed, one might question whether NASA in its current configuration is even the appropriate mechanism to manage our exploration of space. I am not certain just what America’s guiding vision for the exploration of space should be. All I know is that we are in desperate need of one.

My underlying assumption is that we as a nation, and as a species, are destined to expand outward from this planet to personally explore the universe. As such, we need an organization to guide the way. To date, this has been NASA. I see no reason why NASA should not continue to lead America’s exploration of space. But in so doing, NASA needs to constantly adapt to changing pace and character of exploration. Below, I will deal with many of the problems I see as affecting NASA’s current ability to perform its mission. These problems need to be addressed if we expect NASA to go further and learn more in space.

Visions and Frustrations

On the wall above the dais in the Committee’s hearing room is a verse from Proverbs: “where there is no vision the people perish.” NASA’s core problem today is that it has no clear compelling vision to guide it. Nor has NASA had such a vision for decades. When NASA last had such a vision, humans went to the moon a mere 8 years after they decided to do so. We were guided by a clear and simple concept – one that sprang forth from the White House and was embraced and given form by the American people.

What we lack today, as we stumble ahead in our exploration of space, is such a clear goal and shared common vision. Our space activities have suffered greatly as a result. If a clear vision is not soon established for the NASA of the present – there may no longer be a need for NASA. Indeed we may find ourselves retreating from space instead of exploring it. The current way of doing things is broke and needs fixing.

Today, in the absence of a clear, unifying vision, everyone involved ends up creating and then defending their own vision if for no other reason that to justify their own continued existence. The net result is a constant clash of individual self – serving agendas, each held by one branch of government, agency, organization, or industry. Survival replaces progress and we all lose out.

Who is at fault for allowing this situation to happen? We all are.

NASA emerged in a time where ideas seemed to be simpler to express – and comprehend. Back then, we were in a race to the Moon against our clearly defined enemy (Russia), bound to a clearly defined deadline (1969), and in pursuit of a goal embodied within a dream, which had been shared by humanity for millennia. What could be simpler!

Politics, current events, and human yearnings all conspired rather effectively to get us to the moon – but this wonderful confluence of factors was unable to provide a compelling reason to stay there – or to move on. Indeed we began to disassemble this incredible capability within a few months of the first landing on the Moon. The vision that had propelled us to do things we thought impossible had evaporated in the bright light of our own success.

After Apollo achieved its primary goal, our space exploration infrastructure began to shift from one driven by a goal to one of self – perpetuity. Projects were now created to justify NASA’s existence – not the other way around.

Mr. Chairman I am frustrated by all of this. Exceptionally frustrated. NASA and I grew up together. I was not yet three years old when NASA was born. Just as many people stop at midlife to assess where they’ve been and where they’re heading, NASA finds itself doing much the same – only to be confronted with a midlife crisis. NASA is too preoccupied with justifying its own existence and putting out the brush fire du jour to take note of this crisis.

In its youth, NASA was an agency that commanded whatever resources it needed, leapt back into action after many a setback, and could be trusted at its word when it said that a thing could or could not be done. Now NASA is insecure and is subject to the whims of others, burdened with a host of operational responsibilities almost unknown in its youth. As such it is often focused inward upon its own survival with its original core research mission taking second priority. NASA needs to return to the things it does best and shed all other distractions.

I grew up in the 1960’s expecting that we’d go to the moon to stay, and that we’d be on Mars by 1981 – just as Vice President Agnew and others had suggested as we began to land humans on the moon. As a teenager I saw the film “2001: A Space Odyssey” and thereafter firmly believed that I would reach middle age in a time when human civilization spanned two worlds.

Given the rate at which we progressed as we leapt from Alan Shepard’s 15 minute ballistic flight atop a stepchild of the V-2 in 1961 to the first Saturn V launch in 1967, this was certainly within our grasp. This happened between the time I went from 1st to 7th grade. I guess I can’t help holding a mental image of rapid and sustained progress in space propelled by a simple clear vision – for it was the very first impression of space I ever experienced.

Let me pause to note that what I have said thus far, and what I will say ahead, may sound naive and idealistic. In a town swarming with complicated ways of doing things, I’m sure it does. To be honest, Mr. Chairman, I am tired of listening to professional space pundits, politicians, and NASA Administrators (such as represented by some of the people assembled for this hearing) who try and explain why we have or haven’t done things in space – each of whom is unwilling to admit that they are at fault for taking what could be one of the grandest things humans have ever conceived of doing, and burdening it with petty terrestrial agendas.

Here I am at 43 and we are still flying the same Space Shuttle I saw lift off in 1981 at the age of 26 – a spaceship designed in the early 1970’s when I was a teenager. And now this relic is going to dock with a new space station we could have built 20 years ago. This is not progress. Nor is this exploration. Rather, this is stagnation – indeed, it is willful abdication from our traditional leadership role in space exploration playing itself out in slow motion.

My generation was robbed of this reality and now another generation may get shortchanged as well.

Problems and Solutions

Unlike many people, I do not see this crux in our exploration of space as being so simplistic as to have been caused by too much government involvement or too little private sector participation. Rather, as mentioned above, I see the dilemma we now face as being due to a lack of a coherent national space policy – one which sets goals, defines priorities, and provides a forward looking plan that people can depend on.

When it is clear who is going to do what, and when, it should be a straightforward process to decide whether public and/or private sector approaches are most appropriate for the tasks ahead. It should be obvious to anyone who watches NASA that it has been burdened with many operational responsibilities which the private sector clearly can perform more economically. On the other hand, there are intrinsic research endeavors that often require decades to demonstrate economic potential. These things tend to be best done by governmental entities.

Right now, we have no clear plan or vision. Absent such a plan, the whole process of exploring and using space has defaulted to competing factions to whom coordination and cooperation provides no obvious benefit. I am often amazed that we get anything done in space!

While I have no idea whether there will be a government agency named” N.A.S.A.” in the decades to come, yet I see no reason why there could not be one – or some collection of agencies with similar charters. I could also easily imagine that government’s role would be somewhat diminished and that private concerns have expanded out to lead the way much the way it has happened on Earth.

I can predict, however, without a thorough rethinking and overhaul of the way we explore space, we’ll see less progress in the future, not more.

As I mentioned earlier, we are all to blame for allowing this dysfunctional method of space exploration to arise and persist. Citing problems is easy. Coming up with solutions is not – – especially if one is required to admit to being part of the problem. What follows are some general problems, paths for solutions, and a look ahead to the importance of solving these problems.

Problem: NASA is not an airline: We’re all at fault by transforming NASA from a lean, mission – oriented research, development, and exploration agency into a trucking and communications firm. NASA is at its best when it is pushing technological frontiers and going places no one has ever gone before – propelled by goals and dreams along the way. NASA is at its worst when it tries to perform the routine operations in that frontier more appropriately suited for the private sector.

We should have learned by now to run away screaming from anyone trying to tell you that a government entity can operate any transport service economically. Amtrack anyone? We should, in turn, stop and take heed when government says that some things, such as the search for knowledge, are worth doing regardless of economic payback – and can only be attempted with the resources only a government can amass.

We need a NASA that can say “No” as easily as it says” Yes”. We also need a NASA who can tell us” why” something needs to be done in an open and honest fashion.

Solution: The entrepreneurs who run startup firms and begin from zero to grab market share are often ill – equipped to run those very same companies once they have matured and achieved stability in the marketplace. NASA is best at pushing the technological frontiers – not in maintaining them on a daily basis. It is time to get NASA back to what it was chartered to be.

NASA should commercialize routine launch and operations activities as soon as possible. Attempts made thus far are promising but fall far short of what is needed. The FAA pilots do not fly commercial airliners. NASA shouldnot put itself in this position either.

NASA should retool itself to focus upon its chartered responsibilities. The Administration and Congress should exercise restraint and not load NASA up with tasks designed to make the constituents happy back home. Rather, they should keep their eye on the prize and let the chips fall where they best suit NASA – not the next election. Although I think that modern telecommunications makes one’s physical location increasingly irrelevant, NASA should be allowed to close and open centers as it deems fit in order to accomplish its tasks.

However, when no clear compelling geographical preference exists for a task, NASA should seek out and use excellence regardless of where it is to be found. With people telecommuting everyday from a space station it is going to become increasingly hard for NASA to justify sending people and projects to other centers – unless some unique physical facility warrants such a move.

A Look Ahead: NASA has a lot on its plate: missions are being flung all over the solar system, humans will soon living in space permanently, extensive data sets will come pouring out of skies at ever – increasing rates. It is more than enough to expect NASA to deal with this deluge of scientific data without having to operate all of the logistical systems needed to keep things going. NASA has a chance of thriving so long as it knows when to let go of something and let the private sector make it sink or swim. In he rush to commercialize and privatize routine operations, however, NASA needs to be certain that it does not loose valuable capabilities if there is no portion of the private sector ready and able to accept the task.

Problem: Lack of Presidential Leadership: The President and all of his staff at the White House are at fault for issuing a space policy and then promptly ignoring it. The Administration is also at fault allowing economic and foreign policy interests to manipulate our space program – the most blatant example being the abduction of space station program by the State Department for use as a conduit for foreign aid to Russia.

Moreover, when real problems have arisen with the space station program, ones which require their considered attention, the White House is no where to be found. An Administration whose re – election theme song was” Don’t Stop Thinking About Tomorrow” has done just that when it comes to the exploration of space. Such abject avoidance of this problem has been the direct cause of many delays in the space station program since NASA has not been empowered by the White House to use all of the resources at its disposal in order to fix the problems.

Instead of removing Russia from the critical path, the White House has stood by and allowed Russian non – performance to delay progress and drive up costs. Then, to compound this situation, the White House has the gall to tell NASA that these problems all have to be solved within NASA’s existing – and shrinking budget.

The net result is that all of NASA’s other programs are, or will be, delayed, shrunken, or abandoned. The net result is that the space station program has technical decisions being made for political reasons and political decisions being made for technical reasons. Small wonder this program I such a mess. If this is how America intends to run all future, large space programs, I predict that there will be no such programs.

Solution: It is obvious that the current Administration is unlikely to change its approach to space policy any time soon. Regardless of who is elected in 2000, they would be well advised to reinstate the National Space Council. This Space Council should be populated with individuals who can serve as sources of expertise for the development of a cohesive national space policy and, more importantly, as watchdogs for the implementation of this policy.

A national space policy needs to be completed within the first year of the new Administration. We cannot afford to delay much further. This should include an implementation plan and budget request ready for submittal during the second budgetary submission made by this Administration. Everyone needs to know what America is going to do in space, why we are going to do it, when we are going to do it, and how much it will cost. If we decide not to do something in space, a clear rationale needs to be voiced so as to leave no doubt what is and is not a goal of our nation in space.

Politics will always be a part of the exploration of space. However, when political concerns become programmatic drivers, the Administration needs to address these concerns openly and honestly. If a space project is to have a foreign aid component (as is the case with the International Space Station) then funding for that project needs to draw upon those portions of the budget normally concerned with foreign aid i.e. the State Department. Not to do so is being less than honest with Congress and the public.

A Look Forward: Imagine today’s dysfunctional approaches extrapolated onto a program of Martian exploration. If we have so much trouble supporting a multi – national, multi- year multi – billion dollar program in low Earth orbit, imagine what we’d face if we mounted a similarly complicated program to send humans to Mars! What happens if one key member of an international coalition experiences a change in government wherein their contributions shrink or cease? Can the program be designed with enough robustness to proceed? How do we establish mechanisms to manage probes on missions out of this solar system – missions that will require decades of support? We’re never going to explore the solar system if we can’t take a spin around the local neighborhood.

Problem: NASA’s Broken Promises: NASA is at fault for making promises to the White House, Congress, and the taxpayers without first doing its homework. NASA often puts an overly optimistic spin on the true cost of a project and the risks involved for fear of having the project killed as a result of White House and Congressional sticker shock. The International Space Station with its politically motivated Russian participation is the most recent example. Once a project is approved, a creeping cost incrementalism then enters into the equation. The underlying hope at NASA being that somehow money actually needed can be cajoled out of Congress in small chunks so as to fix all of the things that were overlooked during the initial selling of the program. Over the past several decades this approach has been refined into a high art form.

NASA’s contracts are too easily awarded, often to a select concentration of contractors among which competition during the proposal process is now more of a hope than an actual fact. Indeed, merger mania has reduced a collection of aerospace contractors down to two monolithic alternatives – both of which also control the Space Shuttle. How anyone can even suggest that competition is enhanced by such an arrangement escapes me.

My only hope is that some of the new methods of getting into and using space may be soon be done by smaller firms who relish their independence and have to compete everyday to keep their share of the market.

When costs start to rise and contractor problems retard progress, NASA comes to Congress to beg for another money fix to get them out of the cost overrun du jour. Requesting transfer authority well into a fiscal year, shifting the phasing of facilities, and moving research grant anniversary dates and other procedural mumbo jumbo are often used to hide the fact that other programs within the agency find their resources being cut to support the Space Station or Space Shuttle. NASA then asks for forgiveness and pledges that it doesn’t need any more money only to show up a few weeks later asking for more, new excuse in hand. This process is allowed to go on year after year because the White House and Congress let NASA get away with it.

Solution: NASA itself needs to practice what it preaches in the innumerable project management classes it makes its employees take. NASA needs to spend the required time up front to understand the requirements, technological risks, and funding environment before it proposes a new start – not after it has started the task. Waiving management fads such as TQM and ISO 9000 in front of NASA employees is not going to fix a badly designed program. Instead it just serves to increase their frustration since they know that NASA Headquarters will never adhere to the same principles they hoist upon their subordinates.

When NASA becomes aware of a potential cost increase it should be the one who reaches out to Congress – not the other way around, as is all too often the case. How NASA can expect Congress to help them out after NASA has withheld information until the last moment, again and again, always baffles me. I am even more mystified to hear people at NASA complain that Congress doesn’t trust them.

NASA also needs to demand much more responsibility from its contractors. Incentives for contract success should vastly outweigh those for failure. Indeed, right now, the penalty for failure is often rather minimal given the cost plus arrangement favored in most of NASA’s large procurements. The worst that can happen when things go awry is that all contract costs are covered and a CEO has to go to the Capitol Hill to endure a verbal lashing, protected by his golden parachute all the while. in

A Look ahead: Imagine what resistance a future NASA Administrator will face trying to sell another large program (e.g. mars) to Congress. If NASA’s current approach to selling and managing large programs is not fixed rather soon there will be no new large programs space for decades to come. Indeed, I predict that NASA will not be allowed to mount any new human space programs until such time as space station assembly has been completed, the space station has operated for several years and has begun to deliver some of the numerous benefits NASA claims it will provide.

Problem: Better, Cheaper, Faster works, but not for everyone: NASA touts its” better, cheaper, faster” mantra for the radical change in mission design and operation but clearly does not enforce it in all of its programs. Some sterling examples have emerged from NASA – most notably the Mars Pathfinder mission. This approach also includes tough guidelines wherein programs are cancelled if they stray from pre – set ground rules. The cancellation of the Clark mission being one example of this policy in action.

Given NASA’s focus on this approach, you’d think that the preeminent place to practice this new way of doing business would be on the International Space Station program – NASA’s largest single activity. You’d think this would be especially true inasmuch as the ISS program was created as a cheaper and better way to build a space station using remnants of the Space Station Freedom Program. What part of the new, improved ISS program conforms to the cheaper – better – faster way of doing business? I certainly cannot find it. It is not” cheaper”, it is not” faster”, and only time will tell if it is” better”.

Solution: NASA needs to be honest up front about the costs and risks associated with any new project. If NASA is going to set standardized criteria for program cancellation it should be ready to apply the same criteria against all of its programs i.e. the International Space Station. The Clark mission was cancelled when its projections showed it running by 20 % over its $51 Million expected cost. In February 1998, NASA FY 1999 budget estimates showed the Space Station program exceeding it’s advertised developmental cost of $17.4 billion by $4.2 billion for a final expected development cost of $21.66 billion. This represents a 24.5 % cost overrun. I am not advocating the cancellation of the Space Station, but I am suggesting that rules that are ignored are often worse than having no rules to begin with.

A look ahead: There is no doubt that NASA’s Better, Cheaper, Faster approach has clear, proven merits. But invoking it only when politically desirable is not going to provide all of the benefits a broader policy would provide to NASA. It may also prove to be true that some projects, most notably human space flight, may not be as amenable to this approach as are robotic missions. Only time will tell.

I suspect that as we actually move our robots, and then ourselves, out into the solar system that a more pragmatic, adaptive approach will emerge – one based upon actual experience. For all we know deep space missions may require quadruple dissimilar redundancy as a standard requirement. A look at some of the technological approaches attempted by well – meaning, and well – prepared Antarctic explorers serves to illustrate how wonderful ideas at home may be worthless out on the frontier. Perhaps the phrase” Better, Cheaper, Faster” should include” Smarter”.

Problem: Congress as an observer: Congress is at fault when it stands by and allows things to happen. Congress needs to become part of the solution to problems, not just the place where everyone runs with their problems or to complain about others. There also seems to be little in the way of teeth in any measures Congress manages to pass. NASA misbehaves, yet Congress keeps the money flowing.

All too often Congress takes the credit when things go well at NASA, often naming things at NASA (or in their home state) after each other in the process. Yet when things get bad, Congress rushes to point fingers and assign blame – blame which is almost always vectored away from Capitol Hill. Congress also seems ill equipped to listen and respond effectively to bad news when they are not in a mood to hear it.

As an example: the issues facing the ISS program as a result of Russian participation have been known since day one within Congress. Despite a torrent of input from people within NASA about the risks associated with bringing Russia into the ISS program, Congress signed off on the deal.

Now, after half a decade of playing an annual game of brinkmanship driven by a steady series of funding standoffs, Congress, NASA, and the White House are all still blaming each other for the current situation. Each year outraged lawmakers rail against NASA’s delays and the White House’s indifference, yet each year the margin for votes to keep the space station grows and grows. Where’s the incentive upon either NASA or the White House to change their tactics? Congress always gives them what they want in the end- with an ever – growing consensus! From NASA’s perspective, they seem to have hit upon a winning formula!

When Congress does deal with these problems, it only does so after they have become larger than they need to be. NASA is at fault as well since it harbors a well – practiced habit of not telling Congress anything they do not feel it needs to know. Instead of giving Congress advance notice of potential problems, everything is allowed to stew and ferment until it bursts out forcing people to take rash actions instead of making well – considered decisions.

I do not want to suggest that Congress has done nothing when problems have arisen at NASA. But it certainly could do more. Congress must accept and exercise the full extent of its oversight responsibility and hold those responsible accountable for not delivering on their promises. If need be, Congress needs to start rolling their sleeves to help when help is what is needed. If this current situation does not change we will never explore the solar system.

A look ahead: Several years ago, as the 1996 presidential election loomed ahead, there was bipartisan support for a “space summit” – an effort wherein America’s space priorities would get a re-examination, re-adjustment, and re-validation. Soon after the election was over, interest evaporated. The White House laid an ever increasing series of ground rules upon the summit which would have rendered it a waste of cab fare from Capitol Hill – and supporters found something else to be interested in.

This is a shame inasmuch as the euphoria that had accompanied the discoveries within the ALH84001 Martian meteorite had captivated the public. Why NASA did not urge the White House to use this opportunity (or vice versa!) to substantially bolster NASA’s program of planetary exploration still mystifies me. Now we see unnecessary compromises being made to the core science missions in several Mars projects because they have exceeded their cost cap – and there is no money left to spare.

The failure of the space summit was also unfortunate since some of the disconnects between NASA, The White House, and Congress regarding human space flight might have been addressed. Given the stress that ISS delays have had on NASA and its ability to do the other things it is tasked to do, perhaps it is time that this idea be revisited.

Should another attempt be made, however, everything needs to be on the table – budget, priorities, foreign policy, and commercialization policy – the works. And all parties need to abide by a pledge to live with the outcome. Unless some active measures are made to heal these ever widening rifts in regarding the conduct and direction of America’s space activities, NASA will become totally obsessed with the space station and generating the cash needed to stall Russia’s problems for another week or two. As a result, all of the other amazing things NASA has come to stand for will wither and die.

Problem: NASA lacks an advocate: Instead of being an advocate for his agency’s continued health, NASA’s Administrator has been a cheerleader for its diminution and has eagerly boasted of budget cuts year after year. If NASA is so hot, then why is its budget being cut when all other science and research activities have enjoyed budget increases? Saying that NASA is better because it” does more with less” only works for a couple of fiscal years before rhetoric begins to conflict with reality. The cuts have gone too far and NASA’s fundamental health has been undermined.

NASA’s Administrator has the moral and ethical obligation to his employees, his agency, and the taxpayers to make this clear to the White House. I see no evidence that he has done so. Rather, he has dutifully done as the President has told him. Serving at the President’s pleasure does not mean that one should not stand on principle when circumstances merit and tell the President the things he needs to hear. If NASA’s own Administrator isn’t going to stand up for his agency, how can anyone else be expected to?

Solution: NASA’s Administrator should be out promoting the merits of his agency, its mission, and its people along with NIH, NSF and other science and technology organizations to the extent allowable under law. These organizations have all witnessed budgetary growth at the same time, and within the same government downsizing environment, that NASA operates within. What are they doing so right that NASA is doing so wrong?

While achieving efficiencies and cutting costs is always a meritorious goal, this should not impede NASA’s Administrator from seeking additional work and projects and the funds required to do these projects. Indeed, if NASA is so good at doing things cheaper, better, and faster, there is no reason why it can’t tackle larger, more complex missions as a result of having learned these lessons. If NASA’s budget is not at least allowed the option of growth at some point, it is simply impossible to even consider any of the grand feats we often envision for ourselves in space – at least not through government funding.

NASA’s Administrator should assign himself the action item of totally reconfiguring the way NASA interacts not only with the White House and Congress (the ultimate arbiters of NASA’s budget) but also with the general public. Annual Spin Off reports, Public Affairs sanitized press releases, and websites designed to induce sleep are not the way to go.

The exploration of space and the discovery of new and exciting worlds are exciting yet you’d often never know it from NASA. While the visitation numbers have since become almost mythological, the Mars Pathfinder website has probably been visited by everyone on Earth – twice. Has NASA tried to implement lessons learned from that experience?

No. Indeed, the marvelous folks at JPL who jumped for joy on live TV were admonished by NASA Public Affairs for being unprofessional. I’ll take jumping geeks in polo shirts over a bunch of well – behaved headquarters nannies in suits any day.

All I can say is the following: when was the last time (other than the 1960’s) you saw the press actually cheering for a NASA project (” the little rover that could!”)? For a brief moment, that old” can – do” NASA shone forth from Pasadena. Such behavior should be emulated at NASA – not squelched.

A look ahead: It has been difficult enough to get programs in place to perform the initial reconnaissance of our solar system. Clearly if humans are even going to consider moving off of Earth, some rather explicit information is going to need to be available to a large number of people. NASA is going to have to play a pivotal role in public education if we are ever going to see this happen. As such, NASA is going to need to find a way to shed this shyness and tendency to hoard information and get out there and let people know what lies ahead for us.

If NASA itself can’t be an overt cheerleader for the exploration of space, then it needs to facilitate the creation of an environment where others can do the task instead. NASA has been given the most amazing charter ever given any government agency. It is shame that NASA cannot utilize every possible avenue to tell everyone what can be done.

Problem: NASA squanders its human resources: NASA’s Administrator is at fault for squandering NASA’s most valuable asset – its people. NASA has the most inventive, educated, and visionary workforce ever assembled on this planet.

Yet rather than being an advocate for his workforce, Mr. Goldin has gleefully presided over a needlessly harsh and impersonal downsizing process and has avoided even the rudimentary tools successfully used in private industry to treat people in a humane fashion, one which derives from years of dedicated service. Yet once the dust clears from these personnel cuts, Mr. Goldin somehow expects the survivors to feel incentivized to perform better than before. You can’t decimate the ranks and then expect to herd the remaining people into productivity with a horsewhip, Mr. Goldin.

Solution: NASA’s Administrator needs to abandon his current personnel system and rebuild it from scratch. While the realities of overall government downsizing need to be at the core of the way NASA manages its people, such policies need to go hand in hand with a fundamental commitment to the people themselves. As funds become increasingly scarce, and there are fewer people to do the work, it should be obvious to even the most casual observer that the critical link is the ability of the individual to be supported in all ways as they strive for excellence. As the number of people decreases, the care given to the welfare of each person that remains should increase accordingly.

During my experience running NASA Watch, I have encountered innumerable examples wherein people express their frustration with the way NASA is being run. Yet underneath their current frustration, there is always a resolute commitment to the agency still in place. This commitment to NASA and to the exploration of space may be powerful, but it is not indestructible. As such, my biggest fear for NASA is not budgetary, but rather human.

A look ahead: The time for large personnel cuts at NASA seems to have passed (for now) and NASA’s budget seems to have entered into a predictable (although undesirable) state. Now is the time to halt the erosion of human capital at NASA and start rebuilding it. It is also time to start looking ahead to the sorts of people needed to carry out the space exploration of the next century and creating a process whereby those still at NASA can usher in the next generation. To date, NASA’s Administrator has paid little more than lip service to this topic. This needs to change immediately otherwise all of the new ways of doing things will never achieve their full potential.

Problem: Irresponsible Contractors: Aerospace contractors are at fault for lining up at the communal trough to gorge themselves with no thought of societal responsibility. A blatant example being on 5 November 1997 when a Vice President of Boeing testified before this committee on cost increases on the Space Station program. Despite the obvious title of the hearing (” International Space Station: Status and Cost Overruns”), he still could not bring himself to say” cost overrun” resorting, instead to the guilt – shifting euphemism of repeatedly describing a” variance” in their” estimate at completion”. A $600 Million variance at that. Such performance (or lack thereof) is shameful.

This problem is not confined to human space flight either. One look at how the EOS AM- 1 and Landsat programs (both sole source procurements) have been operated and it should be clear that something within NASA’s instruction manual for dealing with big contracts is broke. Indeed one of the first pieces of slang I learned when I joined the space station program was” getting well” which as defined to me as what aerospace contractors did to offset the low bids they used to get contracts in the first place.

Solution: Quite simply, aerospace contractors need to wake up to reality and start to show some responsibility and honesty in the way they provide goods and services to the government. If such obscene cost overruns continue to plague NASA the net result may well be that there are fewer programs of such size to bid on. In addition, NASA’s Administrator has spoken of adding additional penalties for under performance. The easiest way to avoid making this situation worse is to be open and honest with NASA. It may not be the most savvy business advice, but telling NASA that it is wrong when NASA hasn’t done its homework, or that something will cost more than NASA expects it to up front, before the papers are signed, certainly is the ethical thing to do.

A look ahead: Years from now we may well see many aspects of space exploration being done as a private venture with less government participation. This will only happen if the government stops trying to do the operational tasks that private industry is best at doing. However, this activity will likely result only after prudent technological investments by government.

As such, it behooves aerospace contractors to start thinking big picture and long term – and that it may well take a lot more of their own money to” prime the pump” than has been the case in earlier space programs. It may well be beyond their traditional business radar horizon, but any serious expansion outward into the solar system is going to have to rely on more than just 3-5 year business plans.

The aerospace industry has to start to get a little more creative and figure out how an economy spanning multiple worlds is going to operate – and start to factor this into the way they do business – now.

Problem: Reluctant Scientists: Professional scientific organizations are at fault when they allow NASA to use ill – founded hype to sell programs. These organizations are also at fault when detractors of space research release incorrect information and no effort is made to set the record straight.

How many times have you heard members of Congress stand up and talk about the” cures” that NASA promises to develop in space. What” cures” are they talking about? NASA is only doing fundamental research in space. Sure,” cures” could result from this work, but in a decade as a space life scientist, I do not ever recall reading a proposal submitted to NASA wherein the intent was to develop a “cure” for anything.

None the less, do the professional organizations issue press releases to correct these remarks or offer background information on what the facts are? No. Do NASA’s life scientists? No. Instead, NASA and the science community sits there quietly and bask in the momentary good news (however incorrect) being thrown out on the airwaves with no thought of the consequences down the road when such predictions don’t pan out.

Conversely, when one scientific organization issues a report which attacks the scientific merit of another organization’s area of expertise (as the American Society for Cell Biology ASCB did this summer) do other scientific organizations stand up and actively defend themselves, the facts, and NASA’s research programs? No, Does NASA take on their critics armed with facts? No. Why? It seems that everyone hopes that people have a short memory and that this will all blow over. The net result: no meaningful dialog about the true potential of space based research ever seems to make its way into a public forum. This is hardly a solid basis to engender support for space based research. All we get is banter composed of sound bites and no follow – through.

The only time you see any overt movement on the part of scientists and engineers is when funding for their particular program or discipline is threatened. Then they howl in protest and trundle a few Nobel laureates up to Congress to set things right. Far too often however, such efforts often include suggestions that someone else’s budget get cut in order to preserve another. NASA’s science programs will not advance to their ultimate potential if the various factions involved only stand up to support their own disciplines. Support must be forthcoming from all aspects of NASA’s science programs in support of all of NASA’s science programs.

Solution: Professional organizations whose members are active participants in space based research or who are concerned with quality in government sponsored science need to overhaul their public information efforts. NASA should not be relied upon to be the only path whereby such information makes its way to decision – makers and the public. Members of Congress should be able to avail themselves of honest critiques of NASA’s research and the clear benefits that could result from such work.

When organizations or special interest groups attempt to dis – inform lawmakers, the news media, and the public, an effort should be made to take on these activities, and the claims made by detractors point by point. Conversely, when NASA attempts to inflate the scientific value of its programs, professional organizations should be able to rise above petty self – interest and take NASA itself to task. Incorrect information benefits no one.

Moreover, these organizations should expand their outreach beyond the boundaries encompassed by their own members and begin to communication the value of space based research to the general public. NASA needs to enlist the expertise resident within these organizations as it crafts its research and outreach plans.

A look ahead: Picture a website in 2010 dedicated to a space science topic – let’s say the search for life on Mars. To me, the ideal website would have a core goal of allowing any visitor to learn as much as they wish to learn about the search for life on Mars – of failures and doubts as well as successes and future plans. It would also let the visitor know how they can participate or support this research.

On that website you should be able to find clear details of all the missions to be performed as evidence of life is sought, when they will be launched, what they are designed to accomplish, what the importance of each mission’s task in the context of a larger plan of exploration. On that same website a visitor should be able to locate all of the societies and organizations whose interests overlap with the search for life on Mars. These websites should allow a visitor to tap the expertise of the organization’s members as well as learn how to become involved in this activity. This website should also point to the various legislative activities wherein national goals assessed and space research budgets are decided.

Finally, this website should link to sites which take credible issue with the science or the approaches being used so as to allow a visitor to be fully informed to the extent they wish to be informed. They should also openly solicit and post praise and criticism from those who visit and utilize the website. These websites should be developed hand in hand with video, radio, and print materials such that anyone, anywhere can learn whatever they want, whenever they want to. The responsibility for informing all sectors of the public of the value and status of space research is one held jointly by NASA and the scientists and engineers who work on these projects. Neither can do the task alone.

The more informed a citizenry we have, the better decisions all involved will be able to make. The more thorough the decision making process, the more solid the consensus. The more solid the consensus, the more empowered NASA will be.

We are not going to explore the universe with a disinterested and under – informed citizenry. Indeed, I suspect that there is probably some galactic law of evolutionary selection, which does not favor the expansion of an under – informed species out into the cosmos.

Problem: The press and bad news: The press is at fault when it focuses on all the things that go wrong at NASA while spend comparatively little time on what successes are achieved. Most reporters make an honest, consistent attempt to understand the topic they report on. Yet far too often I encounter reporters who are only quasi-informed about NASA and space exploration, often knowing only what is broke and who is to blame, not what works, and who is responsible.

Solution: NASA’s somewhat isolationist behavior, high technical content, and peculiar jargon often erect a cultural barrier which reporters are forced to scale – or breach. NASA’s Public Affairs Office and the fear of the press they instill in NASA employees does not help the situation either. None the less, this should not prevent a truly good reporter from tying to get the real story even if it takes extra effort. Reporters need to spend more time understanding the NASA peculiarities rather than dismissing them as being impediments. Being a former NASA employee, it is often infuriating to see things thousands of NASA employees do everyday misinterpreted and incorrectly reported by a lazy reporter with a deadline to meet.

With an ever-expanding universe of electronic communications, NASA’s ability to hold news in – good or bad – is going to be further eroded. NASA needs to get used to this – soon. Conversely, as evidenced on NASA Watch, the amount of information leaving NASA is going to be in an increasingly raw state begging for interpretation. Owing to the technical nature of what NASA does, one can easily be misled by facts.

In all of my contacts with reporters covering space, I have yet to meet one who, like myself, has reviewed technical and scientific proposals, participated in space station design reviews (regular and Congressionally – mandated), space mission manifest development, annual budget cycles, or payload interface specification development. Yet there is a horde of reporters out there reporting on these topics every week. This scares me. Since so much of what NASA is allowed to do derives from public perceptions, those responsible for shaping those impressions need to know a lot more about that which they profess to understand before they go off and tell people what they think is going on within NASA.

A Look Ahead: Johnson Space Center recently held a workshop for reporters to help them get ready for the International Space Station program. I would hope that this is just the first in a regular series of similar events. NASA should be looking to take this approach for all of its programs. Indeed, NASA ought to consider the journalist’s equivalent of Space Camp as a way to enhance the technical background of reporters covering space.

As we move outward into the solar system, the consumption and production of news is certainly going to follow. How is NASA going to handle interviews with astronauts from Mars? How will they read the morning paper? What happens when people on a space station or some planetary base decide that they will handle their own PR?

The expansion of the Internet and the Web across the solar system will be accompanied by the distribution and access anarchy which it seems to elicit from people. I predict that any attempt to regulate the flow of information in either direction will only happen as a result of constraints imposed by bandwidth and the speed of light – not on the basis of content. As such, it is time for NASA and the fourth estate to start figuring out how to make this work to their mutual benefit instead of their mutual distrust.

Problem: Xenophobia at NASA Public Affairs: NASA’s Public Affairs Office (PAO) is at fault by virtue of having become the de facto Propaganda Announcement Office with the singular role of preventing the release of damaging information. When bad news does get out, NASA PAO seeks to put the best possible spin on it. For information released voluntarily, NASA is often its worst enemy. I have seen far too many examples of amazing and exciting things NASA does” dumbed – down” for public dissemination. Instead of going out of its way to make the agency open to public scrutiny, NASA PAO seeks to keep the public out.

NASA PAO seems to have a mission focused only on purveying happy, positive thoughts. If you visit their Space Station or Space Shuttle websites, you’ll see that they post reader comments. Have you ever seen a comment in anyway critical of NASA? No – nor will you. When NASA put together its 40th Anniversary exhibits of pivotal events in NASA’s history, was there any mention of the Apollo 1 or Challenger accidents? No. NASA has become so xenophobic that it is incapable of admitting, much less dealing with any external criticism. Look at the way they craft their congressional testimony and you will get a regular reminder that they just can’t admit that they are at fault.

NASA’s greatest asset is its employees, civil service and contractor alike. Yet from the way NASA PAO overtly prevents them from acting as ambassadors to the outside world youŎd think they were guilty of some crime. Indeed, recent surveys done by NASA itself show that an overwhelming portion of NASA employees do not feel that they can speak out freely with out fear of retribution. When NASA contractor employees speak out, the fate is far worse.

When Jim Oberg, Ken Hollis, and Tom Hancock (a.k.a.” BitFlip”) exercised their constitutional right to free speech, and discussed NASA without PAO permission, they soon found their jobs in jeopardy such that they had to leave their jobs. These individuals spoke of nothing proprietary and often spoke and wrote things that made NASA look good.

Any organization, which is so eager to silence, those who do not agree with official agency dogma is an organization with a serious case of insecurity – one which is not in keeping with the best interests of its employees, its mission, or the taxpayers it is supposed to serve.

Solution: NASA Public Affairs needs an overhaul. This culture of hoarding and manipulating information has to end. Reporters should be viewed not as adversaries but rather, as intelligent individuals who respond to an open honest answer with an open honest story. PAO complains that reporters get their facts wrong yet PAO goes out of its way to shelter them from information as long as they can possibly get away with it. Small wonder that the press corps covering NASA holds the much the same general suspicions about NASA’s truthfulness as does Congress.

Given the nature of space missions, NASA is responsible for getting the news from immense distances and bringing it back to Earth. With such a role comes the temptation to control the flow of information. Instead of deciding what NASA wants people to hear, NASA should seek to provide them with what they want to know. When problems loom ahead, NASA should be the one who calls reporters with an alert. All too often, stories, which come out of NASA, get inflated out of proportion for silly reasons.

A Look ahead: The era when newsmakers made news, reporters covered it, and people read what reporters wrote are fading fast. With the advent of various electronic networks, the line between consumers and producers of news is already blurred. Look at what home video recorders have done to local news coverage. Now imagine what the world will be like when all of the low Earth orbit global telecommunications systems become operational. Today you can have a website with global access for $19.95 a month.

If NASA PAO finds NASA Watch a painful annoyance, imagine life in the near future, where a million people around the world decide to sit at their home computers (like I do) and” watch” NASA. If NASA adheres to its current xenophobic mindset and does not adapt to the fact that its information control is going to diminish, NASA will soon find itself increasingly consumed with reacting to events, instead of making them happen.

Problem: NASA employees: Its your agency: Fix it. The employees of NASA are at fault for not demanding better management. Despite the current Administrator’s admonition that NASA does not belong to its employees, the last time I checked none of the civil servants or contractors who work for NASA had surrendered any of their rights as taxpaying citizens. This includes their right to communicate their views in public and to their elected representatives. Moreover, as the actual rocket scientists who make the space program work, they should be expected to serve as NASA’s best outreach resources.

Alas, it is not so simple to stand up and speak out. Indeed, there is good reason not to speak out at NASA. Recent surveys taken by NASA itself show an overwhelming majority of NASA employees afraid to speak out for fear of recrimination

None the less, the people who make up the NASA family need to get much more active. If the employees of NASA do not care enough to take a risk and be heard, they have no right whatsoever to expect anyone else to do it for them. I am tired of hearing NASA employees complain in private but shy away from even the thought of doing something about their concerns.

A look ahead: Right now it is “career adverse” to speak out at NASA.NASA’s Administrator claims to support openness at NASA yet his shoot the messenger policy is still very much in place. Someone else will eventually run NASA. I would hope that this person would seek to overtly reverse this unfortunate policy as soon as they come onboard.

A NASA wherein each and every employee is tasked to be an ambassador not just for NASA, but for the exploration of space, would be a powerful motivating force in our society. It used to be that way back when people didn’t know any better than to be openly enthusiastic about working at NASA – and free to say so. I can predict that a NASA wherein this sad state of affairs is not rectified is one doomed to failure.

What vision for America’s space program do I see?

As I mentioned before, I am not at all certain what such a vision should be. In setting a vision and goals, care needs to be taken to set them close enough so that people stay focused on the task – and that they exert a personal relevance to all involved. President Bush might as well have picked the year 3000 when he said that American should be on Mars within 50 years. The goals and visions need to have practical as well a scientific relevance. They also need to fill what I call the” yearning component” within all of us. Looking back at Apollo can be illustrative but it can also be deceiving. That was then, this is now.

Personally, I would suggest that America commit itself to finding life elsewhere in the solar system – and then beyond. This will be done at first by robots. Yet I feel that it is inevitable, indeed and desirable that humans show up once the path has been blazed by machines.

Given recent discoveries on Mars, Europa and elsewhere I am all but certain that we’ll find it. NASA has recently begun a new research initiative – Astrobiology. In its broadest interpretation, Astrobiology seeks to understand how the universe organizes itself to form life, how life evolves, and how life, in turn, expands outward into the cosmos from its planet of origin. I cannot think of a better organizing theme for NASA as it turns 40. The popular vote is in on this topic. A simple glance at the top box office hits should make that abundantly clear.

NASA at 40 is an agency poised on the cusp of what it was and what it will become. NASA has lead humanity’s initial reconnaissance of the solar system and has hurled probes out into interstellar space. We now stand poised ready to take the next great step outward. This time we need to move outward with the full of intent of staying.

While technology does not yet exist to achieve the things we’d like to do, this is not the most difficult hurdle we have to clear. Rather, the hurdle we need to surmount is within ourselves and our ability to rise above the mundane politics of the day and reach for the stars.

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Keith Cowing is trained as a biologist and has a multidisciplinary background with experience and expertise that ranges from spacecraft payload integration and biomedical peer review to freelance writing and website authoring.

Cowing is editor and webmaster of NASA Watch, an online publication devoted to the free and uncensored exchange of information on space policy and NASA operations. This website is read regularly within NASA, Congress, and the global space community. As the editor of NASA Watch, Cowing has been interviewed by the Newshour with Jim Lehrer (PBS) and the BBC World Service, cited as a news source in Congressional hearings by the chairman of the House Science Committee, and profiled by Government Executive Magazine, Gannett News Service, MSNBC, and Florida Today.

Cowing is also webmaster of The Astrobiology Web, which is designed to be” an online guide to the living universe”. The Astrobiology Web has been cited for excellence and utility by a number of broadcast, entertainment, and professional media, including CNN, NPR’s Science Friday, OMNI magazine, New Scientist magazine, Scientific American Frontiers, Final Frontier magazine, The National Space Society, The SciFi Channel, and the official website for the recent film,” Contact”. In 1998, the Astrobiology Web was formally endorsed by the National Space Society.

Between 1990 and 1993, Cowing was a NASA civil servant and served as Manager of Pressurized Payload Accommodations at the Space Station Freedom Program Office (SSFPO). As part of his prime responsibilities, Cowing served as the Payload Accommodations Manager for the 2.5 Meter Centrifuge Facility, the Gas – Grain Simulation Facility, the Gravitational Biology Facility, and the CELSS Test Facility. Cowing also participated in all SSF design reviews held during 1990-1993, representing the interests of the scientific payload community. Cowing was also the SSFPO lead on biospecimen containment and was a NASA representative to the NRC Committee on Toxicology’s subcommittee on Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations.

Prior to his work at NASA, Cowing worked for the American Institute of Biological Sciences (AIBS) on NASA Life Sciences Division Peer review. Cowing also worked for the Universities Space Research Association (USRA) where he managed a subcontract in support of the NASA Life Sciences Strategic Planning Study Committee (a.k.a. the Robbins Committee). Cowing is also a former member of the governing board of the American Society for Gravitational and Space Biology (ASGSB).

After leaving NASA and returning to AIBS, Cowing managed various peer review contracts, including the FY 94 and FY 95 peer reviews for NASA’s Office of Life and Microgravity Science and Applications. Keith also had a senior management role in the AIBS review of 2,668 proposals for the Army’s 1994 Breast Cancer Research Project, the largest single peer review project ever performed by or for the Federal government.

Cowing has had several other” careers”. He has worked as a certified sign language interpreter for the hearing impaired at several universities and signed various speeches from the podium of the 1980 Democratic National Convention ; was an advance man, local organizer, and finance officer for Jerry Brown’s 1980 Presidential campaign and the 1982 Brown for U.S. Senate campaign ; taught biology and sign language on several college faculties ; and worked on the Space Shuttle Program at Rockwell International’s Downey.