Keith’s note: According to this GAO report: “Chief Information Officer Open Recommendations: National Aeronautics and Space Administration“: “NASA needs to take additional steps to secure the information systems it uses to carry out its mission, including improving its risk management program.” … “we recommended that the agency develop an implementation plan with time frames to update its spacecraft acquisition policies and standards to incorporate essential controls required to protect against cyber threats.” “NASA needs to better manage and track its IT resources” “In addition to GAO’s recommendations, the NASA Inspector General also has multiple open recommendations in the area of cybersecurity.”

Keith’s note: according to a new GAO report on NASA “Priority Open Recommendations“: “Dear Acting Administrator Duffy: The purpose of this letter is to call your personal attention to two areas based on GAO’s past work and three open priority recommendations, which are enclosed. Additionally, there are 45 other GAO open recommendations that we will continue to work with your staff to address. We are highlighting the following areas that warrant your timely and focused attention. Specifically: [More below]

Keith’s note: According to a GAO report Audit of Government Property for the Artemis Campaign: “As of February 2025, NASA had allocated over $26 billion in government property to contractors in support of six Artemis programs. Although NASA has policies in place to manage its government property, the Agency can strengthen its oversight by ensuring consistent application of those policies to decrease the risk of unnecessary costs and potential loss, theft, misuse, or destruction of government property.”

Keith’s note: according to GAO’s NASA: Assessments of Major Projects: “Most major NASA projects since GAO’s first assessment in 2009 have avoided significant cost overruns. GAO found that of the 53 major projects that have completed development or are currently in the final phase of development, 30 remained under the statutory threshold for reporting cost overruns. Specifically, these 30 project’s development costs did not exceed their baselined cost estimates by 15 percent or more. When a project’s overrun rises to this threshold, NASA is required to take certain steps. For example, it must notify congressional committees of the overrun and update the project’s cost or schedule plans. At the same time, Artemis and Artemis-related cost overruns are an increasing proportion of the portfolio’s overall overruns. Three Artemis projects account for nearly $7 billion of the total overruns—or almost half of the overruns collectively experienced by the 53 projects.”

Keith’s note: here we go again. A new GAO report: Cybersecurity: NASA Needs to Fully Implement Risk Management is out. Yawn. Once a year GAO, NASA OIG, or some other authoritative body does a review of NASA IT security and they come back and say that NASA is dragging its feet and not dealing with the ever-growing plethora of cyber events that confront us all. NASA writes a letter back saying yea, we’re sorry, I guess you are right but we have an action item to look into this. See you next year. Here are some examples of the past few years: (More below)

“The program has made progress, but the Artemis schedule poses challenges. Artemis II and III launches (planned for September 2025 and 2026, respectively): EGS is making progress refurbishing the Mobile Launcher 1 – the structure used to transport and launch key systems – and modifying elements to support crew during these missions. New capabilities are taking longer than planned, and the program has only limited time to address potential issues. Artemis IV launch (planned for September 2028): EGS has made some progress toward this mission, such as modifying facilities to accommodate processing and launching the larger Space Launch System (SLS) Block 1B launch vehicle. However, much work remains, some of which cannot start until after the Artemis III launch.” Full report NASA Artemis Missions: Exploration Ground Systems Program Could Strengthen Schedule Decisions

Keith’s note: From GAO: “Two pieces of NASA’s Gateway program—the first space station to orbit the moon—are scheduled to launch together in 2027. NASA is taking steps to ensure Gateway will be ready. For example, the program plans to update a cost and schedule analysis that will help determine whether the launch date is feasible. But this program also faces some significant challenges. For example, the mass of the pieces is too high. So, if it isn’t reduced, they might not be able to reach the correct lunar orbit once launched. We recommended documenting the Gateway program’s plans to address this issue to help ensure it can meet the planned launch date.” Full report: Artemis Programs: NASA Should Document and Communicate Plans to Address Gateway’s Mass Risk

