MSFC Decides To Use Qualification Test Articles on First SLS Flight
Keith’s note: Sources report that NASA MSFC has concluded that accelerating hardware originally intended for EM-2 such that it could be used on EM-1 would not be ready in time. So they have decided to try and flight-certify qualification test articles for flight on EM-1 instead. The goal is to try and have an SLS vehicle ready to fly during Trump’s first term in office. Since 2018 is off the table that means 2019 and perhaps 2020. The operative word is “try”.
– NASA Decides Against Putting Crew On EM-1, earlier post
– SLS LOX Dome Dropped And Damaged Beyond Repair (Update), earlier post
– Newt Gingrich Thinks SLS May Become a Museum Piece – Soon, earlier post
– Earlier SLS news
If they can’t fly EM-1 before 2021, then SLS is in deep trouble anyway, for reasons that have nothing to do with Donald Trump’s ego…but also because of his ego. 😉
Good luck with that! Truly amazing what NASA can no longer do.
EM-1 is scheduled for 2019 anyway, so is what you’re talking about here: 1. EM-2 by 2021; or 2. EM-1 with crew by 2021?
Given they dropped one of em-1 tanks beyond repair this is talking about how to salvage em-1 to fly before 2021.
negative, it was one dome, and it was repaired
I am confused also. President Trump’s first term ends on January 20, 2021 at noon. EM-1 is currently scheduled for sometime in 2019, although the schedule continues to slip. Presumably, this is a prediction that not only will EM-1 make 2019, it also won’t make 2020 or even the first 19 and a half days of 2021. This is probably a pretty safe prediction, but if it comes to pass, also the end of the SLS fantasy exercise. Put a fork in NASA, they’re done.
In some ways wouldn’t this would be the same ‘all-up’ approach from the Apollo days, Jim Webb’s original idea (I think it was him)? there was a lot of discussion, many feeling that components should be certified individually before flight. And as I recall my NASA history (someone will have a better memory), the accelerated Apollo schedule was part of the decision.
No, not at all. During Apollo, there was plenty of money to build many copies of the hardware. There are websites which document all of the Saturn V’s built (including structural test articles). There were *a lot* compared to the extremely few copies of SLS currently being built.
Point taken. I was actually thinking of the policy of flight testing many pieces of hardware at the same time.
What I had in mind was the early Saturn 1B flights (AS-201, I think?), in which the heat shields were being tested at the same time that very early command modules – without hatches, for instance – were part of the stack. So little time was available, and that’s the parallel to SLS, which is experiencing a time squeeze in a way but from an entirely different source.
True, “all up testing” was often used by the Saturn program’s flight tests in order to save time. But that wasn’t always the case. The Saturn V’s third stage was the same as the Saturn IB’s third stage. This commonality allowed it to be flight tested before the Saturn V flew.
The discussion was basically between the aeronautical engineers (former NACA people), who traditionally did a large number of tests, each incrementally improving the flight envelope or vehicle capabilities, and the ballistic missile people (former Air Force or military contractors), who traditionally did a few, full-up tests of an entire rocket. I’ve even heard it described as the difference between flight tests (flights where you preform certain, specific experiments or tests) and test flights (where the flight, in and of itself, is the experiment.) I think Webb did weigh in on this, based on schedule, but he wasn’t the origin of the debate.
This SLS issue doesn’t seem like that to me. They haven’t changed the number of planned tests, either on the ground or in flight. They’ve decided to use parts built for a scheduled (and complete) ground test for a scheduled flight test.
Listening to a podcast talking about NASA this morning in the shower, I wondered: how will NASA be regarded by history?
Looking back from 2060 or 2100, can thoughtful historians focus on one or two or three predicate facts that account for the current state of the Agency – and that will drive its future?
In the 60s, Apollo was characterized as the largest research and development project ever attempted. Will NASA ever surpasses ApolloApollo only the beginning? Will STS and ISS and Constellation, be lauded or panned, overshadowing Hubble, Cassini, WFIRST, and COBE (the most significant single project NASA ever did, in my view)?
Does the story live in the halls of Congress, which, some feel, overstepped the bounds of oversight?
Is it an example of governmental ineptness? Can those on the right claim that ‘the free market’ can always do better? Are we blinded by the dazzle of SpaceX? And is the comparison with SpaceX really fair?
Or, stepping back, have we -all who are passionate about space – have we lost sight of the true objectives of mankind in space?
Is there a leadership vacuum? If so, where does it live- the WH, the Administrator?
Did the fractionalization of the Agency, spread over many Centers, have an appreciable contribution to our future-understanding of NASA?
Maybe the generally negative assessment given the Agency on these pages is just dead wrong. Perhaps great things are cooking in an Agency filled with great people (I’m unmovable on that last point, that the NASA employees as a group are top-tier and motivated public servants)?
As I won’t be there for most of those dates, a guess is just as good.
EDIT 6.9.2017: One more thing. Perhaps all of the NASA criticism is completely without merit, that NASA is doing just fine, thank you very much; and viewing the 2017-NASA from 2040, folks will wonder what the hell the fuss was about?
As a private citizen looking in at NASA, I see an organization that pioneered human space flight (Mercury, Gemini and Apollo) as well as beyond Earth exploration with early space probes (Mariner and Voyager.) NASA progressed into an organization that opened access to LEO for science and research (Sky Lab, space shuttle, ISS, Hubble). But now, I also see a NASA that is falling behind and giving way, as maybe it should, to private enterprises in the job of human space flight and potential commercialization of space itself. NASA was the trail blazer that passed the torch. Going forward, perhaps NASA should focus more on space science and robotic explorations, ala, Galileo, Cassini and Mars rovers. This is how I see NASA. Perhaps history will as well. Only time will tell.
They should robot the hell out of the Moon, Mars, and beyond. Incrementally more capable robots carrying out objectives in support of HSF. That should be a significant part of the “human” spaceflight program. Of course there should still be the space science robots, those are fantastic. But I’m thinking they can gradually advance capabilities looking toward bases, collecting raw materials, processing, building, etc. This is something that can go on continuously, much as the rovers continue to drive around (except with more launches surely), so cost is not too high.
Holy crap this program is a hot mess.
Look at the bright side. It isn’t a disaster waiting to happen.
As long as they try to try.
The logic involved in this decision reminds me of something, and that isn’t a good sign.
They decided to build qualification test articles which were not fully flight quality, test them, and then build full, flight quality items for the actual flight. That’s not an uncommon practice, and there are good reasons to do it that way. The people running the program must have thought this was the right way to go.
Now they have changed their minds, and are going to flight qualify the test articles and use them on EM-1. What changed to invalidate the original decision? It’s pretty clear the decision was motivated by schedule pressure and getting EM-1 off in 2019. But what about the engineering considerations which originally made them think the original plan was the best way to go?
Simply saying, in effect, “We just changed our mind about how important that is. Don’t worry, this puts us back on schedule and everything will be find.” is something NASA’s done before, and the results weren’t pretty.
I’m guessing that the decision was so far down in the weeds, as they say, that we won’t learn the thinking.
Unfortunately, issues like temperature sensitivity of O rings and foam debris shedding were pretty far down in the weeds, or were until something involving them went very, very wrong. That’s why I’m sensitive to an important step in the process.
In many cases, they (or we) decided that things should be done in a particular way, for presumably good reasons. Then, for some external reason, like schedule pressure, they decide to do something differently. A critical step is to have them explain the decision to someone else, someone who isn’t subject to that external pressure, show that the previous decision/plan was incorrect and needs to be changed, and have the outside reviewer say, “Ok, that makes sense.” I just worry that, in this case, they may have skipped that step. In fact, in the case of SLS I’m not sure if there are any outside experts who aren’t subject to the same external pressures.
Challenger began as a structural test article, which is why its flight number was 099 and not in the 100s.
The ‘all-up’ testing debate was primarily between the West Coast missile men (led by George Mueller, who made the primary decision) and the German rocket team, whose preferred approach can be seen in the Saturn I testing program: it’s first launch had inert upper stages. Both perspectives, however, presumed extensive individual component testing, something that was originally abandoned during Shuttle development (for cost reasons) in favor of ‘major assembly’ testing (entire engines, etc)…much to NASA’s and the program’s detriment.