Keith’s note: according to GAO Report Open Recommendations: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: “Since our May 2023 letter, NASA has implemented four of our nine open priority recommendations. … We ask your continued attention to the remaining five priority recommendations. We are not adding any new recommendations this year:

• To provide the Congress with the necessary insight into program affordability, ensure its ability to effectively monitor total program costs and execution, and facilitate investment decisions, the NASA Administrator should direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to establish a separate cost and schedule baseline for work required to support the Space Launch System (SLS) Block I Exploration Mission-2 (EM-2) and report this information to the Congress through NASA’s annual budget submission.11 If NASA decides to fly the SLS Block I beyond EM-2, NASA should establish separate life-cycle cost and schedule baseline estimates for those efforts, to include funding for operations and sustainment, and report this information annually to Congress via the agency’s budget submission.
• To provide the Congress with the necessary insight into program planning and affordability, and to decrease the risk of cost and schedule overruns, NASA’s Administrator should direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to identify a range of possible missions for each future SLS variant that includes cost and schedule estimates and plans for how those possible missions would fit within NASA’s funding profile.
• The NASA Administrator should ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations creates a life-cycle cost estimate for the Artemis III mission.
• The Administrator of NASA should fully define and document the role of the senior agency official for privacy or other designated privacy official in reviewing and approving system categorizations, overseeing privacy control assessments, and reviewing authorization packages.
• The NASA Administrator should ensure the NASA Senior Procurement Executive uses a balanced set of performance metrics to manage the agency’s procurement organizations, including outcome-oriented metrics to measure (a) cost savings/avoidance, (b) timeliness of deliveries, (c) quality of deliverables, and (d) end-user satisfaction.”

“Since 2023, NASA’s cumulative cost and schedule performance has improved. Cost overruns decreased from $7.6 billion in 2023 to $4.4 billion in 2024. Schedule overruns decreased from a total of 20.9 years in 2023 to 14.5 years in 2024. These decreases are primarily because two projects, the Space Launch System and Exploration Ground Systems, demonstrated their initial capability and left the portfolio. Previously, these projects accounted for $3.6 billion in cost overruns and each experienced delays of 4 years. … Regardless of their category, most of the projects in development did not experience annual cost growth or schedule delays since 2023. Specifically, 11 out of the 16 major projects in development did not experience cost growth in 2024, and 13 out of the 16 reported no schedule delays this year. … Five of the 16 projects experienced cost growth since our last report, which increased the development portfolio’s estimated overruns by $476.6 million. … In March 2024, NASA announced that it was canceling OSAM-1, a category 1 project with a history of poor cost and schedule performance. … NASA delayed setting cost and schedule baselines for the Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission, a category 1 project with a potential life-cycle cost of $8 billion to $11 billion.” Full report

Keith’s note: According to GAO: “NASA has made progress demonstrating key capabilities needed to support its Artemis missions. …Despite this progress, NASA still faces several challenges:”

• Ambitious schedules. In November 2023 (GAO-24-106256), GAO found that the Artemis III lunar landing was unlikely to occur in December 2025, as planned, given delays and remaining technical work. In January 2024, NASA adjusted the launch date to September 2026 to allow contractors time to complete a significant amount of remaining complex work.
• Artemis III mission cost. In December 2019 (GAO-20-68), GAO found that NASA did not plan to establish an official cost estimate for this mission. NASA concurred with a GAO recommendation to establish one but has not yet done so. While NASA requested $6.8 billion to support Artemis III programs in its fiscal year 2024 budget request, decision-makers have limited knowledge into the full scope of Artemis III mission costs.
• Acquisition management. NASA’s largest, most complex projects, including those that support the Artemis missions, continue to shape the agency’s portfolio. When these projects exceed their cost baselines and require cost reserves to meet their funding needs, it has a cascading effect on other projects. NASA officials are exploring ways to better manage this project cost and schedule growth